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ABSTRACT
The aim of this study was to explore the experiences of people with chronic illness,
specifically ME (Myalgic Encephalomyelitis), also known as CFS (Chronic Fatigue
Syndrome), and stroke at a young age. It begins with an analysis of the meanings of
these conditions. The study then focuses on two key issues highlighted by a review
of the literature on chronic illness. These are, the effects it can have on identity, and
the ways in which sufferers cope. Much of the theory suggests some sort of
commonality of experience among people with different long-term illnesses. A further
aim of this study was, therefore, to examine this assumption.
Current theory largely uses medical, psychiatric or cognitive models to describe the
effects of chronic illness. This study adopts a social constructionist perspective, a
fundamental tenet of which is that meanings are made in interaction. Thus, chronic
illness, identity and coping are not static, measurable phenomena. Rather, they are
treated as something that people do in talk (Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998). Discourse
analysis, with its focus on the rhetorical function of language, provides the means
with which to examine this. There is very little published research using this
perspective or this methodology to examine either ME/CFS or stroke.
Participants were recruited via self-help groups. 49 people with ME and 10 stroke
sufferers were interviewed via email. Four face-to-face focus groups were also held,
comprising a further 7 ME sufferers, and 12 people who had had a stroke (with 5 of
their carers).
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Analysis focused on how sufferers constructed their condition, the effects it had on
identity, and the ways in which they coped. Both conditions were constructed as
serious, and poorly understood. However, only ME sufferers constructed their illness
as specifically not psychological or psychiatric. People in both groups oriented to the
problematic nature of sufferers' identity that arose from their accountability for
becoming ill, and for their inactivity. ME and stroke sufferers oriented to issues of
accountability for the ways in which they coped. People with ME emphasised their
previously high levels of activity, and their mental health, and thus oriented to specific
aspects of their construction of this condition. There was, therefore, some
commonality of experience among the two groups, in that their illness was associated
with stigma. In addition, constructions of identity and coping drew on particular
features of participants' own illness constructions. The study ends with a discussion
of practical implications for sufferers, health professionals, carers and researchers.
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The aim of this thesis is to explore the experiences ofME and early stroke from the
perspective of the sufferer. In particular, it examines the ways in which sufferers talk
or write aboutME and stroke, the effects these conditions have on identity, and ways
in which people might cope with them. A further issue of interest examined here is the
extent to which there is a commonality of experience among people who suffer from
different long-term illnesses. Traditional research into chronic illness has largely used
medical, psychiatric or cognitive models. This study adopts a social constructionist
perspective and uses a discourse analytic methodology.
ME and stroke are examined for two main reasons. The first is that in the chronic
illness literature, there is relatively little research into the ways in which sufferers
experience these particular conditions. The second reason relates to their similarities
and differences. This can be demonstrated by a brief description of the ways in which
these conditions have been defined:
ME is the preferred term among UK sufferers for an illness that is characterised
particularly by extreme and debilitating fatigue, along with other symptoms, such as
sore throat, headaches, muscle pain and problems with concentration. The effects of
ME vary in severity from day to day, and between ME sufferers. Prevalence in
Britain has been estimated at between 110,000 and 150,000 per annum (Cooper,
1997; Levine, 1997). More women than men have been reported to suffer from ME,
although some research suggests that this imbalance may be a reflection ofmedical
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referral patterns rather than actual morbidity levels (Lawrie & Pelosi, 1995). So far,
no biological cause has been found, and there is no established medical treatment.
There is some debate about the role that psychological or psychiatric factors may play
in this condition. This has implications for the extent to which ME is viewed as
medically 'legitimate'. The most commonly reported risk factor is the co-existence of
either physical or psychological stress (Levine, Wessely, Hotoph & Sharpe, 1999).
Stroke denotes the sudden death of brain tissue caused by disruption to the brain's
supply of blood. The initial stage can involve anything from mild confusion to
complete loss of consciousness for a number of days. Those who survive stroke -
35-40% die within the first month - may be left with moderate to severe neurological
impairments that can affect speech, sight, movement and memory. For many
sufferers, stroke results in overwhelming fatigue and/or depression. There is very
little in the way of medical treatment for stroke. The emphasis instead is on
rehabilitation, with the aim of regaining functional competence by means of repetitive
exercise. Prevalence in Britain is around 110,000 sufferers per annum. The rate of
recurrence is around 28,000 per annum (Ellis-Hill, Payne, & Ward, 2000). Although
it tends to affect older people, 25% of stroke sufferers are under the age of 65 (Pimm,
1997). Brain scans show that in 80% of cases, stroke is caused by the partial or
complete blockage of an artery leading into the brain, referred to as 'ischaemic stroke'.
The remainder are 'haemmorrhagic', caused by a pooling of blood around the brain
that causes pressure and subsequent injury. The causes of such disruptions to the
blood supply are not clearly understood, although a number of risk factors have been
identified. Stroke is more likely to happen to people over the age of 65, who smoke,
take little exercise, and have raised blood pressure (Pound, Bury, & Ebrahim, 1997).
Stroke and ME have many features in common. Their prevalence in the population is
similar. Both are chronic conditions, the causes of which are unclear. The impact on
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the sufferer varies from one individual to another. Fatigue and depression are
potentially significant factors in each illness. Symptoms and effects are not
necessarily visible to the outside observer. There is no medical or surgical treatment,
and prognosis is uncertain. The effects can be life-restricting and socially isolating.
ME and stroke also differ in two important respects. The first is that stroke, unlike
ME, is potentially life-threatening. It constitutes the third highest cause of death in
Britain (Ellis-Hill et al., 2000). The second it that ME's status as a medical illness is
less secure than stroke. Whereas the mechanics of stroke can be explained, and
verified using scanning techniques, the origins ofME are not clearly understood. This
has led some researchers to question the physical basis of ME, and to consider the
possible role of psychological factors in this condition.
Thus, ME and stroke can be considered similar in many respects, and at the same time
there are significant differences between these two conditions. Much of the research
suggests that there is a commonality of experience among people with different
chronic complaints. That is, the long-term nature of illness is the important factor,
rather than the condition per se. One of the objectives of this thesis is to examine such
an assumption. ME and stroke are sufficiently similar to explore the possibility of
common ground. However, they are sufficiently diverse to explore any particular
influence thatmight arise from the nature of the illness suffered.
Two aspects of sufferers' experience of chronic illness examined here are its impact on
identity, and the ways in which people cope. Research suggests that a significant
problem for people with ME is that others may not consider the illness to be legitimate
(Clarke, 2000; Cohn, 1999; Ware, 1992; Ware, 1999; Ware & Kleinman, 1992).
Thus, sufferers may experience a degree of stigma, and a negative influence on
identity. For people who have had a stroke, a particular difficulty arises from the fact
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that the responsibility for rehabilitation is on the patient rather than the clinician
(Kaufman, 1988; Pound et al., 1997). This raises issues of accountability, which
again can affect the sufferer's identity.
Coping with chronic illness has been conceptualised differently according to the
perspective used. Cognitive psychologists emphasise the processes that take place
within the individual, and describe these in terms of 'coping strategies' (Leventhal &
Benyamini, 1997; Moos & Schaefer, 1984; Shontz, 1975; Taylor, 1983). Other
researchers have suggested that adjustment to chronic illness requires the sufferer to
modify his or her biography, or 'life narrative', in order to make sense of what has
happened (Bury, 1982; Corbin & Strauss, 1985; Williams, 1984). Dealing with
chronic illness is not, however, simply done in isolation within the mind of each
individual sufferer. It involves living with the condition over a long period of time,
within a social and cultural framework. Therefore, the relationship of the sufferer to
other people is crucial in our understanding of the effects of chronic illness on the
sufferer (Goffman, 1963; Herzlich, 1973; Herzlich & Pierret, 1987; Radley, 1994).
Chronic illness has, broadly, been conceptualised as having a diminishing effect on
the sufferer's sense of self, either because of negative social reactions, or an increased
dependence on others (Kleinman, 1988; Murphy, 1987; Zola, 1982). An important
aspect of this is the individual's relationship with his or her body, which may come to
be regarded as an object beyond control.
In this thesis, I explore the ways in which sufferers describe what it is like to live with
ME, or with stroke. I work from a social constructionist perspective, using a form of
discourse analysis that also draws on techniques of conversation analysis, to explore
the ways in which people construct their illness, how it affects their sense of self, and
how they adjust to their condition.
4
OVERVIEW
The study begins with a literature review, in chapter 1. Research into chronic illness
is examined from three broad perspectives - psychological, biopsychosocial and
sociological. There follows a review of the literature on ME and on stroke in
particular. The social constructionist perspective on chronic illness is then discussed.
This provides a basis for a subsequent critique of the traditional psychological
perspectives on chronic illness with regard to the three key themes - definitions of
illness, identity, and coping. The chapter ends with a summary of the particular
research questions addressed in this study.
Chapter 2 describes the methods used in this study. This includes information on
recruitment of participants, data collection and analysis.
Analysis of data can be found in chapters 3-9. Chapter 3 deals with sufferers'
constructions of ME and chapter 4 with sufferers' constructions of stroke. In chapter
5,1 discuss issues of accountability that became apparent in focus group sessions in
which both stroke sufferers and carers were present. Chapters 6 and 7 discuss,
respectively, ME and stroke sufferers' constructions of identity. An analysis of ways
in which sufferers construct coping with ME and stroke respectively can be seen in
chapters 8 and 9.
Chapter 10 contains a summary of findings. It therefore recapitulates the ways in
which sufferers construct ME and stroke, the effects their illness has on identity and
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the ways in which they cope. Comparisons are made between data collected in focus
groups and via the internet There follows an evaluation of findings, and a discussion




This chapter presents the results of a review of literature in three broad areas. First,
the research into chronic illness in general is explored. It is here that we find the
theoretical and empirical foundations for approaches which suggest some commonality
of experience among those who suffer from different chronic conditions. Second,
there is a review of literature on ME. This is followed by a review of literature on
stroke.
In the review of chronic illness in general, three research perspectives are discussed.
First, the psychological literature was explored. Most of the psychological research
into chronic illness takes a traditional approach in which the emphasis is on the internal
workings of the sufferer's mind. This thesis takes a social constructionist approach, a
fundamental assumption of which is that social processes have a crucial role in how
we make meanings. There is, however, very little psychological literature on chronic
illness, ME or stroke, from this perspective. The biopsychosocial perspective
represents an attempt to encompass a broader view of chronic illness, and this is also
discussed. Finally, literature from a sociological perspective is explored for its
insights into the potentially social aspects of illness. In general, the literature suggests
that chronic illness can affect the sufferer's sense of self, and also his or her
relationships with other people, in particular with regard to the moral implications of
how people 'cope' with long-lasting conditions.
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The review then moves on to the specific conditions examined in this study. It quickly
became apparent that a key feature ofME is that this is a contested illness. In order to
provide some background to the issues at stake, a review was carried out of the ways
in which ME has been described and defined in the medical literature. A similar
review was carried out for stroke. This was initially done to provide some
consistency of approach across the two conditions. However, it was found that the
symptoms of stroke are, similarly, a matter of some debate. This literature is
important because of the implications for the ways in which ME and stroke are
understood by both sufferers and non-sufferers.
Three themes emerge from this literature review as areas of particular interest. The
first is that what it means to sufferME and stroke are contested, specifically in terms
of their causes, symptoms and effects on the sufferer. This has implications for the
ways in which these conditions might be treated. The second relates to the effects that
chronic conditions can have on the sufferer's sense of self. Third, the way in which
people cope with illness, and in particular chronic illness, has moral implications for
the sufferer that affect his or her relationships with other people. I will conclude this
chapter by discussing each of these themes in turn, and will show how they lead to the
research questions that form the basis of this thesis.
Before moving on to a more detailed discussion of the results of this literature review,
I will outline the particular strategies used in carrying it out:
1. Literature review - strategies
The effects of illness on the body have historically been conceptualised separately
from their personal and social consequences, with the result that these have come to
form quite distinct areas of study - respectively, medicine, psychology and sociology.
My view was that a broad understanding of the problems of chronic illness in general,
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and ME and stroke in particular, would best be gained by exploring the literature from
all three perspectives. Since my interest is in the psychological aspects of chronic
illness, it was with this literature that I started. An initial review suggested that there
were two particular areas of concern for sufferers: impact of chronic illness on identity
and how it is that people cope.
I then carried out a full literature search using three databases: the Web of Knowledge
(formerly known as the Web of Science'), BIDS IBSS and PsycINFO, covering the
period from 1st January 1995 - 31st March 2004.
I used the terms 'identity' and 'coping', and synonyms, as follows: 'self; 'cope';
'coping'; 'adjust'* 'adapt'*; 'change' and 'changing'. These were combined with
the following illness category terms: 'chronic and illness'; 'Myalgic
Encephalomyelitis'; 'CFS'; 'Chronic Fatigue Syndrome'; 'CVA'; 'Cerebrovascular
accident' and 'stroke'.
I gathered a large number of abstracts, and eliminated those that were not relevant to
the subject of this thesis. I then analysed the bibliographies in the remaining abstracts
in order to get some idea of the papers and books that were most commonly
referenced. I used this, and a reading of the abstracts, to identify those books,
chapters and papers to be read in full.
The perspective that I take in this thesis is social constructionist, and so I performed a
separate search in which I combined the illness categories, as noted above, with the
following terms: 'discourse'; 'construct*' and 'narrative'.
1 Here, the asterisk is used in truncation to denote the stem used in a word search. In this case, for
example, the search terms would therefore include 'adjustment', 'adjusting', 'adjusts' and so on.
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Some of my data were collected using the internet, and this led me to carry out a
further search in which I tried to find out about the issues that might arise as a result of
using this method of data gathering. I combined either 'internet' or 'email' with the
illness categories, as noted above, and the following terms: 'psychology and
research'; 'health and research'. The results of this review are reported in section 2:1
of chapter 2 which is concerned with the methodology of this research.
2:1 Literature review - introduction
Chronic illness is usually defined as illness that lasts 6 months or more. It is
important to note that many of the claims in the literature about 'chronic illness' in
general stem from work with specific groups of sufferers. There is therefore an
underlying assumption that the extended time span of conditions is, of itself, a feature
that draws together the experiences of people with a variety of different ailments. The
particular illnesses that are most commonly referred to in the literature are Rheumatoid
Arthritis (RA), Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD), Multiple Sclerosis
(MS) and coronary heart disease (CHD). In this thesis, I examine two chronic
conditions, with a view to exploring the extent to which sufferers' experiences are
similar, and areas in which they might differ. These conditions - ME and early stroke
- are also less well represented in the literature.
The review will be in three main sections. I will begin by discussing the literature on
chronic illness. I will then review the literature on ME, and finally stroke.
2:2 Literature review - chronic illness
The literature on chronic illness is reviewed from three perspectives. This section
begins with a discussion of psychological theory and research. It is followed by a
brief examination of the biopsychosocial approach to chronic illness. Finally, there is
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a review a body of research which adopts a sociological perspective on the study of
long-term illness.
2:2:1 Psychological perspectives on chronic illness
In the psychological literature, chronic illness is conceptualised as something that is
dealt with by the mind of the individual, even when implications for the sufferers'
relationships with others are acknowledged. This section starts with a description of
two types of theory which suggest that adjustment happens to a large extent at the
individual level. First, there are theories that have emerged from the perspective of
cognitive psychology, and which provide general hypotheses and models of the ways
in which people think about illness. Second, there are theories in psychology and
sociology that have developed from a close study of accounts of individual sufferers,
in which the aim is to describe the inner experiences of those with chronic conditions.
These theories suggest that chronic illness has some impact on the sufferer's sense of
self. At the end of this section, there is a brief discussion of an important criticism of
these approaches, which is that they take little account of the social context in which a
person is ill.
The cognitive view
Cognitive psychologists have proposed models to explain the ways in which people
adapt to illness in the long term. From this standpoint, the effects of chronic illness
can be examined in terms of individual cognitions and coping mechanisms. Thus, Lau
(1995) asked participants to describe 'illness', and from this he proposed that we have
specific 'illness cognitions' with the following characteristics. In a general sense,
illness is seen as an absence of good health. According to Lau, we realise that
something is wrong first of all when we feel different from the way we normally feel.
We recognise specific symptoms, and can often relate these to particular conditions we
already know about. We also have some notion of the usual consequences of different
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symptoms or conditions, and of their expected duration, or 'time-line'. Following on
from this, after a series of interviews with participants, Leventhal, Benyamini and
colleagues (1997) concluded that our illness cognitions provide us with cognitive
schemas, which enable us to understand the nature of different conditions. These
schemas are said to encapsulate information about illness in five categories, and these
categories have inspired a great deal of the subsequent research into chronic illness.
They relate to the identity of the illness, its causes, consequences, time-line (expected
duration), and finally the potential for the illness to be controlled.
Leventhal and Benyamini (1997) proposed a 'self-regulatory model', in which we are
said to deal with the onset of ill-health in three distinct phases. In the first -
'interpretation' - our illness cognitions form cognitive schema, which represent the
basis of an intellectual understanding of what is happening. These are mediated by
our mood or emotional response. In the second phase, we set about coping, and
broadly speaking, our strategies here have been categorised by cognitive theorists as
either 'approach' or 'avoidance'. Another distinction that has been made is between
'emotion-based', 'appraisal-based' and 'problem-based' coping (Moos & Schaefer,
1984). The third phase involves an appraisal of our coping methods. We are said to
move from one phase to another until we reach some sort of equilibrium.
Shontz (1975) also suggests that coping with illness is a process that can be broken
down into specific stages, and that the best outcome of this process is the development
of an ability to face up to the reality of the illness situation. Taylor (1983), however,
has challenged the notion that we cope better with illness if we are able fully to accept
the 'new realities' that it might entail. In Taylor's 'theory of cognitive adaptation', we
are said to cope best with threatening events - including illness - when we are able to
sustain beneficial illusions about our new circumstances. Thus, in a difficult situation,
we begin by trying to understand what has happened, and its implications, then we
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strive to gain some sense of control or 'mastery'. It is this feeling of control that
results in the self-enhancement that constitutes healthy adaptation.
Hagger and Qrbell (2003) carried out a meta-analysis of 45 studies in which illness
cognitions were correlated with coping strategies. They reported that avoidance and
emotion-expressive coping correlated with perceptions of a strong illness identity, a
chronic time-line and serious consequences. An example of avoidance coping is the
tendency to limp or use some kind of support in order to avoid the adverse
consequences of walking on, say, a damaged ankle. While this might be a useful
strategy at the initial stage of injury, there comes a point at which saving the ankle is
done at the expense of worse longer-term consequences, such as muscle wastage or
compensatory postural problems. Emotion-expressive coping describes a response
that involves the venting of feelings. Hagger & Orbell also report that problem-
focused and emotion-expressive coping strategies were correlated with perceived
controllability. Similarly, Penley, Tomaka & Wiebe's (2002) meta-analytic review
notes the superiority, in terms of health outcomes, of problem-focused coping, when
compared with distancing, seeking social support, avoidance and wishful thinking.
What is of interest in these studies is not the precise nature of these correlations, it is
the fact that different coping strategies have been identified, and that although there is
some debate as to the details, certain types of coping are associated with better
recovery.
When research into illness is carried out from a cognitive perspective, two
fundamental assumptions are made. The first is that we have each developed a set of
beliefs surrounding ill-health in general, as well as specific illnesses, and that we
somehow refer to this bank of knowledge as and when necessary. The second is that
illness constitutes a threat to our usual, that is consistent, mode of being. I will
critically discuss each in turn.
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The assumption that we have illness cognitions, organised as schemas, has led
cognitive psychologists to explore the ways in which we, as lay people, come to
recognise the medical categories into which our illnesses might fit. Such recognition
allows for a subsequent assessment of the likely causes of our illness, its
consequences, expected duration and capacity to be controlled. This notion has been
challenged by Ogden (2000), who suggests that the cognitive structures reported may
be an artefact of the methods used to examine them. Furthermore, in my literature
review ofME, I will show that illness categories are not the clear-cut starting point for
understanding that is implied in the cognitive perspective. In both the ME and stroke
literature, we can see a complex interaction between imputed causes, consequences
and illness identity. Furthermore, in these chronic conditions, there is little certainty
as to the illness duration or extent to which it can be controlled by the sufferer.
Herzlich (1973) also explored how it is that we come to recognise illness, and argues
that becoming inactive is a crucial determinant of this state. The physical body and its
limitations are central to our understanding of illness. If we become so ill that we are
unable to work, or to fulfil social obligations, this will have repercussions that impact
on our relations with the outside world. Thus, the capacity to carry out everyday
activities takes on a moral aspect. This was also noted by Pollock (1993), who found
that health was not always defined by her respondents as the opposite of illness, but
rather was seen in terms of enabling the individual to carry out mundane tasks, the
inability to do so being a marker of ill-health. As Williams noted in relation to
respondents with arthritis, "'sitting' and 'lying down' [to illness] were doing far more
than designating physical positions" (Williams, 1993: 104). One of the major
difficulties facing people with chronic illness is that their fitness for activity can vary
from day to day. This can mean that their condition is not always easily recognised or
acknowledged by others.
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Some researchers have gone beyond discrete, cognitive schemas to take into account
the social and cultural background in which people are ill (Mechanic, 1977;
Zborowski, 1952). Radley, for instance, argues that becoming ill is a thoroughly
social process, rather than being the unproblematic result of bodily changes:
"[s]ymptoms do not necessarily precede sickness; instead, being deemed to be sick is
an important element in appearing symptomatic" (Radley, 1994:71; emphasis added).
This stresses the crucial role that other people have to play in coming to the decision
that one is ill. That is, the state of being ill is not simply decided in the head of the
individual suffer but rather has to be acknowledged by others, in particular those in the
medical profession. Symptoms can only come into being as such if these are
recognised by people other than the sufferer.
The second fundamental assumption of the cognitive perspective is that health is a
relatively stable state, and that illness constitutes an interruption which drives us to
self-regulate until we reach equilibrium again. Self-regulation is thought to happen
within the individual, and its success is judged according to the method used. This
carries the implication that some types of coping are better than others, and that failure
to cope well can therefore be attributed to the individual. It also ignores the social
nature of illness. Radley, for example, makes the crucial point that "good adjustment
[...] is actually a quality granted by others. [It] does not spring ready-made from the
individual sufferer" (Radley, 1994: 158; emphasis added). He proposes a conceptual
framework in which identity and social relations interact with modes of adjustment, to
describe the ways in which people might, at different times, deal with chronic illness.
In this model, sufferers may resist their illness, accommodate to it, or find some
secondary gains that stem from their condition. Adjustment to chronic illness is seen
as an on-going activity that takes place not just in the mind of the sufferer, but in the
context of interactions with significant others:
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"[t]his calls into question the idea of coping as bringing to bear a specifiable
psychological mechanism upon a definite external difficulty. This view
assumes that these mechanisms have a stable form, like tools in a toolbox"
(Radley, 1994: 150)
Radley suggests that instead of looking at coping mechanisms, we should consider the
strategies that people adopt in the face of illness. The focus, then, changes from the
tools in the toolbox to the various things that people actually do when they have to deal
with chronic illness. This approach can be seen in the psychological research
discussed in the next section, the focus of which is on individuals' experiences and
accounts of how they deal with chronic illness.
The experiential view
Research into people's experience of chronic illness highlights two important features.
The first is that people suffering from chronic conditions seem to experience some
kind of disruption of the self-concept, and from this comes a need to find an
explanation for what has happened to them. This may require the sufferer to modify
the story of his or her life in order to make sense of events. The second is that illness
draws particular attention to the importance of the body in the individual's sense of
purpose or value. I will discuss each of these aspects in turn.
In relation to the first point, several writers have explored the ways in which illness
can affect the sufferer's sense of self. Charmaz (1983), for example, developed the
idea that chronic illness involves a 'loss of self. She suggests that the stigma of
illness leads to both a reduction in self-esteem and in the opportunity to have positive
relationships with others. After an initial crisis period in which sufferers refuse to
acknowledge that they have a chronic condition, they can come to terms with their
illness, and at that stage a 'reconstituted self emerges (Charmaz, 1987; Charmaz,
2000). In a personal account of his own illness, Murphy similarly writes about the
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effects of its onset in terms of "new and permanently altered feelings of who and what
I was" (Murphy, 1987: 5). For him, though, the illness became something separate
from the self. He describes initial feelings of incoherence and a need to regain some
sense of order.
Research from this perspective has focused on the ways in which people manage these
threats to their self-identity. A common strategy is for sufferers to make sense of what
has happened to them by incorporating it into their life story. This can be done, for
example, by means of 'narrative reconstruction*. In a content analysis of interviews
with people who suffered from chronic rheumatoid arthritis, Williams (1984) found
that these individuals constructed a new life narrative in order to reaffirm a sense of a
self with purpose. He argues that this is necessary because illness threatens the
sufferer's self-identity, and some kind of meaningful explanation for it is needed.
This was voiced by one of his respondents: "how the hell have I come to be like this?
Because it isn't me" (Williams, 1984: 175; emphasis in original). When participants
were asked "why do you think you got arthritis?", they offered a reconstructed
biographical narrative that constituted an attempt to make some sense of their
experiences. Bury (1982) has described the experience of chronic illness as
'biographical disruption', and notes that feelings of loss of value or of self, and lack
of control over the body, can influence not just the way the sufferer considers his or
her future life, but also past and present experiences. That is, the sufferer has to make
sense of the illness experience in the context of his or her whole life stoiy. The idea of
doing 'biographical work' was developed by Corbin & Strauss (1985; 1987), who
suggest that there are three specific areas to be addressed. The first is biographical
time, which can be thought of as an orientation to the way in which the story unfolds.
Second, the sufferer has to reconsider his or her concept of self. Finally, account
must be taken of his or her diminished bodily capacities.
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Riessman (1990) also studied chronic illness from the individual's point of view.
Using the framework of narrative analysis for her study, she found that her
respondent, a man with advanced multiple sclerosis, strategically used 'story-telling'
to maintain effectively those aspects of his identity that were important to his sense of
self. This was done, as she describes it, against the background of a biography
hugely disrupted by illness. Similarly, Pollock (1988) found that an important part of
sufferers' search for understanding of their illness involved an attempt to find out why
he or she in particular had become unwell. From her work with sufferers ofmultiple
sclerosis, she concluded that people who have chronic illness develop a 'working
mythology' to explain how their conditions came about.
These findings can be contrasted with claims from the cognitive psychological
perspective that sufferers refer to existing cognitive schemas relating to specific
conditions in order to understand what their illness is, how it was caused and so on.
They suggest that people with chronic conditions give meaning to their experience not
by reference to some schematic knowledge but rather by reframing their particular life
story so that the onset and progression of illness make some kind of sense.
The sufferer's relationship with his or her body has been referred to in the work of
Bury and of Corbin & Strauss. This is the second main focus of experiential research.
When we are in good health, we often pay little attention to our bodies. As soon as
we feel pain, or other effects of illness, it is as if the body comes into focus. Its
importance becomes central, and yet this is a time during which the sufferer is often
struggling to understand and come to terms with the physical changes wrought by his
or her condition. The body can become less familiar, and harder to control.
According to Lupton "illness may then be conceptualised as the body taking over, as
an external environment separate to the self (Lupton, 1994: 20). This idea of the
body as quite separate from the mind is possible because of the mind's capacity to
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alienate and objectify the body. As Plessner (1970) describes it, the individual is and
has a body. That is, we are embodied but this does not prevent us from thinking
about our bodies as something separate from our selves.
In the same way that cognitive theory can be criticised for its failure to take account of
the social and cultural background to, and implications of illness, research into
individual experiences often gives the impression that adaptation to chronic conditions
takes place solely within the mind of the sufferer. Adjustment to illness is
conceptualised in terms of working on the 'self, or on the relationship that the 'self
has to the body. There is, however, a great deal of research that emphasises the
importance of social interaction in the experience of chronic illness. In a personal
account, Zola (1982) describes how his condition, and the way it affected him, were
changed by the social context in which he found himself. When he lived and worked
with able-bodied people, he came to ignore aspects of his own disablement, because
of a feeling that limitations of the body reflected limitations of the self. Later, when he
spent time with similarly disabled people, he questioned the idealised self that he had
previously constructed in the framework of a fully-abled majority. Kleinman (1988)
has pointed out the extent to which the sick or disabled person is excluded from a
'healthist' society in which our bodies are expected to function and present normally.
He suggests that the capability of the body affects the value attached to the
psychological self. Thus, when the body fails, in the judgement not just of the ill
person but of others, the person feels him- or herself to be a failure.
People who are chronically ill have to make sense of their experience in a social
context, in which the meanings given to illness, by the sufferer and by others, are
significant (Bury, 1988; Bury, 1991). That is, the sufferer's interpretation of his or
her situation is not necessarily shared by others, a situation that Bury describes in the
phrase 'meanings at risk'. This puts the person with chronic illness in a potentially
19
difficult position with regard to others. Williams (1993) suggests that people with
chronic conditions constantly have to strive to gain the understanding and positive
regard of others with respect to the way they adjust to or deal with their illness. He
refers to this as the 'pursuit of virtue'. A similar process was described byWiener
(1975), who found that respondents with rheumatoid arthritis used a variety of
methods to deal with the uncertainty of illness. Thus, at times, they strategically
passed themselves off as in good health, and at others they acknowledged their
incapacity, according to the circumstances. The important point here is that these
strategies are performed in a social context and relate to the individual's interactions
with other people. In section 2:2:3,1 discuss theories and research in the sociological
literature that explore more fully the potentially problematic relationship of the
chronically ill person with others in society. I will first give a brief account of the
biopsychosocial perspective on chronic illness.
2:2:2 The biopsvchosocial perspective on chronic illness
A review of the medical literature shows that there have been moves to broaden the
scope of enquiry into illness beyond individual, biological and physical aspects, to
include social factors in the experience of illness. This can be seen as an
acknowledgement of the importance of society and culture on the experiences of the
individual with a chronic condition. These issues will be discussed below.
From the medical perspective, the body has historically been the primary focus of
attention in the study of illness. This is described as the 'biomedical' approach. In
acute, epidemic diseases, such as measles and polio, such an approach was valuable in
helping to identify the specific organisms that caused illness. However, in the case of
chronic illness, there is much less certainty about causes, and illness has to be lived
with in the longer term. The medical perspective on illness has, therefore, moved
towards a 'biopsychosocial' approach. This concern to take account ofmore than the
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biological and medical aspects of illness can be seen in efforts to refine the definitions
of terms relating to chronic conditions. Thus, the World Health Organisation (WHO)
has provided suggested classifications aimed at distinguishing between the physical,
and measurable, effects of illness, and the ways in which these effects influence the
relationship of the sufferer to non-sufferers in society (Wood, 1980). The WHO
suggests that the term 'impairment' should be used to refer to any loss or abnormality
of bodily structure or function. This, then, denotes the merely physical aspect of
illness. Impairment, for example the loss of a leg, might lead to some restriction in a
person's ability to perform physical activity in the normal manner. This is referred to
by theWHO as 'disability', and therefore describes the functional impact of an injury.
When disability results in disadvantageous treatment in society, the result is
'handicap'. This would describe the situation of, for example, a person who is denied
access to a building because he or she cannot negotiate entrance steps. According to
the WHO definition then, handicap does not reside in the person, but in the ways in
which he or she can live in society.
TheWHO classification demonstrates a move away from treating the effects of illness
as purely within the individual. However, it is not straightforward in its use. To
describe someone with chronic illness as impaired, disabled or handicapped can
involve a large degree of judgement (Bury, 1997). Impairment is not always visible to
the outsider, and the sufferer cannot therefore assume that others will acknowledge
this state of affairs. The term 'disability' is meant to signify a bias-free description of
the effect of impairment. However, it is defined as the inability to perform actions in
the normalmanner, which inevitably implies some value judgement as to the correct
way in which actions should be performed. When it comes to considering handicap, it
is important to remember that the same disability is likely to affect different people in
different ways. It is, therefore, crucial to take into account the sufferer's own
experiences of the limits imposed by his or her condition.
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A number of writers have suggested that the descriptive terminology should reflect the
differences between the physical and individual, and the social aspects of being
unwell. Thus, Kleinman (1988) suggests that the term 'disease', like 'impairment',
should be used only to denote the biophysical impact, while 'illness' should be used to
refer to the ways in which the individual, in the social setting, deals with his or her
condition. Similarly, Radley (1994) suggests that 'sickness' should be used to denote
the social implications of illness. Bury (1988; 1991) also distinguishes between two
separate meanings of chronic illness. The physical and real effects are described as
distinct from the cultural and social significance attached to the particular condition
suffered. Thus, it is possible to feel unwell, in a physical sense. However, to be 'ill'
or 'sick' depends on legitimisation from others and this will vary between social and
cultural contexts.
These attempts to define what is meant by illness all suggest an awareness of the
importance of the wider social context. I will now discuss research that takes the
wider social context as the starting point for studying chronic illness.
2:2:3 Sociological perspectives on chronic illness
The last section of the literature review on chronic illness describes a body of research,
mainly from the sociological perspective, that has explored the ways in which illness
affects the sufferer's relationships with others. In particular, it will be seen that
coping with illness has moral implications and that these are crucial for the ways in
which the person with illness interacts in society.
In his influential book 'The Social System', Parsons (1951) explores the relationship
between the sick and society in general. He suggests that those who are unwell adopt
the 'sick role', which confers on them both rights and obligations. Such people are
not held responsible for their situation, and are excused their normal duties as long as
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they want to get better. This should be demonstrated by appropriately seeking, and
co-operating with, medical help. In this classic model, the notion ofmotivation - not
just to get better, but also to be ill in thefirst place - is crucial. Furthermore, the
physician's role involves re-socialising the person who is sick, by enabling him or her
to return to normal duties. Although Parsons assumed that the process was beneficial
to society as a whole, this model casts clinicians as one of society's mechanisms of
control. Other writers have explored this role further. Turner (1992), for example,
notes that the rising status of medical science in western cultures has coincided with a
decline in the importance of religion in everyday life. He claims that this has led to a
situation in which medicine has an increasingly moral function in society. Radley
(1994) similarly points out the role of doctors as gatekeepers to social goods. He
describes how, with the introduction of laws relating to sickness benefit, doctors
began to be responsible for assessing individuals' fitness for employment, and
entitlement to payment when unable to work. This research suggests that the medical
perspective on illness is one that carries with it a certain amount of status and power.
Parsons's sick role theory has been challenged, and a useful critique can be found in
Turner & Samson (1995). One point of particular relevance to this thesis is that we do
not all act in the way described by Parsons. People in financially privileged social
groups have been found to present more often in medical clinics, although they suffer
less illness than those in poorer groups (Townsend & Davidson, 1982). This
suggests that social, as well as biological, considerations should be taken into account
when we are looking at who might adopt the sick role. Furthermore, the status of the
sick person in Parsons's framework depends on whether he or she adequately fulfils
the requirements of the sick role. A fundamental duty is that the patient should get
better, and this means that admittance to the sick role is assumed to be temporary. It
cannot, then, easily be applied to people with chronic illness. Rather than speaking in
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terms of access to the sick role, their needs would be more in the nature of a renewable
season ticket, allowing them to come and go as their condition changes.
Freidson (1970) developed the notion of entitlement to the sick role, by distinguishing
between those who might, and those who would never get better. The latter
represents those who are chronically ill with no prospect of improvement, and
Freidson suggests that these people have an unconditional right to adopt the sick role.
However, access to the sick role is not automatic for those whose illness is variable
and whose condition might potentially improve.
Parsons's work draws attention to the ways in which being unwell can affect the
person's relationships in society. Goffman (1963), in his exploration of the
stigmatising aspects of illness, proposes that a person's identity can be 'spoiled' by
the negative reactions of others. He suggests that such reactions are based on social
stereotypes, so that the individual is not seen as an individual, but as a member of the
category of people with illness. It is often in the sufferer's interests, therefore, to
conceal or play down the impact of his or her condition. The chronically ill take on the
difficult social tasks of appearing to 'cope' with their situation, while hiding their
discomfort. People who succeed at these skills tend to be admired and treated with
compassion. Those whose illness is chronic must perform them repeatedly over time
to deserve this treatment (Radley, 1994).
The above research points to the social implications of, and for, chronic illness. These
are described by Herzlich & Pierret, who propose that "it is the individual who is sick,
but he [m'c] is sick in the eyes of society, in relation to it and in keeping with the
modalities fixed by it" (Herzlich & Pierret, 1987: 11; emphasis added). The last point
is particularly important, because of the implied effects that social responses can have
on the ways in which illness is presented, and even on the nature of illness itself.
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I have discussed the ways in which chronic illness is conceptualised from three
perspectives - the psychological, the biopsychosocial and the sociological. Two
particular psychological approaches - cognitive and experiential - have been used to
research chronic conditions, and I have argued that they stress the role of individual,
internal factors and have largely neglected the social context in which people make
sense of and manage their illness. The biopsychosocial perspective represents an
attempt to integrate individual experience within a wider social framework, and the
value of such an approach is demonstrated in research undertaken from a sociological
perspective. The literature discussed so far assumes that some commonality of
experience stems from the extended timespan of different chronic conditions. In order
to explore this possibility, it is now necessary to examine the literature on the
particular illnesses studied in this thesis - ME and stroke.
The review of chronic illness literature suggests that the social and cultural context is a
crucial starting point for an examination of sufferers' experiences. Medical science
has been shown to play a particularly important role in legitimising illness, and
therefore the reviews ofME and stroke literature will begin with an examination of
how these conditions are clinically defined. The aim is not to reify clinical definitions,
but rather to present them as part of the wider cultural context in which people with
ME and stroke experience their illness. An exploration of the history of these
conditions then sets the clinical definitions in a wider historical context. The reviews
ofME and stroke literature end with a discussion of the ways in which these
conditions are currently treated.
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2:3 Literature review-ME
2: 3:1 Definitions ofME
ME is the shortened form of 'Myalgic Encephalomyelitis'. Myalgia denotes muscle
pain, and encephalomyelitis signifies an inflammation of the brain and spinal cord.
Thus, the term 'ME' is used to convey symptoms that are associated with a particular
physical impairment Several causes have been investigated. For example, studies
have been carried out into the possible role of viruses, of the immune system, toxic
exposure, and dysfunctions of the hypothalamic pituitary gland (Pizzigallo, Racciatti,
& Vecchiet, 1999). Although there is some research to support these hypotheses
(Komaroff & Buchwald, 1998), no-one has yet been able to provide reliable,
replicable evidence as to what might bring about this condition, and this has led to
some debate about whether this illness has physical or psychological origins. The
notion that the two can be separated is itself a contentious matter, and one to which I
will return later. The most commonly reported risk factor for ME is the co-existence
of either physical or psychological stress (Levine et al., 1999).
Stress has been suggested as a possible explanation for many types of chronic illness.
Efforts have been made to find cause-effect links between specific external stressors
and particular bodily symptoms, although illness may itself be a stressful experience
so that the links become hard to distinguish. Furthermore, there is uncertainty as to
which particular aspects of life might cause harmful stress. Some researchers claim
that specific life events can be given a score for their potential stress-causing capacities
(Holmes & Rahe, 1967). This suggests that the capacity for causing stress resides in
the event itself and not in the individual's particular response. Other researchers point
to the deleterious effects of long-term but more minor niggles (Pearlin, 1989). A
problem with these views is that specific 'stressors' appear to act differently
depending on the person affected. One implication of the suggestion that stress might
cause ME is that the sufferer can then end up being held to account by others for his or
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her condition. If it is known how people can reduce the risk of illness - for example,
by avoiding stress-inducing situations, or by coping better with them - there may be
some implication that those who have succumbed are, to an extent, responsible. There
is, for example, a reported association between avoidance coping and the onset of
fatigue (Afari et al., 2000).
Naming this condition is problematic. The term 'Myalgic Encephalomyelitis', which
is generally preferred by UK sufferers and their support groups (Jason, Eisels, &
Taylor, 2001), suggests a specific physical pathway (muscle pain resulting from
inflammation in the brain and spinal cord). Since this is, as yet, medically unproven,
the term 'ME' has been largely rejected in the biomedical literature in favour of the
description 'Chronic Fatigue Syndrome' or CFS (Holmes et al., 1988), which defines
the condition purely in terms of its symptoms. That the terms 'ME' and 'CFS' have
different implications can be seen in another paper published by Jason and colleagues
(Jason, Taylor, Plioplys, Stepanek, & Shlaes, 2002). They found that while medical
students perceived CFS to be a serious illness, they rated it less so than ME. Since
this research explores the ways in which sufferers construct their illness, I will retain
the term ME, except where I am explicitly referring to literature in which another term,
such as CFS, is used.
One consequence of the failure to identify a physical cause is that it has not been
possible to establish agreed, reliable, biological markers forME. This means that it
cannot be diagnosed by orthodox medical tests - for example blood sampling, urine
analysis or scans. In the absence of such tests, the symptoms ofME have a special
significance, because it is solely on the basis of reported symptoms that a diagnosis
can be made. There is general agreement that the most important characteristic is
fatigue, but not about the definition of this term, in particular the potential links
between tiredness and depression. Fatigue is a noted symptom in many psychiatric
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disorders, so that when it becomes chronic and incapacitating, medical practitioners
are alert to the possibility that the illness is not necessarily physical. While some
writers do claim that the tiredness is of peripheral, or neuromuscular origin (and refer
to it as 'muscle weakness' rather than fatigue) (Komaroff & Buchwald, 1998), others
stress the role of psychopathologies (David, 1991; Sharpe etal., 1991). Wessely, for
example, argues that the source ofmental fatigue and neuropsychiatric symptoms,
such as poor concentration, cannot be neuromuscular, and that "cognitive (conscious
thoughts), attributional (beliefs about illness), and behavioural factors play a crucial
role in determining outcome and mediating disability" (Wessely, 1996: 213). For
example, research suggests that sufferers avoid activity because they believe they are
incapable, but that this belief is not bome out by objective measures of effort such as
pulse rate and observed symptom severity (Silver et al., 2002). This of course implies
that external observers are better judges of the sufferer's fatigue than the individual
him- or herself. Some of the research suggests that sufferers' failure fully to
understand their capabilities can be explained in terms of their overly high expectations
(Metzger & Denney, 2002). Furthermore, this tendency has been linked to an
excessively active pre-illness lifestyle thought by some to contribute to the onset of
ME (Van Hudenhove, Neerinckx, Onghena, Lysens, & Vertommen, 2001).
The standard medical strategy when an illness is symptom-based, is to produce a
research definition that might ultimately lead to the development of a clinical case
definition. Such definitions arise from a consensus formed on the basis of
discussions among a number of clinicians who have recognised expertise in the
particular illness. The research definition provides a list of necessary and sufficient
symptoms that is designed to identify sufferers as a homogenous group, and also to
distinguish the condition in question from other symptom-based illnesses. Once this
is done, the theory is that large-scale, epidemiological studies can then be made of
those people whose symptoms match those in the definition. The point of such
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studies is to look for patterns in the data from large numbers of sufferers that might
enable a case definition to be made, and also shed some light on the possible causes of
the illness, and potential treatments. Research and case definitions, then, are the
clinical route to ascertaining what constitutes a particular condition, and who is
deemed to be a sufferer. In the case of CFS, efforts have been made to produce a
research definition to guide an exploration of this illness in order that a case definition
might later be made.
The difficulty in coming to a workable, agreed research definition of CFS has centred
around the potential contribution to the illness of psychiatric or psychological
problems. The history of some of these endeavours is briefly outlined below. The
first case definition was produced by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention
(referred to as the 'CDC definition') in 1988. The 'Oxford definition' followed in
1991, and then a 'revised CDC definition' was published in 1992. 1994 saw the
publication of the 'international definition' of CFS.
It is worth noting at this point that new research definitions do not supersede previous
ones, and that any definition can potentially be drawn on for the purposes of studying
this illness. Although there are "strong proponents of the ME concept who still swear
by the original CDC definition" (Ranjith, 2003: personal communication), it is the
Oxford criteria and the 1994 definition that are most frequently used in the UK
(Whiting et al., 2001). The 1994 definition was produced by an international team of
researchers, and therefore its influence is the most widespread.
An international study suggests that research definitions have not yet succeeded in
identifying a homogenous group of sufferers (Wilson et al., 2001). They propose a
sub-stratification within the definition, but note that there is no consensus as to the
basis upon which this might be achieved.
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The CDC definition (1988')
The original consensus research definition for CFS was produced by a team of 16
researchers for the American Center for Disease Control and Prevention (also referred
to as CDC) (Holmes et al., 1988). It was produced at a time when clinicians thought
that the most likely cause of CFS was some sort of infectious episode, and this can be
seen in the proposals that emerged. The main criterion for inclusion as a sufferer is
new onset of debilitating fatigue lasting 6 months or more. To be diagnosed with
CFS, an individual has to have at least 8 of the 11 noted symptoms, or 6 symptoms
and 2 out of 3 physical signs. Physical signs refer to those effects of the illness that
can be observed by the clinician, and they must be verified on at least two occasions,
at least one month apart. They are low-grade fever, non-exudative pharyngitis (dry,
inflamed throat), and palpable axillary lymph nodes (swollen glands). Symptoms
include sudden onset, generalised muscle weakness, prolonged post-exertional
fatigue, and a list of neuropsychological complaints, among which are forgetfulness,
confusion and mild depression. An important aspect of this research definition is that
diagnosis of CFS can only be made if the above criteria are met in the absence ofother
clinical conditions - medical and psychiatric - that might produce similar symptoms.
With this definition, therefore, CFS would not be diagnosed as the cause of fatigue in
someone who has a diagnosis of any kind of psychiatric complaint, other than mild
depressive illness.
The Oxford Definition (19911
Sharpe (1991) argued that the CDC definition's requirements to exclude all psychiatric
conditions, other than mild depression, was both premature and unnecessary, when so
tittle was known about this illness. He headed up a multi-disciplinary group of 26
British researchers comprising not only medical clinicians, but also psychiatrists. This
group produced what is referred to as the 'Oxford' (UK) definition of CFS (Sharpe et
al., 1991). Among the changes they made was to restrict the psychiatric complaints
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that would exclude a diagnosis of CFS to a small number of distinct conditions:
schizophrenia, manic depressive illness, substance abuse and eating disorder. This
meant that patients having any other psychiatric symptoms could, using this definition,
be included in research into CFS.
The revised CDC definition 119921
In the following year, two American bodies, the National Institute ofMental Health
(NIMH) and the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Disease (NIAID) held a
workshop whose aim was also to review the original, CDC case definition. A series
ofmodifications was proposed (Schluederberg et al., 1992). The authors, two of
whom - Komaroff and Straus - were involved in the original definition, suggested that
it was not workable in practice, and that only people with psychotic illness should be
excluded. Psychotic illness can be described as illness resulting from mental
disorders, which interferes grossly with the sufferer's capacity to meet the ordinary
demands of life. Thus, their revisions are similar to those suggested in the Oxford
definition. Schluederberg and colleagues also recommended that a psychiatric
interview be carried out with people at the point of diagnosis, so that any subsequent
interaction between psychopathology and CFS could better be assessed.
The international definition 119941
Katon & Russo (1992) argued that the required number of symptoms and signs
needed for diagnosis of CFS in the original, CDC case definition was too high. The
CDC definition requires sufferers to have 8 out of 11 symptoms, or 6 symptoms and 2
out of 3 physical signs before being diagnosed with CFS. Katon & Russo note that
research has shown a positive, linear relationship between anxiety and number of
physical symptoms. Therefore, they argue, to insist on a minimum of 6 symptoms
will lead to the over-representation in research of relatively anxious people. This,
paradoxically, is contrary to the aims of the original definition, which, with its
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emphasis on physical signs and symptoms, seeks to exclude people with
psychological problems.
In 1994, two years after Katon & Russo's paper, a further revision was proposed by
the International Chronic Fatigue Syndrome Study Group (Fukuda et al., 1994). This
group comprised, among others, Komaroff and Straus - who were involved in the
original CDC definition, and the 1992 revisions - and Sharpe, who was first author of
the Oxford definition. The authors note the great difficulty they had in coming to an
agreement, and that indeed the revision constitutes a compromise rather than a
consensus. The 1994 definition significantly reduces the inclusion criteria to 4
symptoms (out of a possible 8), although tiredness on its own can be diagnosed as
'idiopathic chronic fatigue'. In the original definition, if there are fewer than 8
symptoms, sufferers have to have specific, medically verified, signs of illness.
Fukuda and colleagues argued that the identification of signs was unreliable because it
did not involve objectively measured tests, such as might, for example, be provided
by a blood assay. In this revision, then, there is no requirement to show physical
signs.
We can see then that there has been some difficulty in coming to an agreed research
definition for CFS, and that many of the difficulties in coming to a consensus relate to
the relative importance of physical symptoms and psychological factors in the
diagnosis of this illness. That this is an issue of wider concern is demonstrated
below.
The physical versus psychological debate
The controversy over the extent to which ME or CFS can be explained in physical or
psychological terms can be demonstrated in official statements about this condition.
These reflect an underlying assumption that 'real' illness is physical, and by
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implication, not psychological. In 1987, the British government, in conjunction with
an ME charity, instituted a Task Force to look into this illness. Its report, published in
1998, acknowledges that the illness is "a condition which some believe does not exist
as a true disease" (Campion, 1988: 78). The Royal Colleges also produced a 'Report
on Chronic Fatigue Syndrome' in which it is stated that "some doctors still dismiss the
patient's symptoms with such phrases as 'pull yourself together'" (Royal College of
Physicians, 1996: 15). The editorial reaction in the 'Lancet' to the Royal Colleges'
Report - "psychiatry has won the day for now" (Horton, 1996) - reflects the ongoing
'physical versus psychological' debate. In 1998, Sir Kenneth Caiman, then Chief
Medical Officer for England and Wales, gave assurances in the media that CFS is
indeed "a real entity" (Wilson, 1998: 17).
This debate has implications for people who suffer from ME. It has been reported that
psychological illness carries with it the stigma that the sufferer might be in some way
to blame, whereas physical illness is commonly perceived to be beyond the control of
the individual (Kirmayer & Robbins, 1991). Wessely suggests that both physicians
and many CFS patients regard psychosocial problems, such as depression, as
"imaginary, malingered or non-existent" (Wessely, 1997: 25). An extract from the
jacket cover summary of a recent book, entitled 'Theater of disorder: Patients, doctors
and the construction of illness' and published by the Oxford University Press, gives
some indication of the potential for stigma with this condition :
"In recent years, many Americans have claimed to have multiple personalities
or recovered memories, or to have been abused by satanists or extra¬
terrestrials. At the same time, disorders like chronic fatigue syndrome and
'total allergy syndrome' have been on the increase."
(Wenegrat, 2001: jacket cover)
Research suggests that people who have ME are often stigmatised because their illness
is not held by others to be legitimate (Clarke, 2000; Cohn, 1999; Ware, 1992; Ware,
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1999; Ware & Kleinman, 1992). People with ME may, therefore, deny any potential
association between psychological factors and their experience of illness. Indeed, one
piece of research found that ME sufferers are less likely than people with multiple
sclerosis to interpret their symptoms in terms of negative emotional states (Dendy,
Cooper, & Sharpe, 2001).
It is not only the definition ofME that has been contested. The history of this illness
has also been the subject of some debate:
2:3:2 History ofME
Cohn (1999) has argued that there is no single, undisputed history ofME but rather
that its possible antecedents have been reported in a strategic manner, depending on
the perspective of the author. Some, for example, claim links with neurasthenia. This
describes a weakness of the nerves and nervous exhaustion, with a presumed
neurological basis. Neurasthenia was first described in the late 1860s (Beard, 1869),
and it was held to be a physical reaction to the extra demands put on people who were
living in a time of unusual technological change. For example, the introduction of
such advances as trains and telegrams was thought to have contributed to a general
quickening of the pace of life, which caused some people to have a nervous, physical
reaction. The analogy used at the time was one of a store of energy resources being
depleted by the extra demands of everyday life, and the advised treatment was rest.
Some writers have suggested that the construct of 'neurasthenia' was later gradually
broken down into various affective, psychiatric disorders (Ware & Kleinman, 1992).
Another illness thought by some to be a forerunner ofME is Da Costa's Syndrome, or
'effort syndrome'. Like neurasthenia, it was thought to be induced by environmental
stress, though of a more extreme type. It was first found in soldiers who had fought
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in the American CivilWar (Wood, 1994). Da Costa's Syndrome has been compared
to modem 'burnout' theories (Freudenberger & Richelson, 1980) in which physical
exhaustion is thought to result from a sustained period of environmental stress. By
the 1940s, Da Costa's syndrome had been dismissed as neurosis (Ware, 1992).
On the one hand, to suggest that neurasthenia, or Da Costa's syndrome, are
antecedents of CFS can imply, then, that CFS is of psychological origin. On the other
hand, ME sufferers may refer back to the original 'rest cure' for neurasthenia, to the
notion of physical exhaustion in Da Costa's Syndrome, and also to the implication of
environmental factors in both conditions. Cohn (ibid) has noted that people with ME
may, in addition, refer to these as historical antecedents in order to avoid the potential
accusation that their condition has appeared 'from nowhere', and might merely be a
fashionable ailment that is promoted and maintained by media hype. ME was once
better known for its nickname 'yuppie flu', a term that suggests a relatively trivial
ailment suffered by a young, wealthy and ambitious set identified in Britain in the
1980s.
There is a second strand of antecedents that has been drawn on by writers describing
the history ofME. This relates it to a series of geographically discrete, general
outbreaks of what were thought at the time to be some sort of infectious disease,
possibly related to poliomyelitis. An epidemic of encephalitis (swelling of the brain)
was reported in Los Angeles in 1934 (Gilliam, 1938), and there have since been
similar outbreaks in other locations. The most widely discussed case was in 1955 at
the Royal Free Hospital in London (Crowley, Nelson, & Stovin, 1955; Medical Staff
of the Royal Free Hospital, 1955). Cohn (ibid) notes that to quote such epidemics as
historical antecedents ofME can imply that ME does indeed have a physical basis, and
could also be used to lend support to the theory that it might be caused by some
disorder of the immune system. However, a controversial re-analysis 15 years after
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the Royal Free epidemic suggested that it was no more than mass hysteria (McEvedy
& Beard, 1970). This has meant that references to this particular strand of history can
also be used to cast doubt on the legitimacy ofME as a physical illness.
We can see, then, that there has been much debate around the diagnosis and definition
of CFS. This has implications for the ways in which it is treated.
2:3:3 Treatment ofME
The lack of an obvious physical explanation for ME is reflected in the fact that there is
no medical treatment for this condition. Some researchers have, however, argued that
whatever might have caused the illness, it might beperpetuated by a dysfunctional
belief system, and therefore could be treated with cognitive behavioural therapy.
Wessely, David, Butler & Chalder (1989) observed that CFS sufferers avoided
exercise because they felt it exacerbated their condition, and that they perceived their
illness as poorly understood or mysterious. In a trial at the National Hospital, they
presented patients with two sets of beliefs about CFS. The first reflected these
observations. The second suggested that the enforced rest, possibly resulting from an
initial, acute illness, rendered them unfit, so that when they attempted activity they felt
a worsening of symptoms. The problem, they suggested, was that sufferers wrongly
attributed this exacerbation to a relapse of their illness, and this encouraged them to
take even more rest. Thus, the tendency to want to rest is presented as the result of
unconscious, associative learning, and not related to any physical need. It leads to
more fatigue, and possibly depression. The recommended treatment, cognitive
behavioural therapy, is described by Sharpe:
"The therapist and patient work together in a collaborative fashion in order to
clarify the patient's understanding with a more accurate appraisal of the
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situation. New ways of coping based on this improved understanding of the
illness are then implemented and evaluated."
(Sharpe, 1996: 241; emphasis added)
Italics have been used here to emphasise the assumption in this treatment that the
sufferer does not have a clear or correct insight into his or her condition and this can
be rectified by means of such therapy.
As well as cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), Wessely's National Hospital trial
included graded exercise, supportive psychotherapy, involvement of the spouse, and
drug treatment for depression. Of the 50 severely disabled patients who were offered
treatment, 22 experienced a significant improvement, and for 4 of them, there was no
change. The one patient who felt worse was reported to have maintained a tendency to
attribute symptoms to physical, rather than psychological, factors. A similar argument
can be seen in the paper written by Bentall, Powell, Nye & Edwards (2002), who
attributed poor outcome in the psychological treatment of CFS to patients' low
motivation and compliance. They suggest that this is linked to a resistance to the
therapeutic rationale, and to the existence of secondary gains from being ill.
It is notable that 18 patients refused Wessely's treatment, and 5 dropped out. This
suggests some level of resistance on the part ofME sufferers to this treatment. The
trial has clear limitations. It was relatively small, and did not involve a control group,
although high rates of remission had been indicated elsewhere (Straus et al., 1988).
Therefore, the improvements found in the study might have happened without the
intervention. The outcomes were not independently verified. Indeed, it would be
difficult to either prove or counterWessely's claims that the patient who got worse did
so because of his internal attributions. Other writers have shown that to suggest
someone is 'in denial' can work to discount that person's rejection of a psychological
interpretation of his or her problems (Harper, 1999; Smith, 1978).
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Whiting and colleagues (2001) carried out a systematic review of 44 studies evaluating
the effectiveness of treatments for CFS. They faced two main problems. First,
inclusion criteria varied in the different studies according to the research definition
used. Second, the large number of different outcome measures used made it difficult
to synthesise results in any meaningful way. They conclude, however, that the
treatments which showed most promise were CBT and graded exercise therapy
(GET). It is of particular interest that these treatments also had the highest drop-out
rates, which suggests a level of resistance on the part of some sufferers.
Ridsdale and colleagues (2001) note that there has been very little research into the
ways in which CFS is managed in primary (non-specialist) care. Their study suggests
that counselling and CBT were equally effective. Further research found that CBT
and GET were both relatively useful in treating CFS, but that graded exercise had
much poorer patient attendance (Ridsdale, Darbishire, & Seed, 2004).
Wessely (1977) described further maladaptive cognitive processes thought to be at
play in CFS. In their efforts to monitor their symptoms, sufferers may become both
hyper-vigilant and overly-sensitised to physical stimuli. He refers to research which
suggests that sufferers' fear of illness and uncertainty as to its origins may result in
exaggerated beliefs about the negative effects of activity (Surawy, Hackman, Hawton,
& Sharpe, 1995; Wessely, Butler, Chalder, & David, 1991). Wessely (1997) also
suggests that there is amutual lack of trust between CFS patients and the medical
profession, and that this could be explained by differences in their attributions relating
to the illness. He claims that increased media coverage of lay beliefs about CFS has
meant that people with this condition have become more entrenched in their views, and
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furthermore
"[w]hereas in the past sufferers were open to medical counter suggestion, this
is no longer possible - the balance of power between professional and lay
models of illness is changing."
(Wessely, 1997: 26)
Thus, he proposes that sufferers' erroneous beliefs about their illness are strongly
influenced by external factors, and that the medical account has been undermined by
those of the popular culture.
Horton-Salway (2004) has studied ME from a discourse analytic perspective. She
examined discussions between a psychiatrist and ME support group members to see
how knowledge claims are locally produced. She analyses techniques of fact
construction, and concludes that to refer to a claim as medically recognised is
rhetorically more powerful than to describe personal experience of this illness.
We might ask how it is that an initial attack of acute illness will lead to maladaptive
thought processes in some people and not in others. Some researchers report that the
rigidly-held beliefs typically attributed to the person with ME are a defence against low
self-esteem and linked to defensive coping (Cresswell & Chalder, 2001). Researchers
have noted certain general characteristics ofME sufferers, the most typical being a
highly active and demanding lifestyle prior to the onset of illness, underpinned by high
personal standards of achievement (Eichner, 1989; Riley, O'Brien, McCluskey, Bell,
& Nicholls, 1990; Ware, 1992; Wessely & Powell, 1989). White & Schweitzer
(2000), for example, report that people with CFS had lower self-esteem and were
more perfectionist than a control group. Ware has also described a pre-morbid
tendency among people with ME to give priority to the needs of others above then-
own, as well as a pattern of stressful life histories.
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Horton-Salway (2001a) notes that in the research, patients' assertions have been taken
at face value as evidence of their attributions or personality. This has the effect of
appropriating sufferers' constructions of the illness in the interests of furthering the
analyst's particular theory. Thus, when a person with ME stresses how active he or
she normally is, or used to be, this information can be, and has been, used to argue
that the condition results from over-exertion, stress or a perfectionist personality.
Horton-Salway argues instead that the sufferer's emphasis on previously high
physical energy may be strategic, that is, inspired by a desire to counter implications
ofmalingering, as well as to depict the seriousness of an illness that has brought about
such a reduction in health. She quotes from an illness narrative produced by a sufferer
(Angela) and her husband (Joe):
Extract 4
485 Angela: we always used to go
486 fell-walking [and hik]ing cycling heh heh heh heh heh
487 Joe: [cyclists]
488 MHS: =outdoor people=
489 Angela: =yeah (.) swimming (.) physical things 'cause I know
some couples
490 aren't into that sort of thing (.) they're quite happy to
stop at home and
491 sit (.) aren't they?=
492 MHS: =yes=
493 Angela: =well we were never like that (.) but we've been forced
to be like that
494 in a way (.) to be sedentary instead of active
(Horton-Salway, 2001b: 255)
Horton-Salway notes that when an illness is of uncertain legitimacy, the sufferer is
more likely to be treated as the type of person who is looking for secondary gain. In
her analysis of this extract, she notes the use of a 'before and after' story which
constructs the pre-illness self as active. She concludes that the account orients to the
implicit rhetorical question of what possible motive Angela could have to give up all
the things she enjoyed before becoming ill.
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Biilow and Hyden (2003) report on a form of intervention in Sweden known as a
'patient school', a concept introduced there in the 1990s. This takes the form of an
education programme ran in a hospital clinic in which patients attend lectures and
group discussions aimed at increasing their understanding ofME. They note that in
these different contexts, patients have the opportunity to view their illness using
different frameworks. They can see it from the outside, as a social object and also
against the wider perspective of 'sickness'. In addition, by sharing their experiences
with others they are able to gain a greater insight into the 'inside' perspective. Biilow
and Hyden suggest that it is particularly important for sufferers to consider their illness
from viewpoints other than their own when that illness is contested. They also
propose that in the process of exposure to and discussion of a variety of views,
sufferers can learn the 'discursive management' of their illness, that is, they become
more flexible in the ways in which they can talk about and respond to different
interpretations ofME.
The review of the ME literature has drawn out features specific to this condition,
relating to three particular areas - its medical definitions, the different possible
historical antecedents, and treatments offered to sufferers. A similar review of the
stroke literature was carried out in order to have some understanding of the culturally
available clinical and historical contexts in which this condition might be understood.
2:4 Literature review - stroke
2:4:1 Definitions of stroke
The initial stage of stroke can involve anything frommild confusion to complete loss
of consciousness for a number of days. After this, the sufferer may be left with
neurological impairments. These have been found to vary according to the size and
site of the brain that is damaged. In particular, specific impairments have been related
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to the side of the brain that is affected (Pimm, 1997). For example, paralysis, or
muscle weakness, on one side of the body (hemiparesis) and loss of sight in one side
of the visual field (hemianopsia) result from damage to the opposite hemisphere of the
brain. Some difficulties are specific to the side of the brain that is injured. For
example, research suggests that problems in producing, remembering or
understanding language (aphasia or dysphasia), unco-ordinated or jerky muscle
movements (apraxia), and slow or cautious behaviour, result from damage to the left
hemisphere. If it is the right side of the brain that is affected, symptoms might include
spatial and perceptual deficits, memory loss in performance, quick, impulsive
behaviour, difficulties in emotional expression, and a denial of impairment
(anosagnosia). The effect ofmuscle weakness on either side of the mouth can
produce slurred speech (dysarthria).
The size and site of brain damage does not, however, fully explain the impairments
that are found in people with stroke. In a systematic review, Bhogal, Teasell, Foley &
Speechley (2004) found inconsistencies between studies that attempted to link the area
of lesion with the onset of post-stroke depression. Results differed, for example,
when outpatients were compared to inpatients, and between measurements taken at the
acute and the chronic stage. In addition, there is some doubt about the extent to which
linguistic impairment can be associated with specific internal injury. Traditionally,
these have been linked to left hemisphere damage. Such deficits are measured by
asking patients, usually in the clinical setting, to relate the story depicted in a series of
cartoons. This provides a rating based on linguistic content in a descriptive task.
Manzo, Blonder & Burns (1995), however, studied linguistic difficulties by
interviewing stroke sufferers in their own homes, rather than in the clinical setting,
and in dialogue with their partners. Here, the focus was on interaction rather than the
content ofwhat was said. Using the techniques of conversation analysis, they
showed that stroke sufferers had little agency in the telling of their stories. Their
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'dysfluency' was not related to the side of the brain that was damaged, but instead was
a function of their disempowered status in such interactions. For example, they report
instances in which the spouse would re-issue questions to the patient, or answer the
patient's questions. The following is among the examples quoted. W is used to
represent the spouse, and for ease of reading the spouse's talk is in italics:
Excerpt 6
14 I: And then what happened? Did you fall down?
15 H: I fell down
16 W: uh huh
17: I: And that was the first stroke?
18 W: That's thefirst stroke that he had
19 I: And how long ago was that?
20: W: Aw (.) that was May the fifth
(Manzo, Blonder & Bums, 1995: 317)
Manzo and colleagues note that what follows the interaction in excerpt 6 is a
remarkable pattern of dominance by the spouse, even though the patient, H, had
suffered a right-hemishpere stroke which did not affect his production of language.
A particularly interesting symptom of stroke is anosagnosia, a term used to describe
the sufferer's denial of damage that has resulted from his or her stroke. The origins of
this phenomenon have been the subject of some debate, and have variously been
described as a cognitive, multi-modal sensory perceptual deficit, a form of
psychoanalytic denial, and a coping mechanism designed to protect the sufferer's self-
image (Pimm, 1997). Bendz (2000) suggests that self-image might be threatened by
the stigma that is often attached to a lack of bodily control. She found that the
participants in her study were not inclined to reveal the impairments brought about by
stroke. It has been suggested that sufferers' tendency to underestimate cognitive
impairment renders them less able to adapt to their stroke (Gauggel, Pelaska, & Bode,
2000).
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Research suggests that there are two important issues for people who have had a
stroke. The first is that people whose lives are disrupted by stroke face uncertainty
about the future. Second, they may experience an objectification of the body, so that
the self feels as if it is separate. The body may be viewed as something out of the
control of the mind. These issues will be discussed in turn.
The research suggests that people who suffer stroke experience a disruption in their
lives that brings about uncertainty as to the future. This is discussed by Ellis-Hill and
her colleagues who report that: "[a]ll of the respondents described their lives as having
undergone a change that could be likened to entering a new foreign world" (Ellis-Hill
et al., 2000: 727). This effect was also found in a study in which 100 people were
interviewed up to one year post-stroke (Becker, 1993). Glass and Maddox (1992)
also describe the post-stroke experience as a psychosocial transition in which the effect
of sudden change is to cast doubt on the sufferer's previous assumptions about the
world and how he or she is to live in it. Similarly, Bendz (2000) reports that for her
participants, stroke brought with it feelings of uncertainty as to the future.
The other fundamental effect of stroke discussed in the literature relates to the
relationship between the sufferer and his or her body. In her study of post-acute
survivors, Bendz found that the main impact of stroke related to the person's
relationship with dysfunctioning parts of his or her body. These were referred to as if
they were separate objects, "not included in their personality" (Bendz, 2000: 716).
She suggests that
"[sjuch an objectification allows them to retain their identity better from the
time before the stroke. They can imagine themselves as the persons they used




This suggests that the sufferer's relationship with his or her body has a direct effect on
that person's identity. Keppel & Crowe (2000) similarly reported an association
between a negative body image and low self-esteem in people who have suffered a
stroke.
This theme was further explored by Ellis-Hill and colleagues (2000), who interviewed
8 stroke sufferers and their spouses, using a life narrative approach. They suggest
that people who have had a stroke experience a 'self-body split'. Normally, they
argue, the body and self are felt to be inseparable, the self being created by the body's
relationship to the outside world (Leder, 1990; Merleau-Ponty, 1963). They refer to
Gadow's (1982) proposal that it is the unity of the self and body that makes us able to
distinguish ourselves from others. When the body can no longer be made to act by the
will, it separates from the self and takes on the nature of an object. Ellis-Hill and
colleagues found that the self-body split was experienced for some time. As they
describe it,
"[ajfter they had returned home, the participants in our study gradually built up
a working relationship with their bodies but even by one year this relationship
could break down at times. Maintaining the status quo required constant effort
and concentration. One year after the stroke the task of restoring the self-body
split was still continuing for most respondents in the face of the emotional,
social and physical consequences of a changed body"
(Ellis-Hill et al., 2000: 731-732)
The notion of control over the body has also been explored from a cognitive
psychological perspective, using self-regulatory models. Partridge and Johnston
(1989) found that beliefs about perceived control over their physical incapacities
predicted recovery in stroke patients, and later research found the same relationship,
independent of the effects of coping, exercise and mood (Johnston, Morrison,
Macwalter, & Partridge, 1999). Thus feelings of being in control over the body have
been associated with improved recovery.
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These findings resonate somewhat with research already reported in my review of
chronic illness from the experiential psychological perspective, discussed in the latter
part of section 2:2:1. This research suggests that from the sufferer's point of view,
there are two important issues. These are, first, that people in this situation seem to
experience some kind of disruption of the self-concept which results in a need for
some reassessment of their life story. This includes a consideration of the past, the
present and the future, and how they can be reformulated to make some sort of
meaningful narrative. Second, researchers describe the importance of the body in the
individual's sense of purpose or value. A review of the literature suggests that stroke
sufferers experience this condition as a biographical disruption, and that a lack of
control over the body can have a negative impact on identity. There appear, then, to
be commonalities between the experience of stroke sufferers and people with other
chronic conditions.
This review mirrors the review ofME literature, and therefore goes on to explore the
history of stroke.
2:4:2 History of stroke
In their paper on the history of stroke, Pound and colleagues (1997) argue that the
condition has been conceptualised very differently over the years. The fact that the
medical profession is relatively powerless to help, leaving the responsibility for
recovery with the sufferer, is reflected in the fact that the lay term 'stroke' has largely
supplanted the clinical description 'CVA' (Cerebro-Vascular Accident). This will be
discussed more fully below.
The first recorded use of 'stroke' in English literature (in 1599) referred to it as "the
stroke of God's hande." Subsequent references to "the stroke of justice" and "a
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dreadful visitation" are used by Pound and colleagues to illustrate their argument that
stroke was seen, for centuries, as a punishment for such things as indulgence, excess
and extremes of passion (especially joy). From the time of Hippocrates, however,
until the first half of the 20th century, the clinical description of an illness in which the
sufferer fell to the ground, losing the powers of motion and speech, was 'apoplexy'.
By the end of the 18th century, the classification of diseases on the basis of bodily
signs (which could now be seen postmortem) rather than reported symptoms, was
beginning to take place. Gradually, the theory of arterial wall degeneration led to the
use of the term 'cerebrovascular accident' (CVA).
From the 1950s, medical and surgical treatments were explored, but with very limited
success. In a review of past volumes of a medical teaching textbook, Pound and
colleagues found that in relation to stroke, 'physiotherapy' was first mentioned in
1952, 'rehabilitation' in 1956 and 'occupational therapy' in 1964. Thus, they chart
the development of a team approach to stroke in which the sufferer plays an active role
in recovery. It is from this period onwards that the use of 'stroke' became widely
adopted in the medical literature, although 'CVA' is still used by some practitioners,
and especially in the acute phase, during which the sufferer is often highly dependent
on hospital care.
The adoption of different terms for stroke seems, then, to reflect the extent to which
clinical medicine is able to treat this condition. To revert back to the lay termmight
suggest that this is limited. Salmon & Hall (2003) argue that when the sufferers of
illness are held to be agents in their recovery, this allows clinicians to withdraw from
responsibility from problematic areas. This influences the ways in which stroke is
treated.
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2:4:3 Treatment of stroke
There is little in the way of medical, or surgical treatment for stroke. Any physical
recovery that does take place is said to be 'spontaneous' - meaning that it is not the
result of medical intervention - and is hard to predict. Recovery is thought to happen
mostly during the first 4-10 weeks after the stroke (Ebrahim, 1990; Mayo et al.,
2004), and to tail off within six months (Nilsson, Jansson, & Norberg, 1997). The
condition of stroke survivors will improve spontaneously when damage is of a
temporary nature - for example if it is caused by pressure on the brain that
subsequently is relieved. Where brain tissue has died, the effects are thought to be
permanent.
The focus of medical care for stroke sufferers is on 'rehabilitation'. Recent research
suggests, however, that rehabilitative activities are clinically supported only in the
short term, and that stroke sufferers are subsequently given very little follow-up
(Langhammer & Stanghelle, 2003). This means that much of the responsibility for
getting better rests with the stroke sufferer. In such circumstances, interpretations of
illness can take on a moral dimension (Benner, Janson-Bjerklie, Ferketich, & Becker,
1994; Halligan & Cockburn, 1993). That is, the sufferer can be held liable for the
onset or the progress of his or her condition. A number of risk factors for stroke,
which relate to sufferers' pre-morbid lifestyle, have been identified. It is more likely
to happen to people over the age of 65, who smoke, take little exercise, and have
raised blood pressure (Pound et al., 1997). Using this information, GPs can calculate
a person's 'risk score' for stroke (Coppola, Whincup, Papacosta, Walker, &
Ebrahim, 1995). People who have 'mini-strokes' (or TIAs, that is, Transient
Ischaemic Attacks), where recovery is complete and takes place within 24 hours, are
more likely to have a subsequent stroke (Sacco, 2004). This means that he or she
might not just be held liable for the stroke, but might also be seen as responsible for
preventing further episodes. Some researchers (Nogueira-Antunano,
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Nogueira-Bonanata & Pla-Gaspari, 2003) have even suggested that people who suffer
stroke are likely to have a 'Type A' personality - first identified by Rosenman and
Friedman (1974) as characterised by free-floating hostility, excessive competitiveness
and time urgency.
Research into the ways in which people cope with stroke suggests that some strategies
are unhelpful. However, the findings are contradictory. While one study reports the
negative effects of problem-focused coping (Kremer & Quednau, 2002b), another
suggests that avoidant coping is associated with the onset of depression in stroke
sufferers (Finset & Andersson, 2000).
The aim of rehabilitation is to enable the patient to relearn the practical skills that are
necessary to prevent physical degeneration - such as that caused by restricted
movement - and to regain functional competence. This approach has been criticised
because it can fail to take into account the psychological and emotional effects of
stroke (White & Johnstone, 2000). Furthermore, the emphasis on function may not
reflect the interests and experiences of the sufferer (Kirkevold, 2002). Pound,
Gompertz & Ebrahim (1998), for example, suggest that the importance of function
may have been exaggerated because the research perspective that predominates in the
stroke literature is quantitative, and therefore lays particular emphasis on measurable
indicators of physical abilities. They quote two qualitative, American studies that
show a greater complexity of sufferers' experiences. Kaufman & Becker (1986), for
example, found that as well as losing functional independence, stroke sufferers missed
their former ease of movement, energy and sense of wholeness. They noted that
medical practitioners' preoccupation with the observation and measurement of
rehabilitative tasks was shared by sufferers only in the first few months post-stroke.
Thereafter, stroke sufferers co-operated, but were not 'engaged', their main interest
having moved to recovery, "a non-specific, diffuse goal which implies notions of
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normality, continuity and identity" (Kaufman & Becker, 1986: 83). Kaufman (1988)
reports a discrepancy between sufferer's experiences and their apparent functional
recovery:
"When patients are asked, "do you feel you have recovered from the stroke?"
or "do you feel your life is back to normal?" the answer is invariably "no."
Even patients without a visible disability give this answer, for they believe that
they are physically, emotionally, or cognitively different from their former
selves, in spite of "perfect" performance in therapy. This may be surprising to
practitioners who see that visible rehabilitation goals are being met"
(Kaufman, 1988: 86)
Similarly, in her PhD thesis, Ellis-Hill (1998) found that two years after their stroke,
participants saw themselves as less active, satisfied, independent or interested than
they had been pre-stroke. These perceptions did not appear to be related to the
severity of the physical impairment. Thus, the observable level of physical
impairment is not a reliable indicator of the stroke sufferer's experience of illness.
The relative lack of qualitative research on stroke sufferers' experiences cannot be put
down to communication difficulties. Only between 10% and 16% of people who
survive a stroke suffer dysphasia, and in its more moderate form, this may manifest
itself only as mild naming problems (Ebrahim, 1990).
This review of the stroke literature suggests that sufferers experience a sense of
biographical disruption, and that problems of bodily function can have an impact on
the sense of self. From a historical perspective, research suggests that there has been
a withdrawal of clinical involvement, so that sufferers bear much of the responsibility
for their recovery and treatment. The help that is offered is not always targeted at the
priorities of those who have had a stroke.
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This literature review has focused on three important themes in the study of chronic
illness in general. These are, the ways in which illness is conceptualised, the effects it
can have on the sufferer's identity, and the ways in which people can cope with it in
the social context. It then moved on to a review of definitions, history and treatment
ofME and stroke in particular. Much of the research takes a traditional view on
chronic illness. This will now be contrasted with the potential offered by the social
constructionist perspective which is adopted in this thesis.
3. A social constructionist perspective on chronic illness
Social constructionism has its roots in a number of different disciplines, including
philosophy, sociology and linguistics. A variety of interpretations and theories has
therefore developed that could be described using this umbrella term. We can,
however, trace the fundamental assumptions that distinguish what Gergen describes as
a 'social constructionist orientation' (1985:266) from a traditional, psychological
approach. This will illustrate the theoretical basis for the research reported in this
thesis. It will also serve to highlight the particular benefits of examining the
experience of chronic illness from a social constructionist perspective.
Gergen (ibid) argues that there are four basic tenets of social constructionist enquiry.
The first is that it takes a critical stance towards conventional knowledge. That is, it
challenges the view that what we know about people, or objects in the world, is based
on the objective observation and then description of some pre-existing characteristics.
The second assumption is linked to the first One of the reasons that we should be
critical of the notion of an objective reality is that our knowledge is highly dependent
on social context, history and culture. Thus, conceptualisations of psychological
processes differ across time and from one culture to another. The third tenet of social
constructionist enquiry is that a form of understanding will appear consistent, and
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therefore reliable, to the extent that these characteristics are sustained by social
communicative processes, such as negotiation and rhetoric. This means that our
knowledge of the world originates in, and is sustained by, social practices. Fourth,
"[d]escriptions and explanations of the world themselves constitute forms of social
action" (ibid: 268). So, for example, to construct illness as either psychological or
physical has different implications for the way that sufferers might be treated.
Gergen relates the social constructionist orientation to two key standpoints that have
held sway at different times in the history of philosophy and epistemology -
empiricism and rationalism. Empiricists propose that things, events, people and so on
have an objective reality which imposes itself on us, so that what we know about the
world is an accurate reflection of how it is. Rationalists hold that knowledge depends
on processes inherent in the individual rather than the essential properties of things and
people in the world. Gergen argues that traditional perspectives in psychology are
fundamentally rooted in empiricism. Behaviourism, for example, assumes we are
shaped, or conditioned, by a process of adaptation to the realities of our external
environment. A turn to cognitivism from around the mid-1960s reflects a change in
emphasis. From this perspective, the individual's thought processes are said to
influence his or her action in the world. For example, an inherent tendency to
categorise is thought to influence not only the way we see others, but the way we view
ourselves (Turner, 1982). The roots of cognitive psychology could, then, be
described as rationalist. However, it is based on empiricist assumptions, inasmuch as
it claims objective knowledge of the ways in which we think about the world - for
instance, in terms of schemata, and with reference to particular models of information
perception and retrieval. The anti-essentialist and anti-realist underpinnings of social
constructionism are inconsistent with empirical traditions in psychology. If meanings
are socially constructed, it follows that knowledge will be historically and culturally
specific. We would therefore expect meanings to change over time and across
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different contexts, and this means that there is no such thing as an objective, essential
reality that is not potentially open to challenge. Furthermore, "all psychological
theorising and the full range of concepts that form the grounds for research become
problematic as potential reflectors of an internal reality" (Gergen, 1985:271).
What we have come to think of as 'facts' do not reflect an objective reality, but instead
are the result of a continuing process of negotiation (Berger & Luckmann, 1966).
Thus, definitions of illness, of identity and of coping are the product of social
practices in which language plays a central role. The focus of interest is not
exclusively on the content of discourse, but on the possible functions of what is said.
Shotter (1981) describes a process of 'joint action' in which meanings are constantly
being negotiated in interaction. There is little value in interrogating a person about his
or her intentions or attributions, because joint action takes place not within individuals,
but between them. The site of enquiry therefore moves from the individual to the
ongoing interaction that takes place between people, because "we constitute ourselves
and our worlds in our conversational activity" (Shotter, 1993: preface). Billig (1987)
has suggested that a great deal of interaction is argumentative. That is, there is an
underlying rhetoric defending the position of the speaker, who is not describing
something 'out there', but constructing and defending his or her version of it. It is of
particular interest, then, to explore the nature of those rhetorical devices that are
deployed in social construction.
There is a long history of psychological research into the importance of language in the
ways that we experience our world. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Sapir, 1947)
proposed that the nature of thought is determined by the language that is available to
the thinker. That is, we can only think in terms of the concepts that are offered by the
particular language(s) we speak. This was an underlying assumption of Saussurian
linguistics, known as 'structuralism' (Saussure, 1974). Saussure distinguished
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between the 'signifier' for an object or concept, that is, the noun used to refer to it,
and the 'signified' (that to which the signifier refers). The key point that Saussure
made is that the relationship between signifier and signified is arbitrary. That is,
signifiers will vary according to the language spoken. There will be concepts that
exist linguistically in one language but not in another, and this discrepancy is due to
cultural differences. Saussure held that the sign is allocated once and for all to that
which it signifies, and it is this consistency that enables people speaking the same
language to communicate effectively.
Post-structuralists start from a Saussurian standpoint - the arbitrariness of the sign -
but reject the notion that meaning is fixed. Indeed, they stress the extent to which we
constantly negotiate meaning in everyday life. Language is not, then, merely used for
the exchange of ideas. If it were, the important thing would be to establish the
conditions under which the truth of utterances could be ascertained. Austin, a
philosopher, questioned this notion, claiming in his 'speech act theory' that language
can be seen as performative, and that "all utterances both state things and do things"
(Austin, 1962: 243). Potter (1996b) notes the limitations that arise from Austin's use
of hypothetical examples, in particular that they ignore the interactive context in which
meanings are constructed. An utterance may both state and do things, but what it
states and does will be different each time that particular utterance is made. Speech act
theory did, however, draw attention to some of the action implications of talk. It
suggested that if we study what is being done with language, we might understand
more about social practices. For example, Austin (1961) suggested that an analysis of
excuses would tell us about the kind of conduct that needs justification, and the kind
of conduct that is acceptable. Following this, we might study the ways in which
people speak about their illness experience to discover how illness is constituted.
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The social constructionist perspective that I adopt in this thesis is also rooted in the
ethnomethodological work carried out by Garfinkel in the 1960s and 1970s
(Garfinkel, 1967; Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970). He demonstrated the value of studying
the ways in which people act in their everyday lives. By focusing on these
interactions, we can get some idea of how people understand their world to work. For
example, in his famous breaching experiments, he showed that there are complex
webs of social rules to which we generally adhere in our everyday actions. These
rules become clearly apparent when they are broken. This approach was developed by
Sacks (1979), who found that it is in everyday talk that people make sense of their
worlds, and that there are expected patterns in speech, just as there are in everyday
actions. Close attention to such patterns, and to their disruption, shows how it is that
meanings are constructed in language. From this point of view, chronic illness,
identity and coping are not treated as static, measurable phenomena but instead are
treated as things that we do in talk (Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998a). There is no 'real'
version of events that can be taken for granted. Instead, what we know about the
world is accomplished in discourse that is both occasioned and variable. That is, each
time people construct things or events, they do this within, and in response to, the
local interactional context. We would therefore expect a level of inconsistency in
constructions, as speakers orient to differing discursive demands.
Research into the experience of chronic illness, and its possible effects on the self and
ways in which sufferers cope would benefit from a detailed study of the various ways
in which these concepts are constructed in discourse. This can be demonstrated by a
recapitulation of each of the three research themes:
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3:1 Definitions of chronic illness - traditional psychological and social constructionist
views
Researchers working from the cognitive perspective suggest that we have an internal
set of schemas about the nature of different types of illness. We refer to this when
deciding whether or not we are unwell, what might be wrong, what might have caused
the illness, how it might affect us, and how long it might last We then adopt
particular coping strategies, and these have been associated in the research with
different qualities of outcome. However, the research suggests that people suffering
from chronic illness do not demonstrate such categorisation in the ways they talk about
illness. For example, when Williams (1984) asked participants about what might have
caused their illness, they did not talk in terms of medical aetiology, but instead gave a
narrative account that made sense of the illness as part of their life stories. The
biopsychochosocial approach suggests that there are subtle differences between
physical impairment and socially acknowledged illness, a distinction that is shown to
be crucial from the sociological perspective.
In the particular case ofME, we have seen evidence to suggest that the definition of
this illness is contested. Sufferers prefer to use a term that denotes an illness with a
distinct physical pathway. The term used by health care professionals - CFS - avoids
such an inference. However, clinical research definitions of the illness described by
this term have changed over time and remain in a state of flux. This casts some doubt
on the usefulness of the concept of illness schemas and suggests, rather, that illness
definitions are ongoingly negotiated. The importance of social context is also apparent
in the definition of ME. Uncertainty surrounding its origins can put sufferers in a
problematic situation with regard to others. There is some debate about the extent to
which ME is 'psychological' and not a physical illness, and research suggests that the
former is often considered less 'legitimate' than the latter. If, for example, it is caused
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by stress, and this is something that could have been avoided, then the sufferer may be
held to blame for his or her condition.
In the particular case of stroke, the literature similarly suggests that definitions do not
take the form of schemas that can be referred to for an understanding of this
conditions. For example, research suggests that the link between type and site of
lesion is complex, and that knowledge of the physical injury is not, therefore,
sufficient to predict symptoms. This condition has been re-conceptualised over the
years and it has been proposed that the clinical adoption of the lay term 'stroke'
reflects some level of transfer of responsibility for this condition from the healthcare
professional to the sufferer. This can have implications for the sufferer's relationships
with other people.
Thus, for both stroke and ME sufferers, there is uncertainty as to the duration of their
condition, and indeed the extent to which it might either improve or deteriorate.
Controllability is not a concept that stands on its own, but one that is reflected in the
sufferer's relationship to his or her body, which in turn can influence the construction
of the self.
From a realist perspective, that is, one that allows for the establishment of an objective
truth about the nature of phenomena, illness is definable in terms of its causes and
effects. From a social constructionist perspective, the meaning of illness is locally
worked up, defended and contested. Thus, a fundamental assumption is that
meanings will change over different contexts and different times. In her PhD thesis,
Horton-Salway (1998) explores the struggle for authorship ofME in the discourse of
medical scientists, general practitioners and sufferers. She shows how diagnostic
labels and explanations for illness are both constituted and deployed in participants'
talk. In our current western culture, the clinical account of illness is privileged.
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Parsons (1951) noted the part that the medical establishment plays in enabling
sufferers to access the sick role. This theme has been developed to show how the
clinical account can be used to confer or deny access to social goods, such as welfare
benefits (Radley, 1994; Taylor, 1992). Freidson (1970) argues that, when it comes to
deciding what constitutes a specific illness, the voices of doctors and medical
researchers are usually given more warrant than those of lay people. This, however,
was not always the case. Jewson (1976) argues that the individual's involvement in
diagnosis was greatly reduced with the introduction of tools such as the stethoscope,
which were thought to provide doctors with more objective and reliable indicators of
the symptoms of illness. Whereas symptoms, as perceived by the patient, were once
vital to diagnosis, there has developed an intervening stage involving the interpretation
of signs of illness, which can be verified by medical tests.
Over time, patients have become, literally as well as metaphorically, further removed
from the diagnostic process, a large part of which these days may take place in the
hospital laboratory or clinic. Armstrong (1983) points out that for most illness, the
patient's participation in diagnosis is no longer required. Signs, being independently
verifiable, are seen to provide more reliable evidence than reported symptoms, and to
this extent they are the 'gold standard'. Following from that, those illnesses that can
be diagnosed by medical tests appear to have a higher 'objective' status than those that
can only be ascertained on the basis of reported symptoms. The most recent
international clinical case definition of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (Fukuda et al.,
1994) has excluded signs altogether in the diagnosis of this condition. This means
that the status of CFS as a legitimate illness is uncertain. Indeed, definitions of this
illness are contested and challenged not just among the medical profession, but by
sufferers. Similarly, different versions of the history of this condition are provided
depending on the preferred definition. Thus, those who judge ME to be a viral disease
refer back to previous outbreaks of illness in which clusters of sufferers were
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identified. Those who reject any viral aetiology can draw on historical descriptions of
various types of nervous disease with similar symptoms to ME. We can see, then,
that definitions ofME are contested, and have changed over time.
Even for stroke, a condition whose signs can be verified by medical tests, there is
some disagreement as to the extent to which impairment can be linked to the site or
size of lesion to the brain. Certain symptoms, such as anosagnosia (denial of
impairment) are poorly understood, and some of the speech difficulties of stroke
sufferers may not be due to internal damage, but rather to sufferers' disempowerment
in interactions with others (Manzo, Blonder & Burns, 1995). Although there are
cognitive tests that can be used to assess some of the impairment caused by stroke, the
literature suggests that sufferers' concerns about the impact of their illness goes
beyond the type of functions that can be measured in this way. Qualitative studies into
their experience of illness show a far more complex picture of what it is like to have
had a stroke. It is, therefore, crucial to pay close attention to sufferers' accounts of
their experience of this condition.
The social constructionist perspective offers a unique insight into the nature ofME and
stroke because it starts from the assumption that there is not one, 'real' version of
events and instead places the focus on the ways in which meanings are made and how
it is that we might understand the processes at work. Similarly, it provides a useful
perspective on the ways in which illness might impact on the sufferer's identity.
3:2 Chronic illness and identity - traditional psychological and social constructionist
views
Psychological research into sufferers' experience of chronic illness points to two ways
in which it can affect the sense of self. First, it is described in terms of an interruption
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to the individual's life story. The effects on identity are conceptualised by Corbin &
Strauss (1985) in terms of 'biographical work', and by Williams (1984) in terms of
'narrative reconstruction'. Riessman (1990) describes the strategic use of 'story¬
telling' to maintain a sense of self. Second, its effects on the body can influence the
individual's sense of purpose or value. That the effect of illness on the individual is
more than simply corporeal is acknowledged in the biopsychosocial approach. The
sociological perspective on chronic illness has drawn attention to its potential for
stigmatising individuals, and to the moral implications of being sick.
There is little in the ME literature that relates directly to its effects on identity.
However, some research suggests that a propensity for developing this condition, or
for perpetuating it, can be related to the personality type of the sufferer (Cresswell &
Chalder, 2001; Eichner, 1989; Riley, O'Brien, McCluskey, Bell, & Nicholls, 1990;
Ware, 1992; Wessely & Powell, 1989). Thus, it is reported by some that
characteristics of low self-esteem combined with perfectionism are associated with this
illness (White & Schweitzer, 2000). Furthermore, this condition often follows an
overly active, stressful pattern of living (Van Hudenhove, Neerinckx, Onghena,
Lysens & Vertommen, 2001). Although there has been some criticism of researchers'
tendency to assume a simple, causal connection between these factors, the implications
for ME sufferers are serious. The review ofME literature, then, supports sociological
research which points to the stigma and moral implications associated with chronic
illness.
A review of the stroke literature suggests that there are feelings of 'disruption' of the
self. Furthermore, the body can become objectified, or seen as something quite
separate from the self, and a lack of control over the body can affect the stroke
sufferer's self-esteem. This is similar to findings from the psychological perspective
on chronic illness which suggest that biographical disruption, and lowered self-esteem
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relating to impaired bodily function are key issues for sufferers. The identification of
risk factors for this condition can mean that sufferers are potentially accountable for its
onset. Furthermore, some researchers have suggested an association between
personality type and the propensity to suffer stroke. Thus, we can see that stroke also
has moral implications for the sufferer's identity.
From a traditional perspective, research into the association between personality and
illness assumes that personality is something fairly stable, residing in the individual,
that can be quantified and measured. Further, such measurements can be used to
compare different individuals. Social constructionists avoid the term 'personality'
because of its traditional, empiricist connotations, and instead refer to the self. There
are three ways in which social constructionists have theorised about and studied the
self. First, an analysis of grammar and linguistic practices has shed some light on the
ways in which the self can be expressed (Harre, 1985). Another strand of research
has focused on the ways in which particular discourses about the self help to maintain
the power structures that exist in society (Parker, 1989). Others have concentrated on
the performative functions of certain constructions of the self, that is, those things that
can be discursively accomplished by describing the self in particular ways (Gergen,
1989). This third perspective provides a particularly useful approach to the ways in
which chronic illness affects the self. Social constructionists have argued that we
become who we are through interactive social processes. Potter &Wetherell argue for
the importance of interaction in constructing the self:
"any sociopsychological image of the self, in fact the very possibility of a self-
concept, is inextricably dependent on the linguistic practices used in everyday
life to make sense of our own and others' actions"
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987: 95)
I have noted above that constructions of the self can be seen as performative. They are
therefore likely to change according to what it is that the speaker is trying to
61
accomplish at any given time. In effect, according to Goffman (1959), the self is
'distributed' across different situational contexts. This notion is not intuitive. We do
not necessarily feel that we are constantly, if subtly, changing the way we construct
ourselves. Some theorists have suggested that to display consistency in our
constructions of the self can itself serve a function. Goffman (ibid) suggests that the
'distributed self must present some level of consistency to the outside world at least,
in order to be understood.
Giddens takes the view that "we can learn a good deal about day-to-day situations in
routine settings from analysing circumstances in which those settings are radically
disturbed" (Giddens, 1979: 123). Bury (1982) argues that chronic illness represents
one such set of circumstances. It constitutes a pressing threat to the individual's
identity, which might otherwise be taken for granted in the daily routine of life. Much
of the research on individuals' experience of chronic illness suggests that it brings
about a disruption to the self-concept that demands some kind of recasting of the
sufferer's life story. People who suffer from chronic illness often face an uncertain
future. Physical incapacity can make it very difficult to assert certain aspects of their
identity. They also have to deal with changing social relationships. They do not do
this in isolation, but in interaction with other people. Gergen describes the value of
discursive abilities in maintaining a sense of identity:
"self-knowledge is not, as is commonly assumed, the product of in-depth
probing of the inner recesses of the psyche. It is not the result of acute
sensitivity to the nuances of emotion, motivation, intention and the like.
Rather, it is a mastery of discourse - a 'knowing how' rather than a 'knowing
that'
(Gergen, 1989: 75)
Thus, the social constructionist perspective draws our attention to the ongoing
negotiation of identity in a context in which the meanings of illness are also locally
contested. In his MSc dissertation, Bland (1995) reports that participants' accounts of
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ME were designed to emphasise the severity of symptoms and thus to counter possible
ascriptions of deviant identity. Similarly, Horton-Salway (2001a; 2001b) shows how
her participants worked up illness attributions and identity formulations in the context
of countering potential accusations ofmalingering or psychological vulnerability.
Tucker's (2004) analysis of the accounts of fourME sufferers concludes that narrative
themes were employed to construct this illness as physical and that this oriented to the
possible negative identity implications of having a psychological disorder. The
relationship of the body to the mind is therefore an issue of some importance.
Turner (1992) has pointed out that the dualistic view ofmind and body that has
dominated research since the time of Descartes has resulted in a situation in which the
body has, until recently, been studied in the natural sciences, while the mind has been
the province of the humanities. Disease has traditionally been seen as something quite
separate from the individual's self. From a social constructionist perspective,
however, medicine, disease and the process of illness are all phenomena whose
meaning is ongoingly defined in social interaction. Thus, when people who have had
a stroke talk about the objectification of the body (Bendz, 2000; Ellis-Hill et al.,
2000), this can be examined in terms of the function such a discourse might have, for
example, on the sufferer's sense of self.
Foucault (1976) argued that the body is a socially constructed phenomenon, and that
the 'medical gaze' has had a profound influence on the ways in which the body has
been understood and experienced in western society. Others have proposed that social
and environmental factors can only mould what is a (pre-existing) biological structure.
Thus, Frank (1991) takes a social constructionist approach to the body and illness,
while at the same time acknowledging the body's physicality. He presents the body as
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"a recursive process of inscription and projection. Social and cultural
processes inscribe the body with meanings, and the body, which is always
more than these meanings, projects its realities onto social spaces."
(Frank, 1991: 209; emphasis added)
Inscription and projection, according to Frank, come about in the course of narratives.
He proposes, then, that while the self can to some extent create, or construct, the
body, the body can also create the self, although the latter process is not well
understood.
Shilling (1993) also argues that the individual is able to take part in the construction of
his or her body, and that the body as project can be seen in our capacity to alter our
physical selves, for example through fitness regimes or cosmetic surgery. Indeed, an
ability to change our bodies is seen as a means by which we can exert some control in
a changing and uncertain world. Shilling's argument suggests an intellectual self that
influences the physical self. As a corollary to this, we might expect that unintentional
changes in the body, such as those wrought by illness, may have some effect on the
experience of the self.
The importance of the body to our sense of identity has also been noted by Harre
(1983). On a practical level, the body identifies us to others. A philosophical
exploration of how it is that we know a particular individual is the same person when a
period of time has elapsed, points to the importance of physical, bodily appearance.
Burkitt (1999) similarly argues that identity depends on a bodily presence that is
capable of interacting with others as a distinct and separate physical entity. From this
perspective, physical changes that affect the ways in which we can relate to others
would also have an impact on the sense of self. Goffman's (1963) work also
suggests that the management of the body plays a key role in social relationships and
in the maintenance of identity. This activity is done in the context of social and
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cultural influences, and these also provide the background for an understanding of the
ways in which people cope with illness.
3:3 Chronic illness and coping - traditional psychological and social constructionist
views
From the cognitive psychological perspective, coping with illness has been
conceptualised in terms of internal mechanisms, so that inability to cope is the
individual's problem. However, the suggestion that some coping strategies are better
than others leaves the sufferer accountable to others for any failure adequately to
manage his or her condition. Bury (1988; 1991) shows that the meanings given to
illness by others are crucial, andWilliams (1993) describes as the 'pursuit of virtue'
the ways in which people who are chronically ill have to attend to their moral standing
in the eyes of those around them. This is not something that is done once-and-for-all,
but rather is a skill that has to be constantly worked at in interaction. The
biopsychosocial approach to chronic illness acknowledges the fact that people are ill in
a social context, and this is the main focus of enquiry in the sociological research.
The current clinical treatment forME is based on the view that this condition is at the
least exacerbated by maladaptive belief systems. These beliefs relate in particular to
the seriousness of the illness, the ways in which it affects the sufferer, and the ways in
which he or she should manage this condition. There is, therefore, a tension between
what is considered to be the 'real' cause of illness, and how it should be treated, and
the erroneous beliefs of sufferers. Thus, we can see that the negotiation of illness
definitions is inextricably linked with the ways in which sufferers cope. This suggests
that the notion of coping mechanisms operating on the basis of internal schemas is of
limited value in understanding the ways in which people deal with ME. Furthermore,
the suggested association between personality factors and illness attributions leaves the
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sufferer potentially accountable for the way in which he or she copes with ME, and
this draws attention to the social context in which people manage this condition.
For people who have had a stroke, the fact that there is very little in the way of medical
or surgical treatment means that their role in recovery is crucial. This leaves the stroke
sufferer responsible to some extent for his or her 'rehabilitation'. Thus the moral
implications highlighted in the sociological literature on chronic illness are apparent.
Social constructionism takes as its starting point the importance of interactions in the
ways in which we constitute and experience our world. Research has shown that
people's talk about health and illness is characterised by ambiguities (Rogers, 1991).
For example, people who are ill conceal their condition at some times but not others
(Herzlich & Pierret, 1987; Wiener, 1975). From the cognitive, or medical
perspective, these findings represent an anomaly. Such apparent contradictions in
behaviour can, however, be accommodated if we consider the social constructionist
emphasis on the function of language. Each time we speak, it is in response to the
local context, and our talk is designed to orient to that context. People with chronic
illness might, at times, construct their condition as serious. This is particularly likely
to happen when the condition in question is one that is treated with some cynicism, as
is the case with ME. However, at other times, the sufferer may be working to
maintain his or her status in society as a fully-abled person, and might then
strategically downplay the effects of the illness. Pollock (1993) found that people
who are ill can, at times, feel morally obliged to make light of their condition, when
asked to talk about it, in apparent denial of their observable physical limitations.
We have seen, then, that the social constructionist approach to illness, identity and
coping offers the conceptual framework for a fruitful examination of the experiences
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of people with ME and stroke. It suggests different types of questions from those that
have been raised in traditional illness research.
4, Research questions
Traditional psychological perspectives might ask what ME is, or what stroke is,
because of their underlying assumption that such things can be objectively defined.
The 'gold standard' for such objective definition would be the clinical account, since
this is rooted in empirical, scientific methodology. Sufferers' views have been
conceptualised in terms of schemata, a hierarchical set of beliefs about their illness,
relating to its identity, causes, consequences, time-line and potential to be controlled.
The accuracy of such beliefs can be assessed by comparison with the medical
definition. Experiential psychologists are concerned with the ways in which
individuals weave the occurrence of illness into their life story in order to make sense
of it. Although they do not assume the existence of concepts such as illness schemata,
and they take social context into account, they nevertheless suggest that
autobiographical work takes place within the individual.
Social constructionist perspectives are anti-essentialist and anti-realist, in the sense that
they refute the existence of one, single, accurate definition of illness. Instead, the
meaning of illness is produced in social interaction and it will vary according to
historical time and context. Language is key in this process, and its action orientation
is particularly significant. The objectivity of medical definitions of illness is not taken
for granted; both clinical and lay accounts are seen as occasioned in talk or text, and
they can be examined for the functions they might serve. In this thesis, then,
sufferers' views of their illness are considered in their own right, and not with a view
to judging sets of beliefs for their accuracy. Further, they are considered as social
practices and not a reflection of inner states.
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Social constructionists are similarly critical of the notion that the essence of individuals
can be described in terms of personality types or characteristics. Instead, they view
the self as an ongoing discursive production. They differ from experiential
researchers in the extent to which they stress the social nature of this process. What
becomes important, then, is not the sort of person who becomes ill, or the effects that
illness has on a pre-existing set of attributes, but rather the ways in which identity is
managed in interaction by people suffering from chronic conditions.
Finally, the traditional psychological approach to dealing with illness is to attempt to
categorise sufferers in terms of their coping styles or behaviour. Again, this suggests
that we can form an objective opinion on the nature of coping mechanisms, and that it
is possible to attribute these unproblematically to people suffering from chronic
illness. Experiential psychologists have drawn attention to the social context in which
coping with illness takes place, and the particular relevance this has for people with
chronic conditions. The perspective adopted in this thesis allows an exploration of
how it is that individuals socially construct the ways in which they manage their
illness.
The questions I address in this research are therefore:
(i) How are ME and stroke constructed by sufferers?
(ii) How do ME and stroke sufferers construct the impact their illness has
on their identity?
(iii) How do ME and stroke sufferers construct the ways in which they
cope with their condition?





The rationale for this research was to analyse the discourses of people suffering from
ME and people who had had a stroke. This influenced the ways in which participants
were recruited and questions posed. I have already noted that illness definitions are
contested, and that this is particularly apparent in the case ofME. Clinical and lay
constructions of this illness can be quite different. It is, therefore, possible that there
are people who consider themselves to be sufferers of this condition who are not
recognised as such by the medical profession. Thus, recruitment via GP surgeries or
clinics was not appropriate, and instead approaches were made to sufferers' support
groups. For reasons of consistency, the same methods were used to recruit stroke
sufferers. Stroke at a young age is defined by the support groups concerned as
occurring at or before the age of 55.
There can be practical problems in arranging face-to-face meetings with people who
suffer chronic illness. They may, for example, have problems of mobility, or
difficulties in producing speech. Therefore, while focus groups were arranged where
possible, it was considered a useful strategy to contact people via the internet. This
has the added advantage of allowing access to a greater number of potential
participants.
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The specific details of recruitment are noted below, along with information on how
data were collected, the questions that were used, and the numbers of participants.
The chapter ends with a description of the analytic process.
1: Recruitment
I used two methods of recruiting participants in this research. To begin with, I looked
for support groups for people with ME and those who had suffered stroke at a young
age, where members met on a fairly regular basis. This information was found at the
city's main public library notice board.
I then looked for web-based support groups for these conditions. The ME group ran a
chadine which anyone could join. Correspondence on this chatline was available for
everyone to read and respond to, but was not real-time. That is, members received
every piece of communication in the form of emails, at around 60-70 messages per
day. Personal communication was possible by emailing members 'off-line' on a one-
to-one basis. The web-based support group for people who had suffered stroke at a
young age worked in a different way. Anyone wishing to communicate did so by
posting a message on to the board, to which access was public. In order to see the
board, it was necessary to log on to the web site. Responses were linked to the
original message, so that 'strings' of discussion could be seen under particular
headings. This meant that the discussions were far less free-ranging than on the ME
chatline. Furthermore, perhaps because responses did not automatically arrive by
email, communication was infrequent, and a message could remain without response
for months at a time. I did not, therefore, use this message board to post my
questions but instead used it to make initial contact with stroke sufferers.
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2, Data collection
All respondents were given assurances of confidentiality and contact details in case
they wished to withdraw at a later stage (none did). All personal and place names
were changed. Where hospitals were named, this was replaced by a numerical code
(from 1-3).
I began by organising focus groups with those people I could meet face-to-face. I
telephoned the support group organisers with a view to arranging these sessions. The
organiser of the ME self-help group suggested that I conduct the focus group outwith
their regular meeting times, and that communication with their members should be via
the organising committee. I therefore wrote to the organisers with copies of an
introductory letter for distribution, asking group members to come to a research focus
group at my house (it was felt that access to the university would be too difficult). I
later contacted the organiser for a different group outside the city, and through her I
arranged a further two focus groups to take place at the hospital where they met;
unfortunately, no-one actually turned up for the second of these. Consent was implied
by attendance.
There are regular rehabilitation sessions run by the self-help group for people who
have had a stroke at a young age. I contacted the area organiser, and was able to run a
focus group following on from one such session at the hospital. Some months later, I
conducted a second focus group with a different group of stroke sufferers at the same
hospital. Some of the stroke sufferers came to this rehabilitation group with a carer,
and these people also joined the focus group discussion. Again, consent to participate
was implied by attendance.
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With each focus group, I introduced myself and explained to the people attending that
I was keen to hear them discuss the questions I asked among themselves, with
minimal input from me. This was because my aim was to focus on and give voice to
participants' concerns. I had asked permission to take an audio-tape of the sessions,
and was able to use individual microphones for most people, with a large desktop
microphone in addition to improve the quality of the recording.
I then contacted the web-based support groups. I posted a message on the ME
chatline, introducing myself and asking if people would be prepared to answer some
research questions - preferably as part of the chatline, but otherwise on a one-to-one
basis (that is, via personal email address). Then, over the next several months, I
posted my questions one by one on the chatline, each time re-iterating that this was
being done in the interests of academic research. I waited until any discussion which
had arisen had died down before introducing the next question. I acknowledged all
correspondence, and copied all of the discussions to file. At the same time, I sent
questions individually to the people who preferred their answers to be private. I
posted a similar introductory message on to the stroke website, again noting that the
purpose of collecting this information was academic research. Because of the way that
this support group was ran, and the lack of activity on its message board, the only
practical way to get through my questions was to send them individually to people
who had responded personally to my original message.
2:1 Use of the internet
I carried out a review of the literature relating to the use of the internet for conducting
research. This was focused on four particular areas. The first related to
methodological skills involved in reaching particular groups, real-time interacting and
appropriate ways of recording data. The second related to the potential ethical
problems associated with 'lurking' on real-time chatrooms. This describes a situation
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in which a person can log on and observe other people's conversations without them
being aware of his or her presence. Since all ofmy communications were direct, such
ethical issues did not arise. There is also a body of literature concerned with the
reliability of data gathered, for example, by means of online questionnaires. The issue
here is whether people are telling the truth, or whether they are who they claim to be.
My focus, however, was to analyse accounts provided by people who constructed
themselves as sufferers of eitherME or stroke. The underlying assumption, then, was
that the reality of such claims is of less interest than the ways in which they are
constructed as real. The fourth category of literature explored the potential influence
of computer technologies on communication, and I will discuss some key issues
relevant to this thesis below.
Computer-mediated communication - commonly referred to by its acronym, CMC -
covers a wide range of interactive possibilities. They can be categorised as either
synchronous - as in the case of 'real-time' chat rooms - or asynchronous. The latter
would include communication via email or notice boards. The internet data collected
for this study would be considered asynchronous. Another way of categorising such
interactions relates to the (online) co-presence of other people. Since all emails sent
via the ME email support group were distributed to every member, there was a
potential audience for such communications. One-to-one emails can presumably be
considered to be private correspondence.
Lamerichs & Molder (2003) trace the history of CMC research and note that the
original focus was on the ways in which interaction was affected by the lack of visual
cues available. This was influenced by earlier work into communications
technologies. For example, Short, Williams and Christie (1976) compared face-to-
face with telephone interactions and concluded that the latter was an impoverished
form of communication. Rutter's (1984) 'cuelessness model' suggested that some
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media offer fewer cues than others. To the extent that cues are not available, it was
argued, interaction loses its personal nature and becomes task-oriented. Furthermore,
normative social influences are diminished, and the behaviour of interactants is
therefore prone to becoming extreme and uninhibited.
Later research questioned the notion that such interaction effects were an inevitable
consequence of using CMC. Spears & Lea (1992), for example, suggest that social
cues were not dependent on physical presence alone. Furthermore, they argue that
visual isolation and anonymity can, under certain circumstances, increase feelings of
group coherence and therefore adherence to group norms. That is, there are fewer
indications of difference between people, and so more chance that others might be
perceived as similar to us. Similarly, Bowker & Tuffin (2004) suggest that the online
environment may facilitate a greater level of social interaction, that the lack of social
cues may lessen the opportunities for negative evaluation by others. Although these
claims represent a challenge to earlier assumptions regarding the use of CMC, the
focus remains on the ways in which such technological advances impact on users.
Another area in which CMC is thought to have an effect on users is in its potential for
the dissemination of knowledge. Some writers are concerned about the implications
of 'information overload'. Scott (1997), for example, claims that as more information
becomes freely available, we become less able to make judgements as to its validity.
Instead of trusting what we are told, for instance by an 'expert', we are in a position
of uncertainty. Traditional, scientific knowledge, such as that provided by medical
practitioners, is replaced by a chaotic mass of information whose sources vary in
reliability. Nettleton & Burrows (2003) demonstrate the vast amount of information
available to anyone who performs an internet search on illnesses such as asthma and
eczema. They argue that it is often difficult for consumers to judge the validity of
these data. There is therefore the risk that trivial knowledge will undermine that
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provided by medical experts. It is interesting to note here the similarities in Wessely's
(1997) claim that greater access to information in the media has ledME sufferers to
question the expertise of clinicians working in this field.
Related to the issue of the dissemination of knowledge is that of access to the internet.
Writers have noted that CMC provides a greater level of social inclusion for people in
minority groups, such as the chronically ill (Hardey, 1999) and those with
incapacitating physical or speech difficulties (Bowker & Tuffin, 2004).
Hutchby (2001a; 2001b), however, questions the idea that information technologies
have inherent properties that impose themselves on people with predictable results -
for instance that CMC will lead to depersonalised behaviour, or that its capacity to
provide large amounts of information will result in uncertainty or a lack of confidence
in clinical expertise. Instead, he argues for a different way of conceptualising the
relationship between society and technology. He proposes that technologies can
themselves be shaped by human practices, within certain practical limits. He draws on
Gibson's (1979) concept of 'affordances' to illustrate this proposition. This was
developed in the psychology of perception to describe the ways in which humans,
animals, insects, birds and fish relate to objects in the world. The same object, it is
argued, has certain material properties, but will afford different uses to different
species, and in different contexts. Thus, a rock might be perceived and used as a
shelter by an insect or a missile by a human. The implications for CMC research are
that we cannot assume a priori that it changes human interaction in specific ways, or
that the influence is only in one direction. While CMC may impose some constraints
on human activity, it can also enable new and creative forms of interacting as people
appropriate the new technologies for their own purposes.
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What is needed, then, is an examination of how CMC is used in practice, in order to
examine its role in social interaction, the dissemination of knowledge and social
inclusion. With regard to social interaction, Yates (2001) studied a corpus of data
gathered from a variety of CMC media. His analysis of linguistic markers showed
that the words T and 'you' were used more frequently in CMC than in data gathered
from a very large sample of general spoken and written English. Although he does
not examine the interactional function of these pronouns, Yates concludes on the basis
of their widespread use that CMC is not depersonalised. He also found a particularly
high count for the verbal formulation 'I am' in video-conferencing and chatrooms.
These kinds of interaction involved people from a large number of nations and
societies. Yates suggests that such contextual issues must be taken into account, as
well as the particular medium of communication. Fernback (2003) notes that online
communication is not marked by uninhibited behaviour, but rather that conventions -
often referred to as 'netiquette' - have evolved in response to some of the constraints
of CMC. For example, the upper case is used to indicate a raised voice, and as such it
is generally used sparingly.
In relation to the dissemination of knowledge, an analysis of illness narratives
produced on 'home pages' (Hardey, 2002) reports that sufferers were transformed
from consumers to producers of health care information. That is, their own
experience became a resource for other people (as well as a means by which they
might develop their own understanding of their experiences). Hardey suggests that
this might reflect the development of a new relationship between medical expertise and
lived experience of illness. In terms of access to information available via CMC,
Nettleton & Burrows (2003) argue that the mere provision of internet facilities will not
necessarily lead to a greater level of inclusion. For example, much depends on the use
made of such technologies.
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From the point of view of this thesis, there are also analytic issues involved in
comparing internet with focus group data, an important aspect being the differences
between written and oral communication. The internet data gathered were in textual
form. However, some writers have suggested that despite this, CMC can have oral
qualities. Yates (2001) makes the point that the terms 'written' and 'oral' refer to
socially learned practices rather than mere modes of communication. 'Doing writing'
may in some circumstances be similar to 'doing talking'. Research carried out before
the use of word processing became widespread has shown that speakers have a
narrower range of lexical use than writers (Chafe & Danielewicz, 1987). We might
expect, then, that CMC, with its possibilities for easy correcting and reviewing, would
display an even greater range than the written texts used to support this finding.
However, Yates found this was not the case; CMC resembled oral vocabulary variance
more than written. He suggests that it is not the medium but the social practices
adopted by its users that affect their use of language. Instead of comparing it with
either oral or written communication, we should consider CMC in its own right as a
practice, or rather a number of practices. Similarly, Femback (2003) concludes that
CMC is a site of oral culture, though one that undoubtedly possesses print
characteristics.
This review suggests that internet use may influence the kind of data that are collected,
but that the nature of such influence should not be assumed in advance. Furthermore,
issues arising from the use of the internet are best explored by analysing what happens
in practice.
3. Schedules of questions
I made up a schedule of 13 questions. Of these, four were directly related to the
research themes. Thus, I asked participants to describe their condition in order to see
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how they constructed it. I asked how their illness had affected them as people in order
to explore issues of identity. I asked what advice they would give to other sufferers,
and how they themselves dealt with their illness in order to examine the ways in which
they coped. A further 9 questions were asked in an attempt to generate general
discussion that might have some relevance to this study. All of the questions can be
seen in Appendix I.
4. Participants
There was therefore a total of 56 ME participants, of whom 49 were internet
correspondents. The total number of stroke participants was 22. The breakdown of




ME Internet Personal Correspondence 11
Stroke - sufferers 12
- carers 5
Stroke Internet Personal Correspondence 10
5. Analysis
Discourse analysis is not one method, but rather an approach to data that is shaped by
the particular epistemological standpoint of the researcher, the topic of investigation
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and the type ofmaterial that has been collected. The methods of analysis I use in this
thesis are rooted in the theoretical assumptions I have outlined above. These are that
language has a social function, it is a medium of social action (Edwards, 1997) in that
it is used to construct what is spoken or written about, and it reflects neither a pre¬
existing reality, nor the internal psychological processes of the interactants. Analysis
therefore focuses on how it is that accounts are constructed, and the functions that
such constructions might serve. To this end, I draw on methods of conversation
analysis for the fine-grained examination of local interactional business, and also make
use of some of the insights provided by narrative analysis. A broader analysis of
patterns across the data enables me to relate discursive practices to the wider social
context. I will discuss each of these approaches in turn.
Conversation analysis is informed by the ethnomethodological assumptions that there
are systematic properties underlying social interactions, and that if we study such
interactions closely enough we can see normative patterns in behaviour (Garfinkel,
1967). Thus, Sacks and his associates Schegloff and Jefferson (Sacks, 1979; Sacks,
1984; Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974) turned to naturalistic recordings of
everyday talk and found that it is designed at a highly detailed level to respond both to
the sequential context and to the interactional work that is being done. This has a
special significance for the social constructionist claim that reality is not something that
is constructed once-and-for-all, but is, rather, an on-going interactional achievement.
Conversation analysis enables us to examine how facticity is worked up by
participants at local and interpersonal levels.
The key focus of conversation analytic study is naturally-occurring dialogue, untainted
by the imposition of researchers' own interests on what is said. It is, however,
possible to draw on the principles and findings of conversation analysis in other
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research contexts, and I will discuss this with reference to three characteristics of the
ways in which data were collected for this thesis.
The first and most obvious is that participants' contributions were not part of
naturally-occurring, everyday interactions. Rather, the data were gathered for the
specific purpose of examining sufferers' views and experiences of two particular
chronic illnesses. A schedule of questions was used in order to elicit discussion of the
areas identified as important in the course of a review of the literature. This inevitably
influenced the content of responses. To address this, attempts were made to focus on
participants' concerns, for example by using open and general questions, and
refraining from directing the topic of ongoing discussion to particular areas once the
initial question had been asked.
Classic conversation analysis of naturally-occurring dialogue involves the compilation
of a collection of examples of particular conversational phenomena. By studying such
collections, it has been possible to demonstrate patterns that are normative in the sense
that their disruption is accountable. For example, Sacks showed that certain types of
utterance seem to call forth certain other types of utterance. One such 'adjacency pair'
is invitation/reply to invitation. Adjacency pairs have quite systematic properties
relating to the usual order in which they appear, and the kinds of response that are
preferred. Such conversation analytic findings can be used as a resource for the
analysis of non-naturally-occurring data, and can therefore help to shed light on the
kinds of actions that might be taking place.
The second way in which data gathered in this research differs form the classical
conversation analytic methodology is in the use of focus groups and one-to-one
interviews. Kitzinger (1994; 1995) has noted that a key advantage of using focus
groups to gather data is that participants interact, and even when this is not explicit in
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the data, their talk is potentially directed towards an audience of other participants.
Although such interaction cannot be described as 'natural', it nevertheless provides a
rich context for the study of participants' views. For example, the variety of
communicative actions is likely to be greater than in one-to-one interviews, and can
include things such as jokes, teasing and arguing (Kitzinger & Barbour, 1999). In
focus groups, participants are not always responding directly to the interviewer, and it
is possible to examine the ways in which their constructions are interactively shaped.
The potential to do this is extremely important in conversation analysis. It is crucial to
ensure that findings do not stem from researchers' assumptions but instead are
demonstrably oriented to by participants. Hutchby andWooffitt (1998) refer to this as
'next turn proof procedure'. This involves the turn-by-turn analysis of talk, to see
how it is that interactants take up what has just been said, and how their response in
turn shapes what might come next For example, it is not enough simply to denote a
statement as constructing fact if it is not treated as such by other interactants. Where
next turn proof procedures cannot be used to verify analytic conclusions, participants'
self-repair can be examined for its orientation to the possible uptake of what was said,
and what might have been said. Thus, in the detail of talk we can see how different
versions of events are worked up, collaborated upon, treated as factual or undermined
in different ways.
There is far less potential for such analysis in one-to-one interviews. A significant
feature of the interview data in this research is that participants' turns are extended and
conversational interaction is minimal. Hutchby & Wooffitt (ibid), however, suggest
that the techniques of conversation analysis can still be a valuable resource for the
study of data collected in this way. Researchers working within this tradition have,
for example, systematically explored the use of particular conversational devices, and
the possible functions they might have. Thus, Drew (1987) discusses the 'po-faced
receipt of teases' as a device that works to counter the potential ascription of a deviant
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identity. Data that have less obviously conversational properties can be examined, and
better understood, with reference to such findings.
The third feature of the data gathered in this thesis, which is relevant to the use of
conversation analysis, is that interviews were conducted via the internet and are
therefore in written form. Oral communication is characterised by such features as
overlaps, turn-taking devices, pauses and self-repair, all of which have been shown to
be potentially significant in the analysis of talk-in-interaction. These features are
absent in written communication, so that there are fewer conversation analytic
resources on which to draw. However, it is still possible to read such data for
properties that are not exclusively oral. For example, extreme case formulations can
be used to present the best possible case for something in order to counter a cynical
uptake (Pomerantz, 1986). These are potentially observable in written as well as
verbal communication.
We can see, then, that conversation analysis provides some powerful resources which
can be drawn upon to examine the data gathered for the research reported in this
thesis. A conversation-analytically sensitive approach can shed light on participants'
construction of illness categories, it can be employed to analyse the use of identity as
an achievement and a tool (Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998b) and to explore issues of
accountability that might arise from the ways in which the chronically ill person copes
with his or her condition.
Another potential resource for the examination of data can be shown by reference to
Riessman's (1990) exploration of the ways in which an MS sufferer managed to
construct a positive identity in the face of disabling illness. She argues that narratives
play a crucial role in helping individuals to make sense - for themselves and for others
- of disruptive events such as the onset of serious and chronic illness. In an extension
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of the usual boundaries of narrative analysis, Riessman examines stories not just for
their linguistic content, but also for the functions they might serve. For example, a
'habitual narrative' tells of the general course of events over a period of time. Her
research participant uses this genre to give an account of the reasons for his divorce.
At other points, however, he produces a more specific story, a description of a
particular event, and this serves to draw the hearer more fully into his world. It is
therefore reserved for the telling of events that orient to particularly significant features
of the speaker's identity. These narrative genres are used strategically, then, to
provide a convincing illustration of the participant as a devoted husband and
responsible worker. Riessman also draws attention to the fact that stories are
necessarily selective renderings, and that accounts can be examined not just for the
kinds of things they describe, but also for areas which are glossed over. A sensitivity
to the action potential of narratives described by Riessman informed the analysis of
data gathered for this thesis.
There remains the question of how we can relate findings to the wider social context
Schegloff (1992) distinguishes between two kinds of context that researchers might
consider: the external, or distal, and the proximate. The former includes such things
as social class, sex and ethnicity, categories that are routinely employed in a great deal
of qualitative psychological research. The latter refers to things that relate only to the
immediate features of the interaction being studied, and so might include the fact that
data arose from an interview, or focus group, and the capacities in which people
speak, for example as interviewer, ME or stroke sufferer, or carer. Schegloff argues
that it is only the proximate context that should be provided by the researcher. Other
features of context are of interest only at those times when they are made relevant by
participants.
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In conversation analysis, the burden of evidence for researchers' claims is on the
demonstration of participants' understanding as demonstrated in the data. Analysis
should not be motivated by researchers' a priori theories. This is a controversial
issue. Radley & Billig (1996), for example, argue that talk about health and illness is
ideological to the extent that it potentially perpetuates and renders 'natural' the social
inequalities that are associated with ill-health. It also presents the sufferer with a
particular type of dilemma. If he or she is to be accorded the entitlements thatmight be
associated with ill-health - for example, sympathy, assistance or appropriate treatment
- it is necessary to make the difficulties of illness manifest. At the same time,
however, he or she has to display socially desirable qualities, such as a positive
outlook, forbearance or strength of character. This, they argue, is the context in
which research is carried out, and it should not be ignored. That is, participants can
reasonably assume that the researcher, who is after all carrying out his or her work, is
healthy. They will therefore orient to the moral requirement of providing an account
of themselves that addresses issues of self-presentation and entitlement.
From a conversation analytic perspective, such an orientation is not discounted, but it
could only be defended where it was identifiable in the data. We cannot assume in
advance that participants will at all times respond with reference to these particular
aspects of the research context, just as we cannot assume that they will necessarily
orient to other characteristics such as the age, sex, or ethnicity of the researcher.
Furthermore, in their discussion of the use of rhetorical devices that can work to
convince a potentially sceptical audience, Hutchby &Wooffitt (1998) make the point
that speakers' utterances may be designed to respond not to the interviewer but to
cynicism in the wider community. This suggests that dilemmatic talk of the type
described by Radley & Billig might be found even if the researcher was not deemed by
participants to be a healthy individual enquiring into the lives of the ill. A sensitivity to
the potential for accountability is therefore important at all times.
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The issue of how research might be situated in a wider social setting divides discourse
theorists, broadly speaking, into two schools of thought. Those whose work is
informed largely by post-structuralist theory, as developed, for example, by Barthes
(1977), Derrida (1976) and Foucault (1972), advocate the 'analysis of discourses'.
Here, discourses are identified by the researcher through an interpretation of
interactions, but are abstracted from their situated context. The adoption of a particular
discourse offers particular implications for the interactant. For example, discourses
can be related to the effects of power or ideology so that those people who adopt a
certain discourse can use it to oppress those who do not, or perhaps cannot, use that
discourse (Parker, 1992). This approach to analysis aims to expose the mechanics of
disempowering ideologies and to give a voice to marginalised sections of society
(Parker & Burman, 1993). The 'analysis of discourses', then, takes what Schegloff
described as the external or distal context as a key to both analysis and action.
The alternative way to locate research in the wider social context, and the one that I use
in this research, is proposed by Potter, Gill, Edwards & Wetherell (1990). It is
rooted in the theories of conversation analysis (Sacks et al., 1974), speech act theory
(Austin, 1962), rhetoric (Billig, 1987), and the sociology of scientific knowledge
(Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984). Potter and colleagues (1990) argue that discourses cannot
be abstracted from their context in interaction. To do this, and to treat them as if they
are independently-existing phenomena which cause certain ideological or power
effects is to reify them in order that they can be used to support the researcher's own
aims. They point instead to the usefulness of the 'interpretative repertoire' to make
sense of the more broadly based social functions of certain constructions. These differ
from 'discourses' in three important respects. First, they are examined as they appear
in interactional context, and are not abstracted from what is said or written. Second,
they are not linked to specific groups of interactants. That is, interpretative repertoires
are thought of as available to a wide range of participants. For example, Gilbert and
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Mulkay (ibid) found that both groups of scientists in their study drew on the two
interpretative repertoires that they identified. This relates to the third point, which is
that the same interpretative repertoire can be used to perform different interactional
tasks. Interpretative repertoires can thus be thought of as a flexible resource for
participants, and it is of particular interest here to see how they might be used by
people with different chronic illnesses, and by participants who were recruited by the
different means of focus groups, email chatlines and email one-to-one
correspondence.
Before the analysis can be done, the data have to be transcribed. There are various
levels at which transcription can be carried out, and the amount of detail provided by
the transcription will depend on the various aims of the analyst Potter &Wetherell
(1987) note the requirement to balance the type of information that is being sought
with issues such as the time taken to transcribe, and the readability of the final
transcript Thus, the process of transcription is unavoidably selective and can itself be
thought of as a prior form of analysis (Ochs, 1979). I had a large amount of data from
different sources, and one ofmy aims was to make some comparison between material
collected in different ways. I therefore transcribed the focus group data using a
modified version of the widely-used system developed by Jefferson (summarised by
ten Have, 1999) that provides enough detail to allow me to explore the content and
local organisation of constructions and accounts. This can be seen in Appendix II. I
transcribed overlapping talk, silences and gross changes in emphasis and intonation.
For the data collected by email, I copied and pasted the content into a separate file,
which therefore had details of date and time sent, recipient email address and so on. I
went through this file and copied just the date, time and content of the email, and at
this point changed the participants' names. I retained the layout, in terms of new lines
taken, new paragraphs, etc as far as possible. I also retained the original spelling and
other features, such as capitalisation.
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For each analytic chapter, I gathered together the responses to questions directly
specifically at the relevant research theme. Thus, I collated responses to questions
relating to illness constructions (chapters 3 and 4), identity (chapters 6 and 7) and
coping (chapters 8 and 9). In the course of analysing the ways in which sufferers
constructed stroke, I became aware of the potential importance of carers' contributions
within the focus groups. I therefore collected extracts in which carers appeared to
hold sufferers accountable for their illness, and also looked for instances in which
such accountability was acknowledged even if not explicit in the text For each
chapter, I also went through responses to the more general questions to identify those
data that appeared to be relevant to each analytic chapter and marked them as such on a
printed copy of the transcripts. In accordance with Potter & Wetherell (1987), where
there was any doubt about the relevance of any data, they were included rather than
excluded. Since all ofmy data were on computer file, I then cut and pasted the
marked sections on to a separate file, and printed this off.
Having gathered a large amount of data for each chapter, I read it over several times in
order to get some idea of broad themes. Discourse analysis has famously been
compared to riding a bicycle or sexing a chicken (Wetherell & Potter, 1992), in the
sense that it is not something that is easy to describe in simple stages, and that to some
extent one learns how to do it in a process of trial and error. Potter & Wetherell
(1987) warn against reading for gist. However, it is extremely difficult in the initial
stages to see anything beyond the content of what is said. They give some guidelines:
look for patterns in the data, and consider the possible functions and consequences of
such patterns. When looking for patterns, it is particularly important to also look for
deviant cases. Clayman & Maynard (1995) compare deviant case analysis with
Garfinkel's (1967) breaching experiments. In these experiments, departures from the
usual pattern of events were used to highlight normative elements that were otherwise
taken for granted. Thus, if a pattern is found, for instance that a question is normally
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followed by a response, then when a response is not forthcoming, we might see an
orientation to the normative question-response pattern in the form of hesitation
markers, or some sort of accounting. In this way, deviant case analysis can support
the existence of normative patterns.
Schegloff (1996) also provides some advice on where to start, and suggests that there
are three aspects to an analysis of talk-in-interaction. First, it is necessary to look at
the action(s) being accomplished. This should then be related back to the text to see
that participants do indeed orient to the action(s) as described by the analyst The third
aspect involves an explication of how it is that the linguistic device used manages to
produce the action(s) in question. I attempted to synthesise these guidelines and
adopted the following strategy. When I thought that an action was being performed -
such as constructingME in a certain way -1 would examine why I was reading the
transcript in the way that I did, and try to relate that to what was happening within the
text. For this, I found it useful to bear in mind what Edwards (1997) refers to as the
'could-have-been-otherwise' quality of talk. That is, every detail of what is said or
written is potentially significant because it was said or written in that particular way,
and at that particular time.
In the course of analysis, I found that the devices used in some stretches of text
seemed to be far more obvious than in others, and that progress was not therefore as
steady as Imight have hoped. It was of some comfort to read Potter &Wetherell's
claim that "often it is only after long hours of struggling with the data and many false
starts that a systematic pattern emerges" (Potter & Wetherell, 1987: 168). Cowan
(1997) makes the analogy of a 'tool kit' that can be used as a resource in analysis.
The tool kit consists of rhetorical and linguistic devices, and systematic sequential
patterns that other researchers have found commonly to occur in interaction. The idea
is that if such a device or pattern is found, then the local text can be examined to
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identify the kinds of actions that might be being performed. I began to index the
various concepts, linguistic devices and patterns (for example, active voicing
(Wooffitt, 1992), extreme case formulations (Pomerantz, 1986), devices used in fact
construction (Potter, 1996) that I came across in my readings, so that I might be more
familiar with the ways in which data can be analysed. I constantly referred back to
this, re-read my own transcripts, and studied as many theoretical papers and texts as I
could. The process of analysis was therefore somewhat recursive.
A potential issue of concern for anyone using an analytical approach that by its nature
cannot be described in a set of 'how-to' rules, is that the results should stand up to
scrutiny. Potter &Wetherell (1987) note four ways in which analytical conclusions
can be validated. The first is that "a set of analytic claims should give coherence to a
body of discourse" (Potter & Wetherell, 1987: 170). Second, participants' own
orientations can be used to defend the analyst's claims. Third, if a pattern is found,
then we might find that it brings with it new problems that have to be dealt with as part
of the local interactional business. They give the example of turn-taking procedures,
first described by Sacks and colleagues (1974). Powerful normative patterns that
function to allow conversation to run smoothly bring with them the problem of how to
end an interaction. Patterns that deal with this secondary problem support the
existence of the patterns found to solve the primary problem. Lastly, an analysis has
some validity to the extent that it is fruitful, or useful in helping us to understand an
area of research. To this I would add that, unlike in other forms of qualitative
analysis, discourse and conversation analysts do not paraphrase participants'
contributions, nor do they take single examples of utterances out of context to make a
case for a particular finding. All of the analytical process is explained and can be
verified by the reader. In this particular piece of work, I had the additional validation
check provided by regular meetings, discussions and feedback from my academic
supervisors.
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Before moving on to the analytic chapters, I would like to make it clear that I do not
offer participants' constructions simply as versions of events to be deconstructed and
therefore undermined. That is, I follow Heritage's (1984b) argument that when we
show how something is constructed, and indeed that it is constructed, we do not imply
that it is therefore without value or significance. This is a particular concern when
dealing with the discourses and written texts of groups whose own version of events
has had little voice in the traditional research literature. Furthermore, Wetherell (2001)
makes the point that "results are not found they are warranted into being", and
therefore this thesis itself can be seen as a work of construction. In the following
chapters I warrantmy interpretation of sufferers' constructions ofME (chapter 3) and
then of stroke (chapter 4). Accountability and stroke is discussed in chapter 5. ME
and stroke sufferers constructions' of identity are analysed, respectively, in chapters 6






In Chapter 1,1 discussed the ways in which ME has been described and defined in the
literature. It is generally agreed that the main symptom is enduring fatigue. No
physical cause has been found, and the most commonly reported risk factor is reported
to be the co-existence of either physical or psychological stress (Levine et al., 1999).
This, and the fact that fatigue is a symptom of many psychiatric disorders, most
notably depressive illness, has led some to doubt the physical basis ofME. Indeed, in
the medical literature, the term ME' has been abandoned because it implies a specific
physical abnormality which has not been supported in the research. That is, 'ME'
stands for Myalgic Encephalomyelitis, which suggests muscle pain combined with
inflammation of the brain and spinal cord. This term has been replaced by 'Chronic
Fatigue Syndrome' or 'CFS'. A number of working groups have tried to produce a
case definition of CFS, and one of the main difficulties they have had is in ascertaining
the extent to which it might involve psychological or psychiatric problems.
The finding that stress is a risk factor in ME has led some researchers to look at the
possibility that an examination of the personal characteristics of sufferers might shed
light on this illness. Thus, it has been suggested that the hectic lifestyle prior to the
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onset of illness, described by many ME sufferers, may be a contributing factor in this
condition (Eichner, 1989; Riley etal., 1990; Ware, 1992; Wessely & Powell, 1989).
There is no reliable evidence as to the cause ofME, but it is thought by some that the
ways in which sufferers understand and respond to their condition might help
perpetuate it (Sharpe et al., 1996; Surawy et al., 1995; Wessely et al., 1989). The
recommended treatment is therefore cognitive behavioural therapy - aimed at changing
sufferers' perceptions of their illness - drug treatment for depression, and graded
exercise programmes designed to demonstrate to sufferers that they are capable of
gradually increasing their levels of activity without causing a worsening of their
symptoms. These treatments are based on the underlying assumption that sufferers'
beliefs about their illness are wrong. The aim of this chapter is to explore how people
with ME construct this condition.
When asked to describe their illness, the ME sufferers in this study oriented to ME as
a problematic condition. A preliminary analysis identified three analytic themes.
First, a number of devices that were used to stress the seriousness of this condition.
Second, participants worked to constructME as an enigmatic illness. Finally,
respondents used formulations that were oriented particularly to potential claims that
ME has a psychological basis, and specifically that it might be a form of depression.
The extracts are coded to indicate their source. 'ICC' stands for 'Internet Chadine
Communication, which means that the contents, although addressed to me, were also
distributed throughout the membership of the ME internet support group, in such a
way that participants could respond to each others' comments. 'IPC' indicates that
this was an 'Internet Personal Communication'. These responses were emailed direct
to me, and were therefore private correspondence. 'FG1' and 'FG2' denote focus
groups 1 and 2, respectively.
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All of the internet data are quoted with spelling and punctuation as in the original,
including such features as line breaks, use of capitalisation, and apparent
typographical errors. This was done by cutting and pasting the content of emails
rather than re-typing them.
1. Constructions ofME as a serious illness
Participants in this research constructed their illness in terms of a set of symptoms,
and one way in which this was done was by listing the features ofME. This can be
seen in the following extract, which was an internet chatline response to my question
"how would you describe having ME to someone who doesn't know anything about
it?":
Extract 3:1 MEICCp58 Billy
27 It's still annoying that there's no proper description of the disease in
28 any literature, whereas really there is a very unique symptomatology.
29 Mainly the frequent fluctuation of signs, within hours everything can
30 change. The alcohol intolerance, (you look to others like you're a
31 chronic alcoholic and you haven't had, or desired, a drink in six
32 months). The IBS [Irritable Bowel Syndrome]. The memory loss.
33 Concentration gone. Can't absorb anything read. Emotional IQ
34 completely zeroed out. Fuzzy vision - it looks as if you're looking at a
35 two-dimensional screen, the 3D effect goes and the focus is difficult.
36 Vertigo or giddiness - things don't look steady. Odd attacks of
37 unaccountable backache or joint pain that may last days, weeks, then
38 just go. Can't get to sleep normally; wake up much too early in the
39 morning, so feel tired as a consequence. Night sweats. Muscles that
40 ache or hurt after minor exercise, like turning the car.
In extract 3:1, Billy uses a list construction to warrant the seriousness of his illness.
This is particularly evident when compared with the grammatical style he uses at the
start of this extract. He begins with a sentence that is both complete and fairly long:
"It's still annoying that there's no proper description of the disease in any literature,
whereas really there is a very unique symptomatology" (lines 27-28). In contrast to
this, what follows has a list-like appearance. Thus, in line 29 he moves to the use of
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phrases, and short sentences that lack part of a verb or a personal pronoun. For
example, "Concentration gone. Can't absorb anything read. Emotional IQ completely
zeroed out" (lines 33-34); "Night sweats. Muscles that ache or hurt after minor
exercise, like turning the car" (lines 39-40). He also makes repeated use of the
definite article where it would usually be left out - "the frequent fluctuation of signs"
(line 29); "[t]he alcohol intolerance" (line 30); "[t]he IBS" (line 32); "[t]he memory
loss" (line 32). The effect is to suggest that these are symptoms that are generally
associated with ME, and this helps to construct the reality of symptoms as, literally,
definite articles. In the following extract, we can see how George uses listing to
construct ME as a serious illness.
Extract 3:2 MEICCp26 George
3 You feel profoundly tired physically and mentally for no good reason.
4 You get odd aches and pains (especially headaches and muscle
5 tension). If you overdo things, you feel absolutely shattered.
Jefferson (1991) showed that a three-part list is commonly used to orient to a common
feature of each of the items in it. In extract 3:2, George's three-part list describes the
symptoms of ME in terms of their debilitating nature. Thus, "You feel profoundly
tired physically and mentally for no good reason" (line 3); "You get odd aches and
pains (especially headaches and muscle tension)" (lines 4-5); "If you overdo things,
you feel absolutely shattered" (line 5).
In extract 3:3, Alex, another internet respondent, also uses a list formulation:
Extract 3:3 MEICCp17 Alex
1 My sleep pattern has gone out of the window.
2
3 My muscles ache.
4
5 I'm not tired, I'm exhausted yet I haven't moved off the sofa.
6
7 I get 5 or 6 different types of headache.
8
9 My vision has deteriorated very quickly.
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10
11 I start to talk and forget.... in mid sentence.
12
13 Oh, I must not forget I suffer from IBS [Irritable Bowel Syndrome].
Here, Alex leaves a blank line between each symptom description, so that his account
ofME gives the visual impression of a list. In line 13, he writes "Oh, I must not
forget I suffer from IBS." To introduce this illness as an apparent afterthought, and at
the end of a list, emphasises the importance of the symptoms that came before. Thus,
Alex constructs ME as a serious illness.
We can see in the following extract how focus group participants collaboratively
constructed ME by each contributing to the listing of symptoms.
Extract 3:4 FGME2
1 Jennifer: how would you describe having ME to someone who
2 doesn't know anything about it?
3 Rhona: hhh unbelievable
4 Liz: aye
5 Rhona: e::m tiredness (..) you get switched off
6 I -iz: aye
7 Rhona: you can be sitting (.) no [not] even doing anything
8 Jennifer: mm
9 Rhona: and it's like somebody (..) switches you off and you
10 have got to lie down (..) or you you fall asleep [unclear]
11 Liz: your brain doesnae work properly either
12 Jennifer: mhmm
13 Rhona: fuzzy head
14 Liz: aye
15 Rhona: muscle and (.) joint pain
After Rhona's comment in lines 7-9 that "you can be sitting (.) no even doing anything
[...] and it's like somebody (..) switches you off and you have got to lie down (..) or
you fall asleep", Liz follows with "your brain doesnae work properly either" (line 11).
Then, in lines 13 and 15 Rhona adds to the list "fuzzy head"; "muscle and joint pain."
These last contributions are given with no introduction or explanation, and this adds to
the impression of a list being produced.
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We can see from the above extracts that listing is a useful device to constructME as a
serious illness with an accumulation of symptoms that illustrate the extent and range of
problems faced by sufferers. In the following extract, Debbie makes use of vivid
description to construct her condition as serious.
Extract 3:5 MEICCp2 Debbie
15 Constant thick head that sometimes hurts so badly that you could beg
16 someone to hit you with a hammer as that would probably feel better.
[...]
36 Complete exhaustion where your eyes are rolling into the back of your
37 head and your eyelids refuse to stay open and yet there is no way you
38 can sleep.
Debbie's description here of a "[c]onstant thick head that sometimes hurts so badly
that you could beg someone to hit you with a hammer" (lines 15-16) is vivid. Her
choice of the verb "beg" also helps to suggest the desperate nature of such a request,
and this helps to emphasise the extreme nature of the pain to which she refers. Later
in the same email, she uses another visual image to construct the extent of exhaustion
felt by the ME sufferer: "where your eyes are rolling into the back of your head and
your eyelids refuse to stay open" (lines 36-37). We can see in the next three extracts
how participants used analogy to similarly make vivid the serious impact ofME.
Extract 3:6 FGME1
3 Mandy: there is a definition that I've read of the (.) ME Action if
4 you imagine (.) that you've got (.) severe 'flu (.)
5 Claire: mhmm
6 Mandy you've got a hangover (.)
7 Jennifer: mhmm=
8 Mandy so you've got the tummy and the head
9 Jennifer: yeah
10 Mandy and all the 'flu aches and pains (.) and then (.) if you
11 imagine you've just run a marathon (.)
12 Jennifer: mhmm
13 Mandy you put all those together and you have ME
Extract 3:7 MEICCpl Lynn
4 Remember your worst flu virus you had,now run a marathon,on top of
5 that you have a migrain,feel dizzy,hurt from head to toe.Try to play
6 chessblindfolded,and havent slept for a week.Wake up feeling ok„„ 15
7 minutes later are unable to even get out of bed with out help,every
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8 muscleand joint feels like its on fire,and suddely find out you become
9 dyxlexic, Im sure there are other things ive forgotten.
Extract 3:8 MEICCpl Emily
9 I usually tell my friends that I feel like I have been out all night
10 drinking pints of vodka & tequilla slammers and then forced to run a
11 marathon on top of a dose of flu.
In extracts 3:6 and 3:7, the respondents call upon the reader or listener to imagine what
it is like to have ME. This is done by comparing it to relatively commonplace
experiences that most people would understand. Thus, in extract 3:6, Mandy invites
us to "imagine (.) that you've got (.) severe 'flu (.) [...] you've got a hangover" (lines
4-6); and "imagine you've just run a marathon" (line 11). The common feature of this
three-part list (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984; Jefferson, 1991) is that it comprises
symptoms that most people would be able to appreciate, and many from personal
experience. Similarly, in extract 3:7, Lynn asks the reader to "[rjemember your worst
flu virus you had,now run a marathon,on top of that you have a migrain [sic]" (lines
4-5). This is the beginning of a longer list of the effects ofME. In both of these
extracts, the use of analogy can be seen as an orientation to having the interlocutor
empathise with the ME sufferer. In extract 3:8, Emily offers an account that suggests
she has used this strategy more than once: "I usually tellmyfriends that I feel like I
have been out all night drinking pints of vodka and tequilla slammers and then forced
to run a marathon on top of a dose of flu" (lines 9-11; emphasis added). Here, the
example of alcohol intake is extreme - not only drinking strong spirits by the pint
when they would usually be taken in small measures, but mixing drinks which would
add to the harmful effect. Similarly, in extract 3:7, Lynn's description is of "your
worst flu virus you had" (line 4). Pomerantz (1986) has shown that extreme case
formulations, such as "always", or "never" can be used to provide the strongest
possible case for what is being said, in anticipation of a potentially cynical uptake.
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By comparing ME symptoms to extreme forms ofmore everyday experiences,
participants orient to the potential charge that their fatigue is similar to the kinds of
tiredness commonly felt by other people, and is therefore not a serious condition.
In the following three extracts, we can see how participants used the categorisation of
'good' and 'bad' days to construct ME as a serious illness.
Extract 3:9 MEIPCpl Sheena
1 I heard one description once which I thought was really good:
2 A bad day is like having a bad dose of 'flu with a hangover and also
3 feeling as if you've just climbed a couple of Munros2! A good day is
4 like the aftermath of 'flu when you just feel totally exhausted.
Extract 3:10 MEIPCp6 Dorothy
1 imagine Thatyou had to climb everest, then ran a marathon, then swim
2 ten miles. To do all that gives you an idea of what it's like to start a
3 *good* day with ME. And then it gets worse. Much worse.
Extract 3:11 MEICCp2 Debbie
1 on really bad days I don't even remember what my own childrens
2 names and ages are or even how old I am anymore.
In the first extract above (3:9), Sheena describes two types of day that the ME sufferer
might experience. She begins with a three-part list (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984;
Jefferson, 1991) in which the common feature is that each circumstance would bring
about physical debilitation of some sort: "A bad day is like having a dose of 'flu with a
hangover and also feeling as if you've just climbed a couple of Munros!" (lines 2-3).
This constructs ME as serious, and the effect is emphasised by the sentence that
follows: "A good day is like the aftermath of 'flu when you just feel totally exhausted"
(line 4). Thus, although a 'good' day compares somewhat favourably with a 'bad'
day, it is nevertheless still portrayed as debilitating. The extreme case formulation
(Pomerantz, 1986) "totally exhausted" helps to provide the strongest possible case for
her claim and a useful defence against the possible suggestion that what she is
2A Munro is a mountain of 3,000 feet or more in height
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describing is simply everyday tiredness. Lee (1987) has described the functions of the
particle 'just'. In this case, it has an emphatic meaning, and this further helps to stress
the level of exhaustion felt on a 'good day'.
In extract 3:10, Dorothy uses two devices that I have already discussed in this chapter.
She employs a three-part list (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984; Jefferson, 1991) in which
the common feature is that each pursuit would lead to extreme tiredness, and she also
invites the reader to empathise with the situation of the ME sufferer: "imagine Thatyou
[sic] had to climb Everest, then run a marathon, then swim ten miles" (lines 1-2). She
then claims that "[t]o do all that give you an idea ofwhat it's like to start a *good* day
with ME" (lines 2-3). Here, a contrast is not explicit, but the categorisation 'good'
day implies an alternative category of 'bad' day, and this is further suggested by the
use of asterisks to stress the adjective 'good'. Thus, we can infer that a 'bad' day
with ME is marked by even more severe symptoms, and that the illness is therefore
serious. Debbie also uses one part of the 'good' and 'bad' day categorisation to
similar effect. In extract 3:11, she makes the claim that "on really bad days I don't
even remember what my own childrens [sic] names and ages are or even how old I am
any more" (lines 1-2). For most people, knowing their children's names is something
that they would take for granted and could hardly imagine forgetting. The effect of
"my own childrens" is to make relevant her parenthood, and the seriousness of an
illness that results in such lapses.
I have already noted that one feature of participants' analogies is that they invite the
reader or listener to empathise with them, and this can be done by comparing ME to
more extreme versions of activities that many people would know to be associated
with fatigue, often from personal experience. In the following extracts, we can see
that participants constructed ME as serious by describing sufferers' inability to
perform mundane tasks.
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Extract 3:12 MEIPCp2 Dorothy
24 Holding a pen or a book become thing to be proud of;-)
25 Reading becomes something you can do only in short stints. Walking
26 becomes a trial.
Extract 3:13 MEICCpl 15 Gillian
8 When speaking you have to use tone, facial expression, nods of the
9 head, laughter, gesticulations, which just exhausts my muscles within
10 minutes.
Extract 3:14 MEICCpl3 Lesley
57 standing is one of the most dangerous things one can do.
Extract 3:15 FGME2
816 Rhona if I stand for long periods (.) I don't know about
817 you
818 Liz: terrible
819 Rhona: that kills you
820 Liz: terrible
In extracts 3:12-3:15, we can see that internet and focus group participants constructed
everyday activities as unusually demanding. Thus, in extract 3:12, Dorothy produces
a three-part list (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984; Jefferson, 1991) that orients to the
amount of effort involved in mundane tasks: "[hjolding a pen or book become [sic]
thing to be proud of;-) Reading becomes something you can do only in short stints.
Walking becomes a trial" (lines 24-26). Gillian, in extract 3:13, uses a list formulation
to emphasise the effort involved in talking to other people: "[wjhen speaking you have
to use tone, facial expression, nods of the head, laughter, gesticulations, which just
exhausts my muscles within minutes" Gines 8-10). In extract 3:14, Lesley describes
standing as unexpectedly demanding - "one of the most dangerous things one can do"
(line 57). In extract 3:15, focus group participants collaborate to similarly construct
standing as unusually effortful. In lines 818 and 820, Liz evaluates standing for long
periods as "terrible", while Rhona's comment is "that kills you" (line 819).
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When participants construct mundane activities in this way, they stress the contrast
between the difficulties they have, and the experiences ofmost other people, who
would find all of these tasks quite straightforward and unremarkable. The effect is to
construct their physical condition as serious. Another effect of this device is that it
helps to defend against the potential charge that ME sufferers bring about their fatigue
by overdoing things. This can be seen as an orientation to the possible interpretation
ofME as an illness of 'high achievers', brought on by an unusually active and
demanding lifestyle. In the next section, I will show how participants orient to the
same issues when they construct ME as a mystery illness. First, however, I will
discuss a more general feature of the extracts examined so far in this chapter.
A further notable feature of participants' constructions ofME as a serious illness
relates to their use of pronouns and in particular differences between internet and focus
group data. In two of the three focus group extracts discussed in this chapter, ME
sufferers use the second person plural when describing what it is like to have this
illness. Thus, in extract 3:4, Rhona states "you get switched off [...] you can be
sitting no even doing anything [...] and it's like somebody switches you off or you
fall asleep [unclear] your brain doesnae work properly either" (lines 5-11). Similarly,
in extract 3:6: "if you imagine (.) that you've got (.) severe 'flu (.) [...] you've got a
hangover [...] so you've got the tummy and the head [...] and all the 'flu aches and
pains (.) and then (.) if you imagine you've just run a marathon (.) [...] you put all
those together and you have ME" (Mandy; lines 3-13). The use of 'you' suggests that
the symptoms described are generally associated with ME, and this helps to construct
an identity for the illness itself.
We might tentatively suggest a pattern here, and one way of exploring this is to look at
a case where the first person singular pronoun is used. This can be seen in extract
3:15 above, in which Rhona says "if I stand for long periods (.) I don't know about
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you [...] that kills you" (lines 816-819). Here, we see a pronoun shift. She begins
by using "I." There follows a short pause, and an insertion clause in which she
explicitly seeks some sort of collaboration regarding the effects of standing - "I don't
know about you." Liz takes this up as an invitation to provide an assessment, but
does so selectively, in that she does not refer to her own experience. Instead, she uses
no pronoun at all: "terrible." In Rhona's turn that follows, her claim is general rather
than personal: "that kills you." It seems from this extract, then, that it may be
somewhat problematic to use "I" when discussing the effects ofME as serious. Thus,
when participants use the pronoun "you", it may function not just to suggest general
features ofME, but also as a means of avoiding the use of the first person singular
pronoun.
When those extracts taken from the internet are examined, it can be seen that "you" is
quite commonly used. For example, in extract 3:2, George writes "[y]ou feel
profoundly tired physically and mentally for no good reason. You get odd aches and
pains (especially headaches and muscle tension). If you overdo things, you feel
absolutely shattered" (lines 3-5). In extract 3:10, Dorothy writes "imagine Thatyou
[sic] had to climb everest, then run a marathon, then swim ten miles. To do all that
gives you an idea of what it's like to start a *good* day with ME" (lines 1-3). We can
see in extract 3:1 that Billy also uses the second person plural pronoun - "you look to
others like you're a chronic alcoholic and you haven't had, or desired a drink in six
months" (lines 30-32). It is interesting that in this same extract, when describing
symptoms that are quite specific, and so might reasonably be considered to relate to
personal experience, Billy omits the pronoun where it would normally be expected.
Thus, "[cjan't get to sleep normally; wake up much too early in the morning, so feel
tired as a consequence. Night sweats. Muscles that ache or hurt after minor exercise,
like turning the car" (lines 38-40).
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So far, then, we have seen a similar pattern in data collected from different sources.
There is one significant difference however, and this is in the use of the first person
singular in internet extracts. Alex, in extract 3:3, makes repeated use of "my" and "I":
"[m]y sleep pattern has gone out of the window. My muscles ache. I'm not tired, I'm
exhausted yet I haven't moved off the sofa. I get 5 or 6 different types of headache.
My vision has deteriorated very quickly. I start to talk and forget... in mid sentence.
Oh, I must not forget, I suffer from IBS" (lines 1-13). In extract 3:8, Emily similarly
uses the first person singular: "I usually tell my friends that I feel like I have been out
all night drinking pints of vodka and tequilla slammers and then forced to run a
marathon on top of a dose of flu" (lines 9-11). In extract 3:11, Debbie writes "on
really bad days I don't even remember what my own childrens [sic] name and ages are
or even how old I am anymore" (lines 1-2). This last extract is quite explicitly
personal in its description of the impact ofME.
In the example taken from focus group responses, we saw the pronoun shift from "I"
to "you", and an inserted request for some sort of collaboration regarding the effects
ofME. These suggest that the use of "I" might have been somewhat problematic.
However, no such indications can be found in the internet extracts discussed above.
Thus, while we can see a degree of similarity between the different sources of data,
internet participants appear to have greater potential for flexibility in their use of
pronouns. The second person plural can work to suggest that symptoms described are
global. It can also function to distance the speaker from the views that are expressed.
It may be more accountable to use the first person singular in the context of focus
groups, where other interactants can possibly challenge what is said.
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2, CQnstmCtiQng Qf ME as an enigmatic illness
ME sufferers in this research constructed their illness as enigmatic. This can be seen
by drawing on extracts already presented in this chapter. For ease of reference, the
original extract number appears in brackets:
Extract 3:16 (also 3:1) MEICCp58 Billy
30 The alcohol intolerance, (you look to others like you're a
31 chronic alcoholic and you haven't had, or desired, a drink in six
32 months).
[...]
36 Vertigo or giddiness - things don't look steady. Odd attacks of
37 unaccountable backache or joint pain that may last days, weeks, then
38 just go.
Extract 3:17 (also 3:7) MEICCpl Lynn
6 Wake up feeling ok„„15
7 minutes later are unable to even get out of bed with out help
Extract 3:18 (also 3:2) MEICCp26 George
3 You feel profoundly tired physically and mentally for no good reason.
4 You get odd aches and pains
Extract 3:19 (also 3:3) MEICCpl 7 Alex
5 I'm not tired, I'm exhausted yet I haven't moved off the sofa.
Extract 3:20 (also 3:4) FGME2
you can be sitting (.) no [not] even doing anything
mm
and it's like somebody (..) switches you off and you
have got to lie down (..) or you you fall asleep [unclear]
your brain doesnae work properly either
em (.) it's just a weird weird thing it's no [not] one thing
and it's no [not] one thing (..) two days in a row
mhmm















In all of the above extracts, participants write or speak about ME as an enigmatic
illness. Thus, in extract 3:16, Billy writes about "[o]dd attacks of unaccountable
backache or joint pain thatmay last days, weeks, then just go" (lines 36-38; emphasis
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added). Here, "just" is used in the deprecatory sense (Lee, 1987), in which what is
described is downplayed in comparison to some implicit referent, or an alternative
process. We might normally expect such pains to go after some sort of treatment, or
period of rest. However, as Billy describes it, they 'just' go, and this draws attention
to the lack of imputed reason for their disappearance. Lynn also writes about the
inexplicable nature of her symptoms, and uses a contrast formulation to emphasise the
serious nature ofME: "[wjake up feeling ok,,,,[sic] 15 minutes later are unable to even
get out of bed with out help" (lines 6-7). By providing specific detail as to the time
between these states, she stresses the sudden and dramatic onset of her incapacity. In
extract 3:20, Liz makes the claim "em (.) it's just a weird weird thing it's no one thing
and it's no one thing (..) two days in a row" (lines 29-30; emphasis added). In extract
3:18, George writes that "[y]ou get odd aches and pains (line 4; emphasis added).
Immediately prior to this, he explicitly denies that there might be some identifiable
cause: "You feel profoundly tired physically and mentallyfor no good reason" (line 3;
emphasis added).
In the last two extracts above, participants use a contrast structure to explicitly
formulate symptoms as not being the result of their prior actions or activities. Thus, in
extract 3:19, Alex writes "I'm not tired, I'm exhausted yet I haven't moved off the
sofa" (line 5). Here, "yet" signals the contrast between Alex's previous state of
inactivity, and the exhaustion that he reports. Similarly, in extract 3:20, Rhona sets up
a contrast between what she was doing prior to feeling fatigue, and the extreme nature
of that fatigue: "you can be sitting (.) no even doing anything [...] and it's like
somebody (..) switches you off and you have go! to lie down" (lines 7-10). Rhona
also emphasises her passive role in this by suggesting that the agent is external - "it's
like somebody (..) switches you off." In extract 3:16, Billy writes that "you look to
others like you're a chronic alcoholic and you haven't had, or desired, a drink in six
months" (lines 30-32). As well as using a contrast formulation here, Billy specifically
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orients to the possible charge that his symptoms are brought about by his own actions.
He manages this by stating that not only has he not had a drink for six months, but
that he has not even desired one. In doing this, he reconstructs his symptoms as
causing his distaste for alcohol, rather than being caused by an excessive intake.
3. Constructions ofME as 'not psychological'
In this section, I will show how participants orient to the possibility that others might
take sufferers' fatigue to be due to lack of motivation, or to depression. I will begin
by examining part of a focus group discussion.
Extract 3:21 FGME2
689 Liz: when you say "cannae be bothered" (.) it sounds as if (.)




694 Liz: it it's (..) you know it's no [not] lazy it's (..) you just ()
695 havenae got the energy to do it .h (.) and that's what you
696 say "oh I cannae [can't] be bothered doing that" but it (.)
697 it's no [not] that it's (.) you haven't got the energy to get
698 yourself up out the chair (.) to do it (.) and (..) you just
699 cannae [can't] fathom out what what's going on
In extract 3:21, Liz uses an appearance/reality formulation to construct her incapacity
as due to lack of energy rather than laziness. Potter & Wetherell (1989) have shown
how this formulation can help to construct the reality of what is being claimed. It
involves setting up a construction as the one that may appear to be obvious, then
undermining it by producing the construction that is 'real'. An example of this can be
seen in the first extract of section 2 (3:16), when Alex contrasted the appearance "you
look to others like you're a chronic alcoholic" with the reality "you haven't had, or
desired a drink in six months" (lines 30-32). Here, Liz makes a similar
appearance/reality contrast: "when you say "cannae be bothered" (.) it sounds as if (.)
to me lazy [...] it it's (..) you know it's no lazy it's (..) you just havenae got the
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energy to do it" (lines 689-695). The appearance of ME is constructed as one in
which the sufferer lacks the motivation to do something. With "it sounds as if', Liz
orients to the interpretation that others might have ofME sufferers' inactivity.
Immediately after this, there is what seems to be a repair. That is, we might expect in
the context something like "it sounds as if you're being lazy." What Liz does is to
pause briefly then say "to me lazy." She therefore actively positions herself as a
person who understands this assumption of a lack of motivation. This works to
construct Liz herself as impartial, making the same initial assumptions that any other
observer might have done. In turn, this construction helps to strengthen the reality
claim that follows. In the last lines of this extract, Liz also constructs ME as an
enigmatic illness with her claim "you just cannae fathom out what's going on" (lines
698-699).
In the last two extracts, participants orient to the potential claim that ME is some form
of depression, and in each they refer to the knowledge of a 'reliable witness' to
support their claim.
Extract 3:22 FGME2
475 Liz: a:nd I mean before I went to the doctor (.) the last
476 time before I was () diagnosed or () she agreed with
477 me () I did say to my husband "look (..) do you think
478 it's depression or do you think there's something wrong
479 with me () do you think (.) I'm just making it all up or
480 whatever" he says "no" he says "I live with you day to
481 day and (.) and I know there is definitely something (.)
482 wrong"
483 Jennifer: mm=
484 Liz it's no [not] depression I actually (.) suffered from
485 depression (.) years ago (.) a:nd so I knew it wasnae
486 [wasn't] depression
Extract 3:23 MEIPCp7 Dorothy
29 I called my husbaband into the Drs surgery and told him in front of the
30 Dr what his dx [diagnosis] was. My husband laughed and said that
31 there was no way I was depressed and that as his field of work was
32 mental health he reckoned that he might have spotted the signs in his
33 wife were they present.
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In the above extracts, both Liz and Dorothy make relevant the status of 'husband' as
witness to their condition. Sacks (1974; 1975) has noted that category entitlement can
warrant claims to knowledge, and in this case, someone in the category of a husband,
could be warranted with detailed knowledge of his wife. Potter (1996) also notes the
usefulness of providing corroboration in rendering an account as factual. In extract
3:22, Liz describes a conversation she had "I did say to my husband "look (..) do you
think it's depression or do you think there's something wrong with me" (lines 477-
479). This sets up depression as not something wrong, which suggests that Liz
herself associates depression with malingering. Wooffitt (1992) has shown that
'active voicing' can be used to construct the reality of the reported speech. So, when
Liz quotes her husband, the account appears more convincing than if she had merely
summarised what he had said in her own words. In her account, her husband does
not simply say "no." He also makes relevant his close relationship with her: "I live
with you day to day (.) and I know there is definitely something wrong" (lines 480-
482). He therefore takes up Liz's formulation of 'something wrong' and so both
confirms her first explanation and rejects the alternative one of depression.
In extract 3:23, Dorothy also calls on an 'expert witness' to support her claim that she
is not suffering from depression. She also makes relevant the status of 'husband' and
therefore allows us to infer the kinds of category entitlement described above. Thus,
in line 29: "I called my husbaband [sic] into the Drs surgery", and in lines 30-31
where she reports his reaction to the doctor's diagnosis: "[m]y husband laughed and
said that there was no way I was depressed." Laughter is a surprising reaction to a
being told of a partner's depression, and this account formulates such a diagnosis as
not only wrong but risible. Dorothy's husband's special knowledge is also made
relevant in lines 31-32: "his field of work was mental health", and for a third time then-
relationship as a married couple is signalled: "he reckoned that he might have spotted
the signs in his wife were they present" (lines 32-33; emphasis added). Thus, the
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husband's credentials as a person with knowledge of depression, and as someone
who has a close relationship with Dorothy, are used to expose the doctor's diagnosis
of depression as inaccurate.
4. Summary
Participants in this research displayed sensitivity to potential implications that this
illness is not serious, that it is brought on by over-activity, and that it is linked to
depression. I have shown how respondents constructed their illness as serious. They
did this by using three-part lists (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984; Jefferson, 1991), and
longer list formulations. They used vivid descriptions. They constructedME by
analogy with everyday experiences that cause debilitating tiredness - such as having
the 'flu or running a marathon. This allowed them to invite the non-sufferer to
empathise with their situation. The categorisation of 'good' and 'bad' days was used
to stress the level of exhaustion that is part ofME. In general, the use of extreme case
formulations (Pomerantz, 1986) distinguished the symptoms ofME from 'normal'
fatigue. Participants also described the difficulties they had in carrying out mundane
activities. This descriptive strategy also enabled participants to orient to the potential
charge that their illness was brought on by their previous levels of activity.
Some subtle differences were noted between focus group and internet participants' use
of pronouns when constructing their condition as serious. It appeared to be potentially
less problematic for internet respondents to use the first person singular, thus referring
explicitly to personal experiences and views.
Participants constructed ME as an enigmatic illness. Such a construction emphasises
their passive role in developing symptoms. Respondents also oriented to the potential
accusation that their incapacity could be attributed to a lack of motivation, or to
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depression. They used appearance/reality formulations (Potter &Wetherell, 1989)
and active voicing (Wooffitt, 1992) of 'reliable witness' testimony to construct as real
their claims that ME is not laziness, nor is it depression.
5, Discussion
In the literature review, I showed that there is open debate about what constitutes ME,
or CFS. A fundamental issue relates to the extent to which this can be thought of as a
physical, or a psychological illness. In this chapter, we have seen that participants
constructed their illness as serious, as enigmatic, and as specifically not psychological
Similar results have been found by other researchers. Bland (1995), for example,
found that participants used extreme case formulations to stress the serious nature of
their illness. Horton-Salway (1998; 2001b) and Tucker (2004) record sufferers' use
of corroboration and active voicing to construct their illness as physical. In Horton-
Salway's (2004) discourse analysis of discussions between a psychiatrist and an ME
support group, she shows that what is at stake is whether sufferers can be seen to
'know their own minds'. She concludes that their techniques of fact construction are
rhetorically less powerful than one which refers to the 'doctors' category' of masked
depression.
Kitzinger & Farquhar (1999) suggest that focus group interaction can encourage open
conversation about difficult issues, although there is also the possibility of a kind of
communal censorship. The latter is not a problemper se for research; indeed it can
point up areas of sensitivity. Such actions can be studied by contrasting focus group
with one-to-one interviews. In this thesis, internet communication provides a useful
comparison, one that suggests that the construction of ME may be an accountable
practice. Thus, the context in which data are gathered may be of some significance.
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Traditional research into ME is based on the empiricist assumption that ultimately this
illness can be defined, and then categorised as either physical or psychological.
Definitions are provided by clinicians and researchers, and these can be compared with
the illness attributions of those suffering from ME. In the case of this condition, it has
been reported that sufferers' beliefs about their illness are faulty.
A social constructionist approach to the ways in which people talk about their illness
has a different starting point It does not assume that so-called beliefs, attitudes or
attributions are reflections of particular, private mental states. Rather, they are
regarded as situated, communicative productions designed to perform particular
rhetorical tasks (Potter, 1997; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992).
Horton-Salway (1998; 2001b) notes that the rhetorical and interactive nature of illness
accounts has been ignored in cognitivist approaches. ME sufferers' descriptions of
their illness has been taken at face value as evidence for theoretical interpretations of
the cause of this condition. Thus, sufferers' apparent pre-occupation with its
seriousness, or its enigmatic nature, has been used to support the use of cognitive
behavioural therapy to change 'dysfunctional' beliefs (Wessely, 1996). Sufferers'
accounts might, however, stress the seriousness and mysterious nature ofME
precisely to counter claims that it is not a legitimate, physical illness. This has
important implications for the ways in which ME might best be treated.
Stroke has a more legitimate status as a physical illness than does ME. In the next





In Chapter 1,1 provided an outline of the ways in which stroke has been described
and defined in research carried out from a number of different perspectives. In the
medical literature, the emphasis is on the neurological deficits brought about by
particular types of stroke, and how these can vary with the location of brain injury.
Thus, the consequences of stroke are predominantly viewed in terms of biological
impairment However, the mapping of brain damage to neurological deficit has been
shown to be problematic in two particular areas. Working from a conversation
analytic perspective, Manzo and colleagues (1995) challenged the view that linguistic
difficulty is simply the result of left hemisphere damage. In their analysis of
interactions between stroke sufferers and their partners, they showed that
communicative 'dysfluency' was instead a function of sufferers' disempowered
status.
The second medically problematic area, in the sense that it cannot be mapped to
specific injury, is the symptom described as 'anosagnosia'. This refers to the
sufferer's apparent failure to acknowledge the dysfunction brought about by his or her
stroke. In the absence of a biological explanation, the problem has been attributed to
psychological factors. For example, anosagnosia has been described as a cognitive
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deficit - a problem with the sufferer's thought processes. From the perspective of
cognitive psychology, the knowledge that sufferers (and non-sufferers alike) have of
illness takes the form of cognitive schemas that relate separately to five distinct
categories of information (Leventhal & Benyamini, 1997). Among these are illness
identity and its consequence. Failure to recognise the damage caused by illness could,
from this perspective, be related to the distortion or absence of relevant schemas.
Anosagnosia has also been described as a coping mechanism designed to protect self-
image, and a form of psychoanalytic denial (Pimm, 1997). The stigma attached to the
loss of bodily functions has also been linked to the tendency of some stroke sufferers
to conceal their 'real' level of impairment (Bendz, 2000).
Some researchers, working from a psychosocial rather than medical perspective, have
also found that stroke sufferers have a problematic relationship with dysfunctioning
parts of the body. As Bendz (2000) describes it, these body parts were objectified,
and no longer seen as integral to the sufferer's personality. Ellis-Hill and colleagues
(2000) similarly found the stroke sufferers in their study experienced a 'self-body
split'. They, and other researchers, also found another fundamental effect of stroke is
the disruption it can cause in the sufferer's life (Becker, 1993; Ellis-Hill et al., 2000;
Glass & Maddox, 1992).
In this chapter, rather than address the 'problem' of competing theories as to the
impact of stroke, or the extent to which 'real' injury is acknowledged by sufferers, I
analyse accounts of people who have had a stroke, in order to see how they
themselves construct its effects. Thus, I aim to focus on participants' concerns and
not prior theory.
In my preliminary analysis, I was struck by focus group participants' initial hesitancy
in responding to my question in which I asked them to describe stroke. A similar
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effect was found in the internet data. Further analysis of subsequent extracts showed
how stroke sufferers orient to the problems of describing this condition to people who
have never suffered stroke. This is discussed in the first section. In extracts
examined from later in the course of the focus groups, and in internet correspondence,
I found that participants constructed the effects of stroke in terms of loss of ability,
and the stroke itself as unpredictable. This is discussed in the second section.
Extracts are coded as follows. 'FG' denotes 'focus group', and 'DS' indicates that
the participants were part of the 'Different Strokes' support group. 'IPC' stands for
'internet personal communication', which, in the case of stroke sufferers, was purely
on a one-to-one basis. Those names in italics refer to carers who participated in the
focus group sessions. My own name is underlined.
1. Orienting to the question
The same question was put to the two focus groups, and to the internet
correspondents: "how would you describe your situation - having had a stroke at a
young age - to someone who doesn't know anything about it?" In each case, this was
the first question that was asked
Extract 4:1 FGDS1
1 Jennifer: how would you describe your situation () having had a
2 stroke at a young age () to someone who doesn't know
3 anvthing about it?




8 Kirsty: what way would you des- describe
9 Harry: [trying to speak and pointing at himself]
10 Kirsty: feeling having a stroke?
11 Harry: [unclear] I dunno
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Harry's reply to my question - "I dunno" does not come until line 11. This suggests
that he is having some difficulty in replying, an interpretation that can be supported by
the interaction and vocalisations that take place between lines 4 and 11. The concept
of adjacency pairs is relevant here (Sacks, 1992). Sacks showed that when a
question is asked, a response is expected. That is, the pairing of question-response is
normative, and this can be seen in an analysis not just of the extent to which such
pairings take place, but also in interactions in which the response is not forthcoming.
The rules of adjacency pairing suggest that a delay in producing the response can
indicate some kind of interactional problem. We can see an orientation to this problem
in lines 5, 6, 8 and 10. Both my "yeah?" in line 5 and Norman's "yes?" in line 6 have
a rising intonation, and might be interpreted as minimal continuers designed to
encourage Harry's attempts to speak. Kirsty, a carer, reformulates the question in
lines 8 and 10 - "what way would you des- describe [...] feeling having a stroke." By
partially repeating the question, she treats Harry's failure to produce a timely response
as due either to a failure to understand the question, or to remember it. This also
works to give him more time to formulate the response, as well as providing a more
recent question with which his response can be less problematically paired. Before
my analysis of the last line of this extract, I will turn to the initial response from the
second focus group, which is similarly characterised by its hesitancy:
Extract 4:2 FGDS2
1 Jennifer: okay (.) right the first question I've got (.) is how would
2 you describe your situation (.) that is having had a stroke
3 at a young age to someone who doesn't know anything
4 about it ?
5 (7)
6 Brian: what like (.)
7 Jennifer: just how would you describe it to someone that doesn't
8 know anything about what it's like having had a stroke
9 or [[unclear]]
10 Brian: [ it's like] your worst nightmare realised
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Here, the question is initially met with a 7-second pause (discussed in more detail
below) before Brian requests some clarification: "what like." As in the last extract,
this request for clarification also functions to give participants more time to answer,
and the opportunity to repair any interactional problems caused by the initial delay
between question and answer. Brian's response - "it's like your worst nightmare
realised" - does not appear until line 9, after my reformulation of the original
question.
Jefferson (1989) shows that speakers' usual tolerance level for pauses in interaction is
something between 0.8 and 1.2 seconds. This can be demonstrated by the typical
response to a more lengthy pause, which is that more than one party will 'take the
floor' at the same time. A 7-second pause is, therefore, remarkably long, and the fact
that no-one spoke before this time suggests that the question may not have been an
easy one to answer (this was the only instance of a pause of such length in either of
the focus group sessions). It is worth noting, however, that there are likely to be
particular interactional difficulties when speakers have impaired speech, a symptom
that can result from stroke. We have to consider the possibility that adjacency pairing
might be delayed to some extent by verbal difficulties, rather than as a result of
difficulties with the question itself. However, if we look at extracts taken from once
participants had begun to talk, we can see how they orient to the problematic nature of
providing a description of stroke. To turn back to the last line of extract 4:1, after
Harry's efforts to provide a reply, and his carer's reformulation, he provides an
answer in line 11: "I dunno." This further suggests that the task of describing this
condition is a difficult one. We can also see participants orient to the provision of a
description of stroke as something problematic in the following extract, which is a
continuation of extract 4:2 above:
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Extract 4:3 FGDS2
9 Brian: it's like your worst nightmare realised
10 Jennifer: mhmm
11 Brian: .hhh you know (.) you don't () cos my stroke was quite
12 (.) it was quite eh (.) it built up and then it just .hh (.)
13 and then I fell into a coma
Extract 4:3 is characterised by the hesitant nature of Brian's description of stroke. It
begins with his response to my initial question, and takes the form of a simple analogy
- "it's like your worst nightmare realised." This analogy does give an indication of the
seriousness of stroke, emphasised by the extreme case formulation - "your worst
nightmare realised." Pomerantz (1986) demonstrates that extreme case formulations
can be used as a rhetorical device to forestall hearers' potential doubts as to the reality
ofwhat is being stated. Thus, Brian treats the serious impact of stroke as something
that others might not appreciate. The assessment that follows, however, is
characterised by its incompleteness. Thus, we can see in lines 11-13 a series of
unfinished utterances, separated by pauses, beginning with a long (3 second) intake of
breath, followed with "you know (.) you don't () cos my stroke was quite (.) it was
quite eh (.) it built up and then it just .hh (.) and then I fell into a coma." The hesitant
nature of this account suggests that my question could not be straightforwardly
answered, that, at the least, describing stroke is a hard thing to do. This is implicit in
the next extract:
Extract 4:4 DSIPCpl Derek
1 Please find attached a response to your 1st question. I would
2 not be offended if you felt the style/tone was not suitable and
3 would be open to some guidelines. This is the first time in
4 nearly 10 months that I have actually tried to explain certain
5 issues.
In extract 4:4, taken from internet correspondence, Derek writes five lines before he
embarks on a response to my question (the response itself will be examined later in
this section). There is a disclaimer as to the appropriateness of what follows - "I
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would not be offended if you felt the style/tone was not suitable and would be open to
some guidelines" (lines 1-3). This suggests a sensitivity to the ways in which his
response might be taken up, an impression that is strengthened by his subsequent
explanation for any potential inadequacies in the response - "[t]his is the first time in
nearly 10 months that I have actually tried to explain certain issues" (lines 3-5). This
leaves open the question ofwhy it might be that Derek has not attempted an
explanation for such a long time. We are left to infer that it is not easy to produce an
account of stroke. In the lines that follow, analysed later as extract 4:8,1 will show
how Derek's description of stroke invites the reader to empathise with the difficult
problems that he faces.
In the next extract, there is specific reference to the problems sufferers have in
portraying stroke to non-sufferers.
Extract 4:5 FGDS1
67 Norman: to describe to somebody () having a stroke is (.) I mean
68 we all agreed when we saw the film that it's you can't
69 tell a person [what it's like having a stroke]
70 Steve: [no no no that's] [right aye
71 Norman: [if they've] never had one
72 Steve: aye
73 Norman: [it's like]
74 Yvonne: [aye]
75 Norman: it's like they equate it to like a woman telling her man
76 that she's had a babv the guy wouldn't be able [to
77 understand]
78 Steve: [aye aye
79 aye]
80 Yvonne: to appreciate it
81 Norman: wouldn't be able to
82 Steve: aye
83 Norman: and the effects I would say i::s (.) everything comes to a
84 stop
In extract 4:5, Norman does provide an assessment of what it is like having had a
stroke: "and the effects I would say i::s (.) eveiything comes to a stop" (lines 83-84).
Before making this assessment, however, he makes the claim that "you can't tell a
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person what it's like having a stroke" (lines 68-69). This allows us to infer that what
follows is not to be treated as a definitive account of stroke. That other people would
not understand is presented as consensual: "we all agreed when we saw the film" (line
68; presumably a film about the effects of stroke shown to the people in this support
group), and by reference to an external source: "it's like they equate it to a woman
telling her man that she's had a babv" (lines 75-76; emphasis added). We might infer
that 'they' refers here to the producers of the film referred to earlier. Thus, Norman
works up an account in which he gives the impression that the difficulties in
explaining stroke to others is something that has already been discussed and agreed
not just within the group, but beyond its confines. This helps to make real the claim
that "you can't tell a person what it's like having a stroke." In the last line of this
extract, Norman's use of an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) -
"everything comes to a stop" orients to the possibility that hearers will not appreciate
the severity of the effects of stroke. In the following extract, Eric also orients to the
views that other people might have of stroke:
Extract 4:6 FGDS2
76 Eric: yeah all strokes are different=
77 Brian: aye=
78 Eric: they're all different as well .hh and people think they
79 hear that somebody's had a stroke they (..) immediately
80 imagine well .h they've lost the () the use of one side
81 Brian: [aye]
82 Jennifer: [mhmm]
83 Eric: and that's it you know (.) there's a lot more to it than
84 that yeah () a lotmore
This extract begins with Eric's claim "yeah all strokes are different" (line 76), then
uses an 'appearance/reality' device to contrast what people think stroke is, with what it
is really like. Potter &Wetherell (1989) show how speakers can use this device to
establish factuality where what is being claimed runs counter to what people would
normally understand to be 'true'. While this device works to suggest that non-
sufferers' appreciation of stroke is limited - "people think they hear that somebody's
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had a stroke they (..) immediately imagine well .h they've lost () the use of one side
[...] and that's it you know" (lines 78-83), the reality with which this is contrasted is,
however vague - "there's a lot more to it than that yeah () a lot more" (lines 83-84).
The last two extracts of this section can be contrasted with those we have seen so far,
in which participants provide vague, hesitant or incomplete descriptions of stroke.
Here, we can see how the use of vivid analogies is designed to enable the non-sufferer
to visualise the effects of this condition:
Extract 4:7 DSIPCp4 Charles
17 To someone with no experience of stroke then it's difficult to
18 portray the loss of full functionality to one side(generally) of
19 your body, the only way I can describe it is to imagine having
20 one of your hands tied behind your back and the corresponding
21 side's leg weakened to maybe half functionality where you can't
22 kick or trap a football and to have to do everything one handed
23 without thinking about it.
Extract 4:8 DSIPCpl Derek
1 Please find attached a response to your 1st question. I would
2 not be offended if you felt the style/tone was not suitable and
3 would be open to some guidelines. This is the first time in
4 nearly 10 months that I have actually tried to explain certain
5 issues.
6
7 Imagine looking at a friend's hand, focus on the thumb, the
8 nail, the knuckle, the creases, hairs, blemishes, color, really get
9 to know it as if it is yours... Now try and move your friends
10 thumb without you touching or saying anything, just use your
11 mind.
In each of the above extracts, the reader is invited to imagine what it is like having had
a stroke. Both Charles and Derek invite the reader to put her- or himself in the place
of the stroke sufferer, and in each case this involves a vivid and detailed description.
Thus, in extract 4:7, Charles does not just say that one hand does not function, he
suggests that we imagine what it would be like if it was tied behind the back. He
illustrates the partial loss of function in the leg by suggesting that we imagine being
120
unable to "kick or trap a football" (line 22). Derek provides an even greater level of
detail when he asks us to imagine looking at a friend's hand - "focus on the thumb, the
nail, the knuckle, the crease, hairs, blemishes, color" (extract 4:8, lines 7-8) - and
trying to move it solely by the power of the mind. By providing this level of detail,
Charles and Derek design their accounts to enable the reader to empathise with some
of the difficulties they face. This implies that otherwise the reader might not be able to
understand this condition. In both extracts, we can see an orientation to the difficulties
participants have in describing their condition to other people. I have already
discussed this in relation to extract 4:8 (the first 5 lines of which comprise extract 4:4).
In extract 4:7, Charles prefaces his account of stroke by claiming that this is not an
easy thing to do: "it's difficult to portray [...] the only way I can describe it is" (lines
17-19).
We can see in these two extracts, then, that participants construct stroke as something
that is hard to define, an orientation that has been found in previous extracts.
However, whereas in other cases participants gave hesitant, incomplete and vague
responses to my questions, Charles and Derek resolve the difficulty by constructing
stroke through analogy. It is notable that the former accounts were largely from focus
group data, and that the latter responses were communicated via the internet. Vivid
and detailed assessment such as that provided in extracts 4:7 and 4:8 may be more
vulnerable to challenge in the context of focus groups in which differently affected
sufferers, and their carers, are present. However, in the context of one-to-one emails,
such considerations may be less relevant. It is also notable that the descriptions here
portray the difficulties that stroke sufferers have in undertaking quite mundane tasks, a
device that I will return to at the start of the next section.
So far, we have seen that focus group participants were hesitant in their initial
response to my question "how would you describe your situation - having had a
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stroke at a young age - to someone who doesn't know anything about it?" Analysis
has shown that when they did provide a response, participants inferred that stroke is
complex and hard to describe. They achieved this by providing an incomplete or
vague account of their condition, and referring explicitly to the inadequacy of that
account. Respondents also referred, explicitly and implicitly, to the inability of non-
sufferers to understand what stroke is like. There is a contrast between the vague and
incomplete accounts provided by sufferers describing their own experiences direct,
and the detailed accounts given when they invite non-sufferers to imagine what stroke
is like.
In the next sections, I will refer to those descriptions that were produced after an
initial, hesitant, start in the focus groups. I also analyse extracts taken from later
discussions and emails. Two issues emerged from my analysis. The first is that
stroke was constructed in terms of a loss of ability. Second, participants constructed
stroke as unexpected. I will now discuss each of these issues in turn.
2. Constructions of stroke in terms of loss of ability
Participants used two rhetorical devices to construct the effects of stroke in terms of
loss of ability. The first involved using mundane activities to give some indication of
the level of loss. The second was the use of story-like accounts to demonstrate the
ways in which stroke incapacitates the sufferer.
I referred briefly to the use of mundane activities in extracts 4:7 and 4:8, in which
participants invited the reader to imagine what it is like having had a stroke, using the
examples ofmoving one's thumb and trapping a football. In the following extracts,
taken from later email correspondence, we can see that respondents used various
examples from everyday life to construct the effects of stroke in terms of loss of
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ability. The presentation of extract 4:11 may seem somewhat unusual. As with all the
email correspondence, it is pasted exactly in the form sent to me, with no
'corrections'.
Extract 4:9 FGDS2
616 Euan: just () you know realising that things you could do
617 easily before () are now so difficult
618 Jennifer: yeah
619 Euan: like reading and comprehending things are now
620 Brian: mhmm
621 Euan: really really difficult
Extract 4:10 FGDS2
623 Euan: you do things a lot slower because you just can't do
624 things at the same rate
625 Jennifer: mhmm
626 Euan: say things which (.) you used to be able to do before
627 which were so easy
628 Eric: veah C...11 think Tconfidence takes al
629 Euan: [like like I don't have] enough energy
630 to read through the paper each day=
631 Brian: mm=
632 Euan: before I get I get tired after about (.) a couple of pages
633 Brian: mm
634 Euan: and it means you miss most of the things (.) in the paper
Extract 4:11 DSIPCp3 Tim
9 the stroke also leaves me
10 feeling pretty useless in many ways, leant take my children out
11 as I used to I dont go out with my wife to the pub or out for
12 meals anymore it seem,s you have to change your whole way
13 of life
In each of the above extracts, participants make a general claim about the effects of
stroke, and follow this with examples of the difficulties posed by mundane activities.
Thus, in extract 4:9 Euan makes the general claim that "things you could do so easily
before () are now so difficult" (lines 616-617) and in extract 4:10 that "you do things
a lot slower" (line 623). These are followed by more specific examples, relating to
reading and comprehending. Similarly, in extract 4:11, Tim's general claim - "the
stroke also leaves me feeling pretty useless in many ways" (lines 9-10) is followed by
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specific examples of how it has affected his life: "leant take my children out as I used
to I dont go out with my wife to the pub or out for meals anymore" (lines 10-12). In
all three extracts the inability to perform mundane, everyday activities is used to
illustrate the seriousness of stroke, in that these are activities that most of us could
manage with very little difficulty. The severity of stroke is also conveyed by the use
of emphasis in extracts 4:9 and 4:10. Thus, Euan describes the things he used to be
able to do before "so easily" (extract 4:10, line 627), and now "so difficult [...] really
really difficult" (extract 4:9, lines 617 and 621).
In the following extract, one of the focus group participants describes a situation in
which she is able to perform everyday activities, but by making this performance
noteworthy, she achieves the same ends.
Extract 4:12 FGDS1
946 Yvonne: I stay on my own and I like it (..) because (.) at least I
947 can do things you know wee silly stupid things like
948 make a cup of coffee now
949 Jennifer: mhmm
950 Yvonne: I can bring through half a cup of coffee and (..) I was
951 fair away with myself the other day I was smiling away I
952 made myself a bit toast for the first time
953 Ian: yeah
954 Yvonne: I thought "oh this is great" and it tasted brilliant you
955 know
In extract 4:12, Yvonne describes her ability to perform an everyday activity: "I can
[...] make a cup of coffee now" (lines 946-948). She describes this activity as "wee
silly stupid." These adjectives serve to minimise the importance of being able to make
a cup of coffee. However, this can be contrasted with Yvonne's subsequent
assessment, in which a usually unremarkable activity is made special by a description
of her delighted reactions: "I wasfair away with myself the, other day I was smiling
away I made myself a bit toast for the first time [...] I thought "oh this is great" and it
tasted brilliant" (lines 950-954; emphasis added). In this extract, then, the contrast
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between a seemingly insignificant ability and the high level of achievement that it now
represents for Yvonne helps to construct stroke in terms of loss of ability. By
describing a specific event, Yvonne draws on the narrative potential of a story noted
by Riessman (1990). That is, the story can be used to illustrate significant features, in
this case the level of achievement implied in carrying out an everyday activity. In the
following two extracts, we can see further examples in which participants used stories
to construct stroke in terms of a loss of ability.
Extract 4:13 FGDS1
166 Norman: and and () one day I mean literally when I had this
167 stroke (.) I woke up on the bed and I said "mm that
168 wasn't too good I think I'm gonna call the doctor now" I
169 got off the bed () and went straight across the room and
170 hit the wall and it's like or the wardrobe because (.) I




175 Norman: but I couldn't
176 Jennifer: yeah
177 Norman: and I couldn't even crawl (.) and I literally had to slide to
178 the floor to go to the phone
In extract 4:13, Norman provides an account of what happened when he had his
stroke. This has a number of story-like properties. Thus, it begins in the way that
many of our culture's stories begin - "one day", it depicts events in chronological
sequence, and provides a level of detail that allows the hearer to visualise what
happened: "and and one day I mean literally when I had this stroke (.) I woke up on
the bed and I said "mm that wasn't too good I think I'm gonna call the doctor now""
(lines 166-168). Here, Norman quotes his own reaction to this event. Wooffitt
(1992) suggests that the use of 'active voicing' - the provision of reported speech or
thoughts - works to construct what is said as an accurate reflection of events. Norman
then describes the difficulty he had in making this call to the doctor: "I got off the bed
and went straight across the room and hit the wall and it's like or the wardrobe" (lines
169-170). Hitting the wall or the wardrobe is a highly unexpected consequence of
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walking across the room. Thus, Norman sets up a contrast between what he intended
to do, and what he was capable of doing, and this helps to emphasise the loss of
abilities that resulted from his stroke. This can also be seen in the following: "I
thought I could still walk [...] but I couldn't [...] and I couldn't even crawl (.) and I
literally had to slide to the floor to go to the phone." (lines 170-178). In the next
extract, we can see how Norman again uses an account in which a contrast
formulation is used to emphasise the loss of abilities brought about by his stroke.
Extract 4:14 FGDS1
101 Norman: and I was physically fit and everything and very capable
102 of doing almost anything and they said "right do this
103 and this" (.) and I just looked at them and (.) I said "I
104 don't know how to [do that"]
105 Steve: [mm]
106 Norman: and they said "can you plea-" I said "can you go
107 through it (.) even more slowly than that describe what
108 the first thing that happens" cos I just didn't have a clue
109 there was nothing that I knew about walking any more
Here, Norman accounts for his inability to walk, and specifically not knowing how to
walk - "I just didn't have a clue there was nothing that I knew about walking any
more" (lines 108-109). In the account, which precedes this claim, Norman uses a
story-like account and a contrast formulation to emphasise his inability. Thus in lines
101-102, he makes a claim about his physical condition prior to his stroke that
contrasts with the account that follows. Thus, he claims that prior to his stroke, he
"was physically fit and everything and very capable of doing almost anything." Here,
a 'softened' extreme case formulation - "almost anything" is deployed. Edwards
(2000) suggests that this can be used to orient to the rhetorical weakness of the
extreme case, and here it would be more defensible for Norman to claim that he was
capable of "almost anything" than "anything." Thus, his claim is delicately designed
to counter the possible response that he is exaggerating his pre-stroke abilities.
Norman follows this with a contrasting account of what happened after his stroke, and
he uses active voicing (Wooffitt, 1992) to construct this as factual. The people he
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refers to here are rehabilitation physiotherapists: "and they said "right do this and this"
(.) and I just looked at them and (.) I said "I don't know how to do that."" (lines 102-
104). As well as providing a contrast with his pre-stroke abilities, Norman contrasts
what he could do with what the physiotherapists expected him to do, and this works to
demonstrate the lack of understanding that even healthcare professionals can have of
the problems faced by stroke sufferers.
Story-like accounts are therefore used to provide a vivid portrayal of the effects of
stroke, and of the loss of ability that can result Specific stories work particularly well
to draw the hearer into the world of the speaker (Riessman, 1990). Their
chronological sequencing provides the opportunity to use contrast to highlight the
difference between sufferers' previous capabilities, and the restrictions that follow
stroke. Participants also used examples of mundane activities to emphasise the loss of
ability brought about by stroke.
3. Constructions of stroke as unpredictable
Participants used two devices to construct the stroke as unpredictable. They told
narratives in which their doctors initially failed to recognise this event, and they used
'before and after' constructions to construct stroke as something unanticipated and out
of the ordinary.
In the next two extracts, Norman produces an account in which he illustrates the initial
problems that medical staff had in ascertaining that he had suffered a stroke:
Extract 4:15 FGDS1
233 Norman: I think what's also tragic I mean a lot of these people
234 say things about their doctors () but it's a genu-1 mean I
235 my wife works (.) she's a medical (.) mm eh a practical
236 em eh a practice manager so she works with the doctors
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237 and I'm friends with a lot of the doctors (.) and most
238 GPs haven't really got a clue I mean [they]
239 Kirsty: [that's] [[unclear]
240 Norman: Irevisedl
241 their whole way that they work after my case because
242 Jennifer: mm
243 Norman: they didn't know that I'd had a stroke () and he wa:s (.)
244 probably the most experienced doctor they had in that
245 practice () and he didn't realise he gave me pills for ear
246 balance problems and all that
247 Jennifer: yeah
248 Norman: and em he only came I phoned he only came two hours
249 later gave me a list [prescription] and that was at lunch t
250 time and only about five o'clock at night he came back
251 and and saw me again and [unclear] "I don't understand
252 what's happened to this bugger"
Extract 4:16 FGDS1
789 Norman: I mean I had two consultants and they they're pretty
790 good at [hospital 2] and they really were struggling
791 [slight laugh] I mean they apologised to me afterwards
792 when they they finally sorted it cos they took me back
793 there () after I'd been to [hospital 1] for a while (.) and
794 e::h Dr Y who was a consultant for the geriatric ward
795 came back and apologised because (.) he says "you only
796 get one of these a lifetime
797 Kirsty: mm
798 Norman: and you're it "
799 Kirsty: mm
800 Norman: cos they just didn't have a clue what was wrong with me
In extract 4:15 , Norman's central claim is in line 243: "they didn't know that I'd had a
stroke"; in extract 4:16, it can be seen in line 800: "they just didn't have a clue what
was wrong with me. In both accounts, Norman constructs the medical personnel
involved as highly capable clinicians. Thus, in extract 4:15, Norman follows his
claim by providing information about the GP's level of experience that also allows us
to infer that none of the other doctors in his practice would have realised that he had
had a stroke: "and he wa:s (.) probably the most experienced doctor they had in that
practice" (lines 243-244). Prior to making this assessment, Norman provides an
account that helps to establish the assessment as factual, based on relevant experience:
"my wife works (.) she's a medical (.) mm eh a practical em eh a practice manager so
she works with the doctors and I'm friends with a lot of the doctors" (lines 235-237).
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Norman's central claim is followed by an account that constructs his GP's failure to
realise what had happened. He describes how his doctor thought initially that the
problem was relatively minor: "he didn't realise he gave me pills for ear balance
problems" (lines 245-246). He uses active voicing (Wooffitt, 1992) to enhance the
facticity of his GP's comments when he came to visit for a second time "I don't
understand what's happened to this bugger" (lines 251-252).
In extract 4:16, Norman similarly works to stress the level of expertise of the doctors
concerned. His central claim is the upshot of an account provided in lines 789-798.
In this account, Norman makes relevant the doctors' status as experienced clinicians,
and the reputation of the hospital he was in: "I mean I had two consultants and they're
pretty good at [hospital 2]" (lines 789-790). Sacks (1974; 1979) suggests that
category terms, such as consultant, can be used to make available certain inferences
about people or things belonging to the category. In this case, we would expect that
someone described as consultant could be regarded as expert in medical matters.
Norman also makes relevant the fact that there was not one, there were two
consultants, and furthermore that those at this particular hospital are "pretty good."
The claim that follows is, therefore, surprising: "they were really struggling" (line
790). Norman accounts for this by twice referring to the doctors' acknowledgement
of this state of affairs - "I mean they apologised to me afterwards " (line 791); "Dr Y
who was a consultant for the geriatric ward came back and apologised" (lines 794-
795). In both extracts, Norman provides a level of detail that helps construct the
reality of his account His description of the doctors' confusion in extract 4:16 is
constructed as one with which they themselves would agree, and not just Norman's
personal opinion. As in extract 4:15, Norman uses active voicing (Wooffitt, 1992) to
enhance the credibility of the doctor's statement: "you only get one of these in a
lifetime [...] and you're it" (lines 795-798). This emphasises the rarity of Norman's
condition, and hence its unexpected nature. The story in extract 4:15 also works to
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illustrate the difficulties Norman's GP had in discovering what had happened to him.
We can infer from these accounts that Norman's stroke was both unpredicted and
unpredictable.
In the next two extracts, participants used 'before and after' formulations to construct
the unpredictability of stroke:
Extract 4:17 FGDS1
216 Kirsty: it just hits you so sudden doesn't it?
217 Steve: aye I [know aye I know]
[you couldn't describe it]218 Yvonne:
219 Steve: that's what I eh (.) [when it]
220 Yvonne: ri'd beenl to the rbingo that nightl
221 and
222 Kirsty: [that's I think]
223 [that's]
224 Steve: [when I]
225 Yvonne: drove back to Edinburgh
226 Kirsty: mhmm
227 Steve: mm
228 Yvonne: got in my hall and that was me
In extract 4:17, Yvonne tells a story following on from Kirsty's comment "it just hits
you so sudden doesn't it?" (line 216). In her narrative, Yvonne describes what she
was doing prior to her stroke. She had had a social evening out - "I'd been to the
bingo that night" (line 220) - something that someone would not be likely to do if he
or she felt very unwell. She drove her car back - the emphasis in "drove back to
Edinburgh" (line 225) can be heard as inferring that this was out of town, again
something that she would have been unlikely to have undertaken if she had had any
inkling that she was about to have a stroke. Thus, Yvonne's story helps to construct
her stroke as unpredicted. It is interesting to note Yvonne's description of the moment
when she had her stroke: "got in my hall and that was me" (line 228). As we have
seen in earlier extracts, this constitutes a somewhat vague account of what happened.
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In the following extract, Eric also uses a 'before and after' construction to describe the
effects of stroke:
Extract 4:18 FGDS2
38 Eric: I think you go through .h your life em doing just doing
39 things .h as normal I mean Lorna although is .hh the the only
40 carer here you go through life you just (.) things just go and
41 then you evolve and .h and you just do things then suddenly
42 this stroke hits you and you .h everything comes to a dead halt
Extract 4:18 can be divided into two parts. In lines 38-41, Eric works up a description
of ordinary life. Lee (1987) writes that the particle 'just' can be used in a deprecatory
sense, indicating that what it refers to is somewhat trivial in comparison to an
alternative referent that can either be explicit or implicit. Where it is implicit, it
suggests that there is an alternative which is in some way more important or more
significant. In this case, then, the repeated use of 'just' serves to suggest that life
before stroke is ordinary and unremarkable - "I think you go through .h your life em
doing just doing things .h as normal [...] you go through life you just (.) things just
go and then you evolve and (.) you just do things" (lines 38-41). This works to set up
a contrast between life before the stroke, and the sudden impact of this condition. The
description is also marked by its imprecision and incompleteness - "just doing things"
(lines 38-39); "things just go" (line 40); "you just do things" (line 41), and by an
impression ofmovement - "you go through (.) your life" (line 38); "you go through
life" (line 40); "things just go and then you evolve" (lines 40-41). In the remainder of
the extract, the stroke takes the active part of the verb - "this stroke hits you" (line 41),
and the description, portraying a sudden stop that contrasts with the previous
impression ofmovement, is not lengthy and vague, but short and precise: "then
suddenly this stroke hits you and you .h everything comes to a dead halt" (lines 41-
42).
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The 'before and after' construction was, then, used to emphasise the unexpected
nature of stroke. The same effect was achieved by the use of story-like accounts
describing the difficulties that experienced doctors had in diagnosing stroke. If the
sufferer was thought to be at all likely to have a stroke, we might assume that
clinicians would have recognised this fact sooner.
4, Summary
In this chapter, I have shown that stroke sufferers in the focus groups were hesitant in
providing an answer to my question "how would you describe your situation - having
had a stroke at a young age - to someone who doesn't know anything about it?"
While some hesitancy might be attributable to speech difficulties, it has been
demonstrated that there are other possible explanations. Stroke is hard to describe;
and other people cannot really understand what it is like. Participants oriented to these
points, and also went on to construct the effects of stroke in terms of a loss of ability,
and the stroke itself as unpredictable. It was noted that more vivid assessments were
provided in internet communications, and that this may be because they were less open
to challenge by other people. Mundane activities and story-like accounts were used to
illustrate loss of ability. Unpredictability was constructed by means of 'failure to
diagnose' narratives, as well as 'before and after' devices.
5. Discussion
We can see, then, that stroke sufferers did not themselves construct stroke solely in
terms of the neurological deficits it can bring about. Neither did they construct stroke
in terms of distinct cognitive schemas relating to its identity and effects. The
participants in this research did not demonstrate a denial of injury, but they did at times
display hesitancy in constructing the effects of stroke. This was shown to be
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suggestive of an orientation towards the likely failure of non-sufferers to understand
stroke. While respondents may have had some linguistic problems, these did not
prevent them from providing accounts that were delicately crafted to construct stroke
in terms of the loss of ability it can bring about, and in terms of its unpredictability.
This can be seen in both the verbal interaction of focus groups, and the written
communication in email correspondence, although it appears that accountability may
have been a greater issue in focus group discussions. There are implications for the
ways in which research is carried out into the effects of stroke on the sufferer. Most
studies have used a quantitative methodology to measure functional losses and this has
formed the rationale for rehabilitative treatments that do not always focus on sufferers'
own concerns (Kirkevold, 2002).
Other researchers (Bendz, 2000; Ellis-Hill et al., 2000) have found that stroke
sufferers experienced their condition in terms of a self-body split, in which the body
becomes objectified. The perspective of this thesis is that such accounts might be
examined not just for their content, but also for their rhetorical function. Such a
construction might serve, for example, to avoid the stigma associated with bodily
incapacity. That is, the notion of the self-body split might be used to orient to
accountability issues. Billig (1987) has shown the importance of argumentation in
interaction. That is, any one construction is rhetorically designed to counter a number
of other possible constructions. In this research, carers of some of the stroke
sufferers participated in the focus groups, and this meant that issues of situated




Research into chronic illness suggests that people can potentially be held accountable
for being unwell and for their role in getting better. This was highlighted by Parsons
(1951) in his classic exploration of the relationship of the sick person to society. A
fundamental assumption of his thesis is that the notion of patient motivation - not just
to get better, but also to be ill in the first place - is crucial. Thus, falling ill is a
potentially warrantable state of affairs.
In the case of stroke, Pound and colleagues (1997) explore the ways in which this
condition has been named and described over the years. They suggest that sufferers'
lifestyles have historically been implicated in stroke and that stroke has been seen in
terms of a punishment for such lifestyles. Thus, they cite references to "the stroke of
God's hande" and "the stroke of justice." In more recent times, medical researchers
have identified a number of risk factors for stroke, and these can be used by GPs to
estimate the likelihood that particular individuals might suffer this condition (Coppola
et al., 1995). The lifestyle factors that are directly implicated in stroke are smoking
and taking little exercise. In addition, people with high blood pressure - a condition
which itself is related to lifestyle factors such as dietary intake - are at risk.
Furthermore, there is research that suggests an association between personality factors
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and susceptibility to stroke. Finally, the majority of sufferers are over the age of 65.
Therefore, to have a stroke at a younger age might be more accountable because it is
less easily explained by currentmedical research.
In chapter 4,1 showed how stroke sufferers constructed stroke as complex, hard for
others to understand, unpredictable, and in terms of the loss of abilities it brings
about. An interesting feature of the stroke data is that carers contributed to the focus
group discussions, and in this chapter, my aim is to examine the ways in which their
presence might shed some light on the possible functions of sufferers' constructions
of stroke. Preliminary analysis suggested two possible functions of these
constructions. First, to construct stroke as unpredictable can serve to counter the
potential charge that sufferers were in some way accountable for having had a stroke.
A discussion of this can be seen in Section 1. Second, to construct stroke in terms of
loss of abilities can be seen to orient to the problem of distinguishing the effects of
stroke from laziness. To construct stroke as complex and hard for others to
understand can serve the same function. This is explored in section 2.
1. Accounting for having had a stroke
In this section, I examine the 'stroke as unpredictable' construction. In chapter 4,1
demonstrated that participants used two particular devices to do this. They told
narratives in which medical professionals initially failed to produce an accurate
diagnosis of what had happened, and they used 'before and after' stories to construct
stroke as something unanticipated and out of the ordinary. If it can be demonstrated
that doctors could not recognise the event of stroke, and that the sufferer had no prior
symptoms of note, then we can infer that the sufferer would not have been in a
position to prevent this occurrence. Thus, the 'stroke as unpredictable' construction
might be used to absolve the sufferer from responsibility for his or her condition. I
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therefore examined the data further to see whether this interpretation was something to
which participants oriented. First, I analysed responses to a question that I had posed
about the possible causes of stroke. Second, I reasoned that participants were more
likely to orient to issues of accountability when in the presence of carers who might
challenge sufferers' constructions, so I re-examined all of the focus group data to see
whether the carers who were present constructed stroke as an accountable issue. This
led to my third line of enquiry, which was to explore whether internet participants
used accountability devices relating to the cause of stroke. This group was of
particular interest here because they emailed me on a one-to-one basis and therefore
did not orient to the presence either of other sufferers, or of carers, although what they
wrote can perhaps be seen as part of the wider social context in which stroke sufferers
construct their condition. I will discuss each of these three stages of analysis in turn.
1.1 Constructions of the possible causes of stroke
The extracts discussed in this section were all taken from the response to my question:
"do you have any ideas about how it is that people get strokes at a young age?"
Extract 5:1 FGDS1
1453 Yvonne: cos they've been buggers in their lives no? [general
1454 laughter]
1455 Steve: no [not] me no eh [laughs]
1456 Kirsty. to me it's a lot (.) to me it's (..) the luck of the draw to
1457 tell you the (.) know what I mean it's (.) people smoke
1458 they say "oh smoking's not (.) good for you" but
1459 Ian: well I've never [smoked so]
1460 Kirsty. [and this] know what I mean it's (.)
1461 people that have never smoked in their life and died of
1462 lung cancer
In extract 5:1, we can see that there are two separate accounts offered to explain what
might cause stroke. First, Yvonne's response "cos they've been buggers in their lives
no?" (line 1453) explicitly suggests that stroke sufferers are in some way to blame for
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their condition. The second account is provided by Kirsty, a carer, and her
interpretation is non-blaming: "it's (..) the luck of the draw" (line 1456). Each
account, therefore, orients to the possibility that the sufferer might be held accountable
for having had a stroke.
An interesting feature of this extract is the stroke sufferers' response to these accounts.
In line 1455, Steve follows Yvonne's claim with "no me no eh [laughs]." This can be
seen as a somewhat po-faced receipt of a tease, a conversational device that was first
observed by Drew (1987). Steve's laughter shows that he does recognise that Yvonne
is being humorous, but he nevertheless begins his response with a denial. Drew
suggests that the tease ascribes a deviant identity to the recipient, and that one way of
resisting such an identity is to provide a po-faced response. In this case, the ascription
of the identity "buggers" (line 1453) can be considered deviant.
Ian provides a similar response to Kirsty's account, before she has even finished.
After her initial claim that having a stroke can be attributed to bad luck, Kirsty uses the
case of smokers as an illustrative example. Thus, she states that "they say "oh
smoking's not (.) good for you" but" (line 1458). We might expect, following
Kirsty's original claim, that her example would illustrate the role of luck in illness, and
that her use of "but" might signal such a construction. However, it is at this point that
Ian produces a denial, using an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) for
emphasis: "well I've never smoked" (line 1459). While Kirsty's construction would
not be seen as a tease, it is treated as one thatmight ascribe a deviant identity to the
stroke sufferer - especially with her reference to smoking, which has been linked with
stroke.
We can see from this extract, then, that responsibility for stroke is oriented to in
respondents' accounts, and furthermore that stroke sufferers orient to the potentially
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deviant identity that might be ascribed to them when the cause of stroke is being
constructed. In the following extract, an internet respondent orients to the possibility
that he might be held responsible for having had a stroke:
Here, Frederick's reply to my question - asking if he had any ideas about what might
cause stroke - is "[n]ot really" (line 1). This denial is followed by an account that
constructs stroke as something that is poorly understood by the medical profession,
and therefore, as I have argued in Chapter 4, unpredictable. Frederick also orients to
the possibility that he might be held responsible for his condition, and he does this by
laying the blame elsewhere: "if they really knew I wouldn't have had one" (lines 2-3).
The next extract is taken from the second focus group, and in it we can see that
participants orient to the accountability that might arise from being a young sufferer of
stroke.
Extract 5:2 DSIPCp21 Frederick
1 Not really. I think the doctors don't know themselves. They
2 offer all sorts of explanations, but if they really knew I





















do you have any ideas about how it is that people get
strokes at a young age?
(4)
all the old people said to me "you're gey [very] young to
have a stroke young laddie" [laughs]
[laughs]
I know (.) old wives' tale (..)
it's the other way round
I think (.) both Brian and Eric sort of sort of illustrate
what happens with a lot of stroke survivors is that () we





like Brian there just can't remember the full (.) technical
detail of it
mm
the full name of it he's al- he's almost right
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1378 Brian: mm
1379 Euan: it's something like encetoph- encetalophy or
1380 Jennifer: mm
1381 Brian: no progressive multi-focal oh neurgh [[unclear]]
1382 Eric: [I didn't want to
1383 know] I didn't want to know
1384 Brian: [laughs] I still can't say it [laughs]
1385 Eric: I think ehm the doctors have sai-said .hh you're your
1386 own vou are your own doctor if you feel off-colour then
1387 you should go to your doctor .h (4) mm? and that's the
1388 (.) for the (.) young people if there's something wrong
1389 well .hh we all we all think we're invincible
My question "do you have any ideas about how it is that people get strokes at a young
age?" is followed by a 4-second pause, which indicates that this question might be
problematic. A 'standard' pause would normally be in the range of 0.8-1.2 seconds
(Jefferson, 1989). The remainder of the extract will be examined in three sections.
First, in lines 1362-1364, there is an insertion sequence referring to the young age at
which Brian had his stroke. In the next section, from lines 1365-1384, participants
provide warrants for their claim to knowledge about stroke. Finally, in lines 1385-
1389, Eric orients to issues of responsibility for seeking appropriate medical attention
when necessary. This is discussed in full below.
In the insertion sequence, lines 1362-1364, Brian uses active voicing (Wooffitt, 1992)
to illustrate the reaction that old people had to his condition: "you're gey young to have
a stroke young laddie" (lines 1362-1363). Brian's adoption of a slightly tremulous
tone, as if impersonating an old person's voice, and some rather old-fashioned
colloquial terms - 'gey' and 'laddie' - serve to characterise this statement as somewhat
humorous. Indeed, Brian, and then Eric, proceed to laugh. Brian's claim that follows
- "I know (.) old wives' tale" (line 1365) constructs this account as one that is not
based in fact but folklore. Thus, Brian orients to his young age as a phenomenon that
some people might find unusual, and at the same time he undermines that view as one
that should not be taken seriously.
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In the next section of this extract (lines 1365-1384), participants work up a claim to
knowledge which, can be seen to orient to some of the features of the 'old wives'
tale'. Euan uses a general, medical term "brain injury" (line 1370), which can be
contrasted with the lay term "stroke" used by the old people. This is followed by a
joint attempt to produce the correctmedical term: "it's something like encetoph-
encetalophy or" (Euan; line 1379); "no progressive multi-focal oh neurgh [unclear]"
(Brian; line 1381). Medical knowledge of the condition might be considered to have
more warrant than an "old wives' tale." However, Euan and Brian are patently having
some difficulty in providing the medical terminology. It is at this point that Eric
interjects "I didn't want know I didn't want to know" (lines 1382-1383), which is
followed by Brian's turn "[laughs] I still can't say it [laughs]" (line 1384). These
claims reframe their failure to produce the medical term. We are left to infer that Eric
might have known, had he wished this, and that Brian does know but is unable to
enunciate it. In accounting for their inability to use the correct clinical term, they
bolster the claim to knowledge that the use of such terminology implies.
In the last section of this extract (lines 1385-1389), Eric re-orients to the original
question with the claim that "if vou feel off-colour then you should go to your doctor"
(lines 1386-1387). This orients to a potential accountability on the part of the person
who is unwell, and the 4-second pause that follows suggests that such an orientation
is problematic. Eric's account that follows - "if there's something wrong well .hh we
all we all think we're invincible" (lines 1388-1389) - serves to mitigate this
accountability in two ways. First, he uses the general form 'we' to suggest that stroke
sufferers are not the only people who do not attend the doctor when they perhaps
should. Second, he suggests that this can be put down to feeling invulnerable, and
this constructs the identity of the stroke sufferer in a relatively positive light.
140
The following extract can be seen as an exception to the ones discussed so far, in that
no blame is inferred and no accounting is offered.
Extract 5:4 DSIPCp21 Ana
1 The causes of stroke in younger people include head
2 injury, brain tumour, infection(encephalitis or cerebral
3 abscess), congenital vascular malformations e.g. aneurysms
4 and AVM [Arterio-VenousMalformation], and familial
5 hypercholesterolaemia.
Here, Ana provides a list of possible causes of stroke. There is nothing in this
account to suggest that sufferers might be held responsible for their condition. It
differs from the previous extracts in two ways. First, Ana draws on specialist medical
terminology, and does not refer to lifestyle factors that have been implicated in stroke,
such as taking little exercise and smoking, but instead physical events over which the
individual could not be expected to have any control. This in itselfmay avoid the need
for further accounting. Second, she refers, in line 1, to "[t]he causes of stroke in
younger people" in general, and does not discuss her particular case. Thus, her
account is presented as one that is both objective and warranted by medical
knowledge.
We can see from the above extracts that participants generally did orient to the causes
of stroke as problematic. By imputing particular causes, participants allow certain
inferences to be made regarding the extent to which the sufferer might be held
responsible. Stroke sufferers oriented to the potentially deviant identities that were
offered in accounts of the cause of stroke. Clinical terminology was used to validate
claims to knowledge about stroke, and in the one extract in which there was no
evidence of accountability for stroke, the respondent drew solely on general medical
causes.
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1.2 Constructions of the causes of stroke in sufferer-carer interactions
The extracts in this section come from focus group data, and in particular interactions
involving carers - who were close relatives or spouses of the sufferers - and the people
who had had a stroke. It is notable that these people did hold stroke sufferers
accountable. The extracts shown here are of interest because they provide the
opportunity to examine sufferers' responses when they are explicitly held accountable
for their stroke, and not just when responding to my question about its possible
causes.
In the following three extracts, carers construct stroke sufferers as responsible for







don't know why I had a stroke in the first place
you like being in control
oh yes
oh yeah
well definitely from what you've said [looking at Alison]
definitely
definitely yes (.) oh yeah (...) but I would have taken the





















[looking at Brian] did you think you deserved it? (...)
had you been leading a wild (.)
yeah
cos you're the youngest in the group [laughs]
ah (..) aye I was I wasn't meant to be born I was I was a
mistake my mother and father
[[laughs]]
[it was though] YOU DON'T HAVE SOMEONE
WHEN YOU'RE FORTY-FIVE you don't have a child
when you're forty-five
[very quite] [unclear]






and what would you (.) say would be the warning signs

































ehm (.) diet () lack of exercise
mhmm
yeah [[unclear]
[and it's not in] the year or so beforehand it's
[yup]
[away] back it's right throughout
yup
eating your lunch at your desk [sort of thing mhmm]
Ivears ago my mum] told
him that years and years ago
yeah (.) [I think it's]
[cos he never would] take a lunch break he
never ate from () when he left in the morning till he
came in at night
yeah
the whole day you know and ["well" my mum used to
say "you're gonna make yourself ill"] little did we know
[I'm sure that would cut
down on the number]
mhmm
yeah I think there's a category of person I think that
yup
you can identify high risk people (.)
In extract 5:5, Lorna's claim "you like being in control" (line 577), coming straight
after Eric's claim "don't know why I had a stroke in the first place", appears to be
offered as an account of why Eric had his stroke. Lorna does not just suggest that his
stroke is attributable to a personal characteristic, she also infers some volition on
Eric's part in her use of "you like." Thus, she holds Eric responsible for his
condition.
In extract 5:6, Lorna's questions, aimed at Brian, imply that he might be to blame for
his stroke. Thus, she asks "did you think you deserved it?" (line 1047) and her next
question asks for information about Brian's lifestyle prior to the stroke: "had you been
leading a wild (.)" (tine 1048) - the sentence is incomplete, but we might assume from
common usage that the missing word is "life." By asking these questions, Loma
makes Brian accountable for his stroke.
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Extract 5:7 begins with my question - which referred to an earlier reference by Loma
(one of the carers) to "warning signs" - "and what would you (.) say would be the
warning signs (.) to look out for?" (lines 1407-1408). We might expect the response
to this to be concerned with physical symptoms that suggest something is wrong.
However, what Loma does is provide a list of behaviours that might be thought to
precipitate stroke - "stress running around running ragged not taking a break" (lines
1409-1410). She follows this up in line 1413 with "diet () lack of exercise." Thus,
she uses features of the stroke sufferer's lifestyle, over which he or she presumably
has some control, to suggests responsibility for this condition. Furthermore, she
refers back to a vague time in the past: "and it's not in the year or so beforehand it's
[...] away back it's right throughout" (lines 1416-1418). Taking up this construction,
Alison uses extreme case formulations (Pomerantz, 1986) and active voicing
(Wooffitt, 1992), from someone we can infer has the category entitlement of a reliable
witness - her mother. These devices helps reinforce this biographical account of her
partner (Eric) as indeed marked by these behaviours. An illness of some sort is
constructed as something that was foreseen some time ago: "years ago my mum told
him that years and years ago [...] cos he never would take a lunch break he never ate
from () when he left in the morning till he came in at night (lines 1421-1426;
emphasis added). Here, Alison uses the 'habitual narrative' genre, which Riessman
(1990) described as a useful strategy when making a case for the way in which a
situation might have developed over time. It functions well to suggest that Eric's
stroke was attributable to his lifestyle. Alison does not just make Eric accountable for
his stroke, she makes it clear that he was warned and so cannot claim ignorance of the
dangers of his lifestyle. Thus, we can see in this extract that sufferers are held
accountable in terms of their behaviours prior to having had a stroke.
In the first two extracts above, the initial response of the stroke sufferer in question is
to provide an agreement token. Eric's response to Lorna's claim that he likes being in
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control is "oh yes" (extract 5:5, line 578); Brian's response to her suggestion that he
might have deserved his stroke is "yeah" (extract 5:6, line 1049). An analysis of
subsequent turns, however, shows that both sufferers orient to the potential charge
that is being made, in that they each provide an account that is subtly designed to
deflect personal responsibility for their stroke. In extract 5:5, Eric's "oh yes" (line
578) is recycled by Alison (Eric's wife) in line 579 - "oh yeah." Lorna upgrades the
agreement token with "well definitely from what vou've said." This upgrade suggests
that Lorna does not treat the agreement tokens provided so far as sufficient. Lorna's
reference to something that Alison had previously said is used to warrant her claim.
There are two aspects to this warrant that make it particularly difficult to challenge.
The first is that no details are given. Potter (1996b) points out that details can be
examined and questioned, whereas to provide a vague account can work to resist such
a response. The second relates to the first - in order to challenge this, Alison would
have to ascertain what it was that she had said to Loma. This could be problematic in
the presence of her husband, as well as the other participants. Alison's response is to
recycle Lorna's assessment - "definitely" (line 581) but with no reference to any prior
conversation. Eric recycles this upgraded assessment, but follows it with a reiteration
of his and Alison's original, weaker agreement tokens: "definitely yes (.) oh yeah"
(line 582). He then provides an illustrative example relating to the topic of control:
"but I would have taken the view before the stroke that I could have run this hospital
you know" (lines 582-584). To have felt competent enough to have run a hospital has
far less negative connotations than were implied by Lorna's claim at the start of this
extract - "you like being in control" (line 577). This suggests that the desire for
control is general, and we might infer from this that it is not always appropriate. It
also implies that this relates to Eric as a person and is therefore something for which
he should take responsibility. Eric's formulation, however, suggests specific
competence in a particular setting, and furthermore that he was hard-working. These
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are socially acceptable qualities. Thus, Eric's account works to deflect personal
culpability.
We can see a similar pattern in extract 5:6. This begins with Lorna's inference that
Brian's way of living might have contributed to the onset of his stroke - "had you been
leading a wild (.)" (lines 1046-1047). 'To lead a wild life' is a fairly common
idiomatic expression. Drew & Holt (1989) have noted that such formulations can be
hard to challenge because they are vague and they refer to some shared, common-
sense knowledge about the world. This particular expression implies an excessive
lifestyle which is likely to lead ultimately to harmful consequences. Brian provides an
agreement token - "yeah" (line 1048) and Lorna's response is to provide an account
for her inference - "cos you're the youngest in the group [laughs]" (line 1049). Thus,
she makes relevant the age difference between Brian and the other young stroke
survivors. This works to make him even more accountable, in that it is far less
common to have a stroke at a younger age than an older age. In the turns that follow,
Brian responds subtly to the charge that his stroke is related to the excessive lifestyle
of a younger person. Lorna ended her turn with laughter, which might have worked
to downgrade her previous remarks to a tease or joke. However, Brian does not
orient to this but instead to the serious nature of her allegations. He begins with
another agreement token, and follows it with a claim that casts him in a completely
passive role - "ah (..) aye I was I wasn't meant to be born I was I was a mistake my
mother and father" (lines 1050-1051). Eric takes this up as a joke, but while he is
laughing Brian continues "it was though" then in a loud voice he provides an account
that justifies his claim - "YOU DONT HAVE SOMEONEWHEN YOU'RE FORTY-
FIVE" (lines 1053-1054). His use of "you" here allows him to suggest that what he is
saying is part of some shared, general knowledge. By referring to the relatively late
time in life at which his parents had him, Brian allows us to infer that, although he is
younger than the others, they may have similarly aged parents. This lessens the
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difference between him and the older stroke sufferers in the group. Further more, it
moves the focus from Brian to his mother and father. It is notable that when he
recycles his claim in lines 1054-1055 - "you don't have a child when you're forty-
five", he refers to "a child" and not "someone", and thus is able to stress the
dependent nature of the relationship. Finally, Brian provides an upshot of the fact that
his birth was not planned: "that's cos I was being dragged all round the world with my
father" (lines 1056-1057). Thus, he suggests that his "wild" lifestyle was
characterised by a great deal of travelling when he was extremely young, and had little
choice in the matter. The latter can also be inferred by the passive use and lexical
choice of the verb in "I was being dragged." Brian's response therefore also works to
minimise personal responsibility for the onset of his stroke.
In extract 5:7, carers construct the stroke sufferer as a busy and active person. This
might be seen as a less blameworthy construction than one that, for example, involves
having led a wild life, which we saw in extract 5:6. Indeed, one of the stroke
sufferers collaborates in the carers' construction: "eating your lunch at your desk that
sort of thing mhmm" (line 1420). It is also interesting to note Eric's response. He
agrees, and does so with reference to characteristics of the stroke sufferer: "yeah I
think there's a category ofperson I think that [...] you can identify high riskpeople"
(lines 1433 and 1435). Thus, Eric implies that personal characteristics contribute to
the chances of suffering stroke. In this case the personal characteristics in question
would normally be considered in a positive light When this is not the case,
participants' responses are subtly designed to reduce personal responsibility for their
stroke.
In the next two extracts, accountability for stroke rests on the sufferer's success or
failure in seeking the appropriate medical attention on time, an issue that was oriented
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to by Eric in extract 5:3, when he suggested that "if you feel off-colour then you
should go to your doctor" (lines 1386-1387).
Extract 5:8 FGDS2
1469 Sharon: I actually didn't feel well before my brain haemorrhage
1470 and I went to my doctor and he sent me for an eye test
1471 cos I said I was getting headaches [and he]
1472 Jennifer: [mhmm]
1473 Sharon: said "go and get you and get your eyes tested and go and
1474 do this and this and this" .hh and it didn't even seem to
1475 occur to him there was something serious coming
Extract 5:8 is taken from slightly later in the same transcript as extract 5:7. Here,
Sharon produces a narrative in which she describes a visit to her doctor prior to her
stroke. This type of specific story can be used to highlight significant features of the
lead-up to her stroke (Riessman, 1990). By claiming "I actually didn't feel well",
Sharon suggests that such symptoms are unusual in the run up to a stroke. This
allows us to infer that stroke sufferers might not normally have any 'warning signs'.
Sharon notes that she did go to the doctor, "and it didn't even seem to occur to him
there was something serious coming" (lines 1474-1475). Thus, she constructs her
stroke as unpredictable, while at the same time making relevant the fact that she did
seek medical attention prior to it. This allows her to avoid the potential charge that she
might have been in a position to do something to avoid her stroke.
Extract 5:9 FGDS2
1119 Euan: you know my stroke could probably have been avoided
1120 which is annoying=
1121 Alison: well yeah
1122 Eric: I'm the same [yeah]
1123 Lorna: [and] you've only got yourself to blame
1124 Eric: I'm the same (.) no?
1125 Jennifer: what kind of things (.) would [prevent it]
1126 Eric: [well like] higher blood
1127 pressure [or]
1128 Lorna: [it] runs in the family
1129 Eric: my mum
1130 Lorna: he would have gone to doctor when he had a headache
1131 that he doesn't normally have
1132 Jennifer: mm
1133 Lorna: [you know he would]
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1134 Euan: [when I bashed it] on a on a when I was fixing a shelf
1135 for you
1136 Lorna: on his desk was the doctor's tele- the GP surgery's
1137 telephone number (.) and it was there for how many
1138 days before you had your stroke? because I said to you
1139 "you've still got your headache I think you should make
1140 an appointment"
1141 Jennifer: mm
1142 Lorna: and it's (.) probably STILL sitting on the desk
1143 Jennifer: mhmm
1144 Euan: but [but]
1145 Lorna: [not] willing [to take a little bit of [unclear]] advice
1146 Euan: [if if ifmy my headache was] nothing
1147 to do with my stroke
1148 Lorna: yes it was (.) it was all related your blood pressure was
1149 (.) gently soaring (..)
1150 Euan: but it takes (.) but you (.) getting an appointment at the
1151 GP is actually quite hard
Extract 5:9 is long, but is offered in its entirety in order to provide context for the
points that will be discussed. At the beginning, Euan makes a claim: "you know my
stroke could probably have been avoided" (line 1119), and Lorna's response is to
make Euan fully accountable for his stroke: "and you've only got yourself to blame"
(line 1123). In the rest of the interaction, Lorna provides evidence for this claim, and
this focuses on Euan's failure to consult his doctor for the headache he suffered prior
to his stroke. This failure is made accountable by her claims that Euan had the GP's
telephone number on his desk, and Lorna had advised him to make an appointment.
It is interesting to note that Euan neither agrees nor collaborates with Loma's
construction of him as accountable. Instead, he produces defensive statements that
orient to her specific claims. Thus, Lorna claims that to prevent his stroke "he would
have gone to the doctor when he had a headache that he doesn't normally have" (lines
1130-1131). Thus, she constructs his headache as unusual and therefore one that
merited a clinical consultation. Euan counters this with "when I bashed it on a on a
when I was fixing a shelf for you" (lines 1134-1135). In the context of this
interaction, we might assume that 'it' refers to his head. Here, Euan constructs his
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headache as having an identifiable cause, and therefore presumably not something to
worry about. Lorna's claim that "on hi& desk was the doctor's tele- the GP surgery's
telephone number" (lines 1136-1137), makes relevant the fact the Euan had easy
access to this information, and from this we can infer that he is accountable for not
making the necessary call. Euan does provide an account for his failure to arrange a
consultation: "but it takes (.) but you (.) getting an appointment at the GP is actually
quite hard (lines 1150-1151).
In the extracts discussed so far, participants' responses were delicately crafted to
counter implications that they might be personally liable for their stroke. When carers
constructed sufferers as active and busy people whose lifestyle might in some way
have contributed to their condition, participants colluded somewhat in this
construction. Another type of accountability to which participants oriented was a
failure to seek appropriate medical attention prior to their stroke. Stroke sufferers
quoted here did attempt to counter implications of responsibility in this case.
1,3 internet participant?' constructions of the possible causes Qf Stroke
We have seen how, in interactions between carers and stroke sufferers, the latter are
held responsible for their stroke. In this section, I will show that one-to-one internet
participants also treat the cause of stroke as accountable:
Extract 5:10 DSIPCpl Kenneth
1 I had a stroke(caused by an unusual accident), at the age of 48.
2 my circumstances are probably greatly different than most.
Extract5:11 DSIPCpl0 Ana
1 My stroke was due to an aneurysmal haemorrhage (no
2 prior history of problems).
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In both extracts here, respondents insert a claim in parentheses which serves two
functions. First, it says something about what might have brought on the stroke.
Second, it constructs the stroke as unpredictable. Thus Kenneth's claim about his
stroke is that it was "caused by an unusual accident" (extract 5:10, line 1). In
extract 5:11, Ana inserts a claim that suggests there was no precipitating incident: "no
prior history of problems" (lines 1-2). Kenneth's use of the adjective "unusual"
helps to emphasise that this event was something out of the ordinary, and Ana's claim
similarly constructs her stroke as something that could not have been foreseen.
Putting a remark in parenthesis is a useful emphatic formulation. It allows the writer
to add information as an aside, and it has the effect of separating it from the rest of the
text, therefore drawing particular attention to it.
In these extracts, then, we can see some orientation to the problematic issue of
accounting for the cause of stroke. This suggests that responsibility for having a
stroke is a concern for sufferers even when such a possibility is not explicitly
constructed in interaction.
2. Accounting for level of disability
My analysis of the data in chapter 4 suggested that sufferers oriented to accountability
not just for having had the stroke in the first place, but also to the possibility that their
disability might not be entirely attributable to their condition. In this section, I will
begin by discussing two extracts in which I show that stroke sufferers do orient to the
views that other people have of their level of disability. I will then examine a further




278 Eric: and e:m () there's I think as Lorna says from the
279 outside outside ehm (..) it doesn't () show if anything's
280 happening you know my doctor said to me that eh (.)
281 from the outside I look perfectly normal (.) and we met
282 (.) eh George and (...) what's the wife's name (.) she's
283 about that height ehm George B and his wife (..)
284 Alison: oh God I cannae [can't] [remember]
285 Eric: [yeah] .h we met them anyway
286 and she said "oh you're back to normal again" I said "am
287 I hell"
288 Jennifer: mm
289 Eric: because they can't see what's happening inside you
290 know
Extract 5:13 FGDS1
405 Norman: 11 went to the fire brigade (.) eh rehabilitation place that
406 they've got em (.) in Yorkshire () and the physios
407 would and the physio she's going and the physios
408 would turn around and say "well do this" and "do that"
409 and they'd say "what are you doing that for?" and I had
410 to turn round and tell her "look I'm scared stiff (.) you
411 know I'm gonna fall down and hurt myself here and 11
412 know what I can do (.) it looks easy for you and [the]
413 Ian: [mm]
414 Norman: trouble is we look normal
In both extracts 5:12 and 5:13, participants orient to the views that others have of
them, specifically that they do not appreciate the extent of the stroke sufferer's
disability. The stroke sufferers talking here produce a narrative that works up to a
claim that external appearances do not reflect the reality of their condition. Riessman
(1990) notes the strategic value of producing a specific story to highlight essential
features of what is being talked about. Thus, in extract 5:12, Eric's upshot on outside
appearances is that "they can't see what's happening inside you know" (lines 289-
290), and in extract 5:13, Norman claims that "the trouble is we look normal" (lines
412-414). Prior to these claims, both Eric and Norman provide an account in which
they use two devices that Potter (1996b) shows are useful in constructing a particular
version of events as factual. Thus, they use detailed narrative in which information is
provided relating to people and places - "and we met (.) eh George and (...) what's the
wife's name (.) she's about that height ehm George B and his wife" (extract 5:12,
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lines 281-283); "I I went to the fire brigade (.) eh rehabilitation place that they've got
em (.) in Yorkshire" (extract 5:13 lines 405-406). They also use active voicing
(Wooffitt, 1992) - "oh you're back to normal again" (extract 5:12, line 286; "they'd
say "what are you doing that for?" and I had to turn round and tell her "look I'm
scared stiff" (extract 5:13, lines 409-410).
In extracts 5:12 and 5:13, then, stroke sufferers contrast appearances with reality to
suggest that their account is the more valid one, and in addition they use detailed
narrative, and active voicing (Wooffitt, 1992) to construct as fact that their disability is
due to the effects of stroke. The use of these devices suggests that stroke sufferers'
inability to perform tasks is an accountable issue. In the next two extracts, we can see
how this is explicitly formulated in interactions between sufferers and carers.
Extract 5:14 FGDS2
636 Lorna: but you've (.) dropped lots of things that you used to do
637 as well
638 Euan: mhmm
639 Lorna: you would do it I think if you were asked (.) like (.) do
640 that extra wee bit of (.) tidying up in the garden that you
641 might have done voluntarily before (..) you j- the
642 whether that's energy or just (..) whatever you just don't
643 do it now
644 Sharon: mm
645 Eric: I think it's a bit of both () really
646 Lorna: yeah
647 Eric: I think it's .h energy
648 Alison: I mean Eric will say I'll ask him the the the same thing
649 "yeah I'll do that for you" [but it doesnae [doesn't]
650 happen]
651 Euan: [I always got ideas of] things
652 I want to be doing but (..) never get them done
653 Eric: energy and motivation [yeah]
654 Lorna: [mhmm]
655 Alison: yeah I've wondered about that as well whether that's (.)
656 the stroke or whether it's just that they have well (.) it
657 doesnae [doesn't] (.) "I cannae [can't] be bothered" you
658 know whether it's (.) being lazv or whether it's (.) the
659 stroke
Extract 5:15 FGDS1
1003 Emma: but I've I have found and I've found this with my father









if she's gonna be honest (.) if you're there (..) and
you're [unclear] she would let you run back and forward
[unclear] she'll do on her own if there's nobody there
aye
and if you're there the more you do for them
yep
the more they'll expect they'll expect you to do
In extracts 5:14, and 5:15, Lorna and Alison, and Emma, carers of Eric, Euan and
Yvonne respectively, construct stroke sufferers as unwilling rather than unable to
carry out tasks. They use a number of rhetorical devices to achieve this. The first
relates to lexical choice; Loma's use of verb in "you've (.) dropped lots of things that
you used to do" (extract 5:14, line 636) suggests that Euan has actively opted not to do
these things, rather than that he is incapable. Second, she makes a conditional claim:
"you would do it I think if you were asked" (line 639). Similarly, Emma claims that
"she'll do on her own if there's nobody there" (extract 5:15, line 1007). These claims
make activity conditional on a prior state of affairs, and suggest that the sufferer has
some control over what he or she can do. Alison develops Loma's construction by
claiming that she does ask Eric to do things, that he agrees but still fails to act, and she
uses a third device, active voicing (Wooffitt, 1992), to construct her account as
factual: "I mean Eric will say 111 ask him the same thing "yeah I'll do that for you" but
it doesnae happen" (lines 648-650).
Emma makes an explicit claim to truth with "she must admit this if she's gonna be
honest" (lines 1004-1005), which leaves us to infer that if Yvonne does not agree with
her, then it is Yvonne who is not being honest.
In extract 5:14, Loma followed up a 'before and after' contrast of Euan's activities
with a partially incomplete assessment: "whether that's energy or just (..) whatever
you just don't £& it now" (lines 642-643). Alison similarly ends her account with an
assessment: "whether it's (.) being lazy or whether it's (.) the stroke" (lines 658-659).
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In both cases, the carer suggests that there is some uncertainty as to the reason for
sufferers' failure to carry out tasks. However, these assessments can be seen in the
context of previous constructions of stroke sufferers as unwilling to help out, and
hearers are therefore likely to draw the inference that stroke sufferers are being lazy.
This has two rhetorical functions. First, carers manage indirectly to infer a
construction that might otherwise be thought of as unkind on their part. Second, the
hearer is more likely to see a construction as factual if he or she was the one to make
it. Emma's assessment, at the end of extract 5:15, is more direct She uses the
pronoun "them" to construct stroke sufferers, in general, as lazy - at least when other
people are around: "the more you do for them [...] the more they'll expect they'll
expect you to do" (lines 1009-1011).
It is interesting to note the stroke sufferers' responses to implications that they are
lazy. They do not counter this by, for example, attributing their failure to carry out
tasks to the effects of stroke. Instead, in extract 5:14, they reframe their failure to
carry out activities. Thus, Loma's initial assessment - "whether that's energy or just
(..) whatever" (line 642) - left open the possibility for alternative explanations.
Alison, another carer, reformulated this in more negative terms: "whether it's (.) being
lazy or whether it's (.) the stroke: (lines 658-659). Eric, however, claims "I think it's
a bit of both () really" (line 645). He recycles the first part of her assessment - "I
think it's .h energy" (line 647) - and in his next turn he continues "energy and
motivation yeah" (line 653). When Alison gives her account of Eric's failure to do
things even when asked, something that might be construed as laziness, this is
overlapped by Euan's claim: "I always got ideas of things I want to be doing but (..)
never get them done" (lines 651-652). Here, Euan defends against any inference that
he is not motivated to do things, but he does not actually provide an account of why
the things never get done. Specifically, he does not draw on the possible inference
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that this is due to laziness. Thus, Eric's and Euan's accounts represent a less
damaging assessment of their failure to carry out tasks.
In extract 5:15, it is interesting to note that Yvonne does not offer any comment, far
less a defence against Emma's construction of stroke sufferers as lazy (and does not
do so in the lines following the extract). This may be a reflection of the rhetorical
strength of Emma's construction. Ian's "yep" in line 1010 is ambiguous. It may, on
the one hand, represent agreement. Using the techniques of conversation analysis,
Pomerantz (1984) has shown that an assessment is commonly paired with either an
agreement or disagreement, and that the former is the normatively paired response.
Interaction runs more smoothly when the preferred response is provided; this can be
seen in the pauses and accounting that take place when the response is of the
dispreferred type. When an assessment is followed by an agreement, this can also
provide the signal that the previous speaker's turn is complete. Emma, Kirsty and
Norman orient to this in the next line, in which Emma finishes her sentence and Kirsty
and Norman take the floor. Thus, Ian's agreement might be considered a way of
drawing a close to Emma's damaging claims. Norman's claim reframes the failure to
carry out tasks when someone else is there to do them, in terms of the problems the
sufferer might have in performing such tasks in front of other people - "it's it's
embarrassment" (line 1013). This works to deflect personal blame from the stroke
sufferer.
3. Summary
In this chapter, I have considered two areas in which stroke sufferers can be held
accountable: for having had the stroke in the first place and for the extent to which
their disability prevents them from carrying out tasks. In responses to my question
about the possible causes of stroke at a young age, participants oriented to issues of
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accountability, and they were sensitive to the negative implications this might have for
their identity. Responsibility for having suffered a stroke was constructed by carers
here in terms of sufferers' previous lifestyle choices and their failure to seek
appropriate medical care prior to the event. While the sufferers quoted here did
attempt to counter claims relating to the latter, they colluded somewhat with carers'
construction of stroke sufferers as busy and active people (pre-stroke), despite the
implication that this may have contributed to their condition. However, when the
personal characteristics inferred were less positive, participants constructed a subtle
and effective defence in which personal liability was minimised.
Some internet participants also oriented to issues of accountability, although none was
explicit in the interactional context. Some stroke sufferers also oriented to others'
views on the extent to which their incapacities were due to the effects of stroke.
Indeed, carers here constructed sufferers as, at times, lazy. Stroke sufferers here
reframed this account in terms that were personally less damaging.
4. Discussion
Parsons (1951) drew attention to some of the social implications of being unwell, in
particular the sick person's motivation to be in that situation. In this chapter, we have
seen that sufferers and carers treat both the cause of stroke and their subsequent
incapacity as accountable. The stroke sufferers in this study attended to the potential
negative identity that might arise from the imputed causes of their stroke. Pound and
colleagues (1997) trace the history of stroke and suggest that there have always been
moral undertones relating to the lifestyle factors that are thought to be involved, which
have been described as smoking, having high blood pressure, being over 65 and
taking tittle exercise (Coppola et al., 1995). Stroke sufferers here did orient to the
potential impact of each of these factors, in focus groups where carers also
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participated. In the extracts shown, respondents who had suffered stroke constructed
themselves as active and busy people prior to their stroke. In extracts from internet
participants' responses, we also saw an orientation to accountability. This suggests
that accountability might not just derive from the immediate social context, but that it
might be explained by wider social and cultural factors. Research suggests that there
is a stigma associated with being chronically ill (Goffman, 1963). Thus, people with
long-term conditions might have to attend to potentially negative identity implications





Research into chronic illness suggests that people suffering from such conditions
experience some sort of disruption to their sense of self. In order to make sense of
this disrupted self, the person with chronic illness may modify his or her 'life
narrative' to preserve some feelings of continuity (Corbin & Strauss, 1985; Corbin &
Strauss, 1987; Riessman, 1990; Williams, 1984). In addition, research suggests that
there is a stigma attached to having a chronic condition.
For people with ME, identity implications arise from the uncertain medical status of
this illness. We have seen, in chapter 3, that participants in this study constructed ME
as serious, as enigmatic, and specifically not psychological.
In this chapter, I will discuss participants' responses to my question "in what ways
would you say that having ME has affected you as a person?" Preliminary analysis
led to the identification of two broad types of response, and chapter sections are
organised accordingly. First, I will examine responses in which participants wrote or
spoke about the effects ofME as a change for the worse. In the second section, I will
show how some participants employed both 'positive' and 'negative' categorisations
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of the impact of ME. I will also discuss responses that described the changes brought
about by this condition in terms of a change for the better.
1. Effects ofME as a change for the worse
I will begin by showing how respondents in this research used 'before and after'
constructions to emphasise the losses they suffered as a result of their illness. An
example of this can be seen in the following extract:
Extract 6:1 MEICCp77 Alex
9 I was a very active person with a very good social life who
10 enjoyed nothing more than going for long walks with my wife
11 and the dog or visiting the pub with friends for a few drinks
12 and hopefully a quiz.
13
14 The garden was my pride and joy. Indeed the year before I
15 developedME I transformed my then fiancees (now wife)
16 garden from a bare patch of grass to an oasis of colour
17 complete with ponds, flower beds, borders and even a
18 bench. Every day people passing would stop and admire the
19 changes in die garden.
20
21 I was a very ambitious person with hopes and dreams for my
22 future. Part of this was a complete career change and I had
23 already begun the initial stages of this when the illness struck.
24
25 Suddenly everything came to a grinding halt. The energy I had
26 always had and taken for granted was no longer there, even the
27 simplest task left me feeling totally drained. My body ached
28 from head to toe, I had almost constant headaches and other
29 symptoms too numerous to mention. The visits to the pub had
30 to go, I became totally intolerant of alcohol and the smell of
31 cigarette smoke or perfume turns me into a gibbering wreck.
32
33 I am now a virtual recluse, most days the only people I see and
34 speak to are my wife and daughter. Friends I once had regular
35 contact with have all but disappeared. I look at my garden and
36 I can see all the jobs that need to be done and in my mind I
37 form a plan of action but in reality very little actually gets done.
Extract 6:1 can be divided into two sections. In lines 9-23, Alex describes his life
prior to falling ill with ME. In the rest of the extract, he gives an account of the impact
this illness had on him. In the first part, Alex makes the claim that he was a "very
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active person with a very good social life" (line 9). This is followed by an account,
warranting this claim, of the things he used to do: "going for long walks with my wife
and the dog or visiting the pub with friends for a few drinks and hopefully a quiz"
(lines 10-12). This account helps to construct as a fact that Alex used to be an active
and sociable person. There is another aspect of this account that is of some interest.
The activities that Alex describes are mundane, everyday activities. They are things
that ordinary people do, and by referring to them, Alex constructs himself as an
ordinary person. Sacks (1984) noted that 'being ordinary' does not describe a state,
or an 'average' person, but instead is an accomplishment that has continually to be
worked at in the course of interaction. Alex's description in lines 10-12 can be seen,
in Sacks' terms, as 'doing being ordinary'. However, he also makes relevant
information that suggests the extent of his participation in these activities. Thus, he
describes "going for long walks" (line 10; emphasis added), and "visiting the pub with
friends for a few drinks and hopefully a quiz" (line 12; emphasis added). We can see
a similar formulation in lines 14-19, where Alex provides a narrative description of his
love for gardening - another quite mundane activity. He constructs a vivid contrast
between the description of the garden before and after his intervention - he
transformed it "from a barepatch of grass to an oasis of colour complete with ponds,
flower beds, borders and even a bench" (lines 16-18; emphasis added). The visual
contrast invoked here suggests a particularly high level of achievement. By listing the
features of the newly created garden, and describing these in the plural, Alex similarly
emphasises the contrast with what was there before. He also provides an external,
and therefore objective, warrant for his achievements: "[ejvery day people passing
would stop and admire the changes in the garden" (lines 18-19). Alex's description of
his involvement in mundane activities, combined with a marking of the extent to which
he participated, enables him both to construct himself, pre-ME, as an ordinary person
and as someone who put an extra level of effort into his hobbies. The claim that
161
follows in lines 21-22 - "I was a very ambitious person with hopes and dreams for my
future" - constructs Alex as someone with high aspirations.
Hutchby & Wooffitt (1998) show how, in their verbal descriptions of paranormal
experiences, people prefaced their description of a psychic event with a mundane 'state
formulation', of the type 'I was just doing X (mundane activity) when Y (paranormal
event). They suggest that this construction works to defend against a sceptical
reappraisal of the psychic experience. That is, there is nothing in the immediate
context of the paranormal claim that might help to 'explain away' the event. In this
extract, Alex prefaces his description of the ways in which ME has affected him as a
person with a series of claims that construct him as ordinary, as well as active and
motivated. This construction works to defend against the possible accusation that
there is something different about him as a person that might explain his ME. By
constructing himself as hard-working and motivated, he also counters the possible
accusation that he is lazy rather than ill. All of this provides an inferential context for
the second section of this extract, in which Alex describes the effects ofME. Here, he
uses extreme case formulations to emphasise the seriousness of this illness - "even the
simplest task left me feeling totally drained. My body ached/ram head to toe" (lines
26-28; emphasis added); "I became totally intolerant of alcohol" (line 30; emphasis
added). Pomerantz (1986) noted that extreme case formulations can be used to
provide the strongest possible case for what is being claimed, and that this orients to
the possibility of a challenge from interlocutors as to the validity of the claim. In this
case, it is notable, given the description of Alex's activities and level ofmotivation
pre-ME, that he has been seriously incapacitated by illness. His description of his
post-ME state is systematically designed to provide a contrast with the claims made in
lines 9-23. Having characterised himself as "a very active person" (line 9), he
describes in lines 25-26 his loss of energy. Whereas, in line 11, he had noted his
previous liking for visiting the pub with friends, he notes in lines 29-30 that such a
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pastime is now intolerable. In lines 35-37 he notes his inability to carry out the work
that should be done in the garden. The effect of this 'before and after' structure is to
emphasise the seriousness ofME by providing specific examples in which previous
abilities are compared with current incapacity.
In the following two extracts, both in response to my question about how ME has
affected the sufferer as a person, participants work to accomplish 'being ordinary' as
their pre-illness state:
Extract 6:2 MEICCp73 Lynn
12 I miss things like reading,going to
13 the pictures,having discussions with friends, playing
14 chess,backgammon.My home used to be a hive of
15 activity,people dropping round,for a meal,wine,catering for 10
16 people was easy then,and i loved doing it,dinner parties arent
17 just about eating,I guess my social life suffered the most. LOL [laugh
18 out loud] im lucky if i see more than 2 people a week now,and of of
19 those is normally the postman,Shopping becomes a
20 pain„sainsburys 30 mins home, thats the extent ofmy weekly
21 outings,smile. Personality,changes,Yes i suppose it does,you
22 feel cut off from the average working,fit,person.
In extract 6:2, an internet chatline communication, Lynn uses a list formulation to
recount the things she misses (lines 12-14) as a result of having ME. In chapter 3,1
showed how listing could be used to construct ME as serious, by illustrating the extent
and range of problems faced by sufferers. Here, listing is used to denote the extent
and range of activities in which Lynn can no longer participate. In extract 6:3, Liz
Extract 6:3 FGME2
862 Jennifer: irn (.) what ways would you say that having ME has
affected you as a person?
oh (..) completely different person .hh e:m hh
housework h (.) I was never hh (.) one for () polishing
day and night but my (.) my house was always clean
and tidy and (.) the work was done and it wouldnae
[wouldn't] pile up .hh but (..) that that's the least of it
() we went dancing three times a week
mhmm
a::m (..) parties (.) dances (.) we loved dancing (.)












similarly provides a three-part list (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984; Jefferson, 1991):
"parties (.)/ dances [...]/ walking" (lines 871-872). She also uses a three-part list to
describe the extent to which she was able to do housework before she had ME: "my
house was always clean and tidy/ and (.) the work was done/ and it wouldnae pile up"
(lines 866-868). A three-part list is a rhetorical device often used to orient to a
common feature of the items listed (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984; Jefferson, 1991).
Here, it suggests that Liz was sociable and active, and was able to keep ahead of her
housework. Again, the kinds of pursuits to which she refers are mundane, and this
helps to construct Liz as ordinary as well as active and hard-working. In Lynn's case,
although the list is longer, the items have certain similarities. That is, "reading, going
to the pictures, having discussions with friends, playing chess, backgammon" (lines
13-14) relate to everyday, mundane activities, and they help to construct Lynn as an
ordinary person. The extent to which she enjoyed seeing people is evoked by her
detailed description of the social activities that took place in her home, and that
involved her in a good deal of work. She notes that she used to cater happily "for 10
people." This level of detail serves to construct her claim as factual, and to mark her
achievement at this ordinary activity as extra-ordinary. It is also forms a basis upon
which comparisons can be made with her life since she had ME.
In line 17, extract 6:2, Lynn begins the contrasting account of her life now, and a
direct comparison is made in terms of the number of social encounters she has - "im
lucky if i see more than 2 people a week now, and of of [sic] those is normally the
postman" (lines 18-19). The first 'of in line 18 appears to be a typographical error,
and it seems likely that it should have read "one of." That Lynn's social activities are
now quite restricted is conveyed by her account of the number of people she is now
likely to see in a week - 2, one of whom is there to deliver her mail and whose visit
would therefore not normally be considered a social one.
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Liz, in extract 6:3, does not provide a contrasting account. She does, however, imply
that she is no longer able to take part in the activities she speaks about, and she does
this by referring to them in the past tense - "my house was always clean and tidy and
(.) the work was done and it wouldnae pile up [...] we went dancing three times a
week" (lines 866-869). By specifying the frequency, Liz constructs this claim as
factual (and also constructs her level of participation as high). Liz also marks the
changes brought about by ME in her claims at the beginning and the end of her
account Thus, in line 864 she makes the claim, in regard to the ways that ME has
affected her, that she is a "completely different person." Having listed the activities in
which she used to take part she ends her claim "you just cannae do it now" (line 872).
Thus, Liz constructs herself pre-ME as ordinary, active and sociable, and she allows
us to infer that her illness has prevented her from participating in the mundane
activities that she describes.
In both of these accounts, participants describe an ordinary life before being ill. They
refer to their inability now to perform mundane tasks as a contrast to the level of
activity they enjoyed before. There is an extent to which such a formulation can also
help to construct these sufferers in the present. Dingwall (1976) described
ordinariness in terms of a cultural imperative, all the more important when some aspect
of a person's life might be considered to be deviant. Illness is one such circumstance.
He noted that being ordinary does not describe a state of affairs inherent in the
individual, but rather an interpersonal achievement. In order to claim ordinariness, he
argues, one needs to understand what 'ordinary' is, and be able to 'do' it. In the
extracts above, Lynn and Liz describe their present situation as one in which they are
not able to perform everyday activities. However, by referring to mundane activities,
they demonstrate their cultural competence. That is, they know what constitutes
ordinariness. Furthermore, by stressing how much they miss such everyday
activities, they align themselves with the ordinary person in the here and now.
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In the final extract of this section, Tricia begins her response by describing her
situation now, and this provides an inferential context for a description of her life
before ME. The effect is similar to that in the extracts already discussed. That is, it
sets up a 'before and after' contrast between her pre- and post-ME states:
Extract 6:4 MEIPCp19 Tricia
1 To all who knew me before there is little resemblance between the
2 sick, housebound and often bedbound I am now and the busy
3 career person with a large home, student children, a wide circle of
4 friends and many interests like running a Guide Company,
5 teaching elocution, demonstrating crafts to women's groups and
6 church activities.
In extract 6:4, a one-to-one internet communication, Tricia uses a three-part list
(Atkinson & Heritage, 1984; Jefferson, 1991) to describe how she is now - "sick,
housebound and often bedbound" (line 2). This is then contrasted with the person she
was before, the description of which takes the form of a list. In this list, which runs
from lines 2-5, Tricia describes everyday activities involved in work, family life and
social life. This constructs the pre-ME Tricia as an ordinary person who is also
extremely active and hard-working. Her references to running a Guide Company,
demonstrating crafts to women's groups, and church activities also help to construct
Tricia as a 'good citizen', and thus attends to identity work. By framing the 'before
and after' ME contrast as one that would be apparent "[t]o all who knew me before"
(line 1), Tricia constructs the reality of the detrimental effects of this illness.
2. 'Positive' and 'negative' categorisations of ME
Some participants responded to my question by constructing the different effects of
ME as either 'positive' or 'negative' for the sufferer. This can be seen most clearly in
the following extract, which is long, but has largely been left intact to allow for an
analysis of the way in which it is structured:
166
Extract 6:5 MEIPCp17 Jim
2 Let me first start with the negative sides, and then the
3 positive ones:
4
5 - Lack of energy influences in a big way what I can or rather
6 cannot do.
7 - Lack of finances has got a similar effect
8 -1 lost my fulltime, wellpaid job because of the ilness [stc]
9 -1 lost many friends because I was unable to keep up with them
10 - The illness caused a lot of other health problems eg Flu and
11 Cystitis.
12 -1 can no longer enjoy a prper [sic] holiday, because of lack of energy
13 and finances.
14 - Finding parttime employment is hard as nobody want a crippled
15 person
16 -1 need other people to do a lot of jobs for me, which forms an
17 extra financial burden.
18 -1 cannot travel 'home' as often as I did to see my relatives in
19 Holland.
20 - Socialising is difficult because of lack of energy and money.
21 - It is difficult to have hobbies as energy is lacking
22 -1 need a lot of extra rest and sleep, often mid-day.
23 - The continuous battle overmoney matters with die Benefits
24 Agency is a nightmare!!!
25 -1 often feel guilty that I cannot offer my family what other people
26 have.
27
28 - Thru the illness I have learned a lot about myself (and other
29 people).
30 - My spiritual development has increased
31 -1 am more in tune with myself and Mother Nature.
32 -1 can now appreciate the little things in life more.
33 -1 have become closer to my family.
34 -1 have found who my true friends are (not many, though).
35 - I've gained a lot of knowledge about Medicine.
36 -1 have learned how to cope with stress.
37 -1 am now a different person (for the better, I believe)....
In extract 6:5 Jim uses a list formulation to describe first, in his terms, the "negative
sides" then the "positive" (lines 2-3). Each point is prefaced with a dash, and takes its
own line, and this gives his response the visible appearance of a list. It can be seen at
a glance that there are far more 'negative' than the 'positive' effects (the latter are
separated from the former by a blank line at line 27). In the 'negative' list, Jim refers
to the ways in which ME has affected his level of activity, his ability to work, and his
social life. We can infer a certain amount of information about Jim's life prior to ME
from the detail that is provided in this first part. Thus, "I lostmy fulltime, wellpaid
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job [...] I lost many friends [...] I can no longer enjoy a prper [sic] holiday" (lines 8-
12) imply that these are all things that he had before he had ME. This information can
provide an inferential context in which to assess the detrimental impact of this
condition. This is similar to the ways in which respondents in section 1 constructed
the effects ofME as a change for the worse. They constructed themselves as active,
hard-working and sociable people prior to the onset ofME. They also constructed
themselves as 'ordinary' people, and 'doing being ordinary' can function to defend
against the suggestion that there might be something different about ME sufferers that
causes them to have this illness.
To provide nothing but a long list of its negative effects could leave Jim open to the
accusation that he is a 'complainer', with the potential inference that the symptoms of
his illness are exaggerated. The provision of a list of 'positive' effects functions to
counter such potential accusations. Furthermore, we can see that this second list
refers to non-physical changes rather than those to do with physical accomplishments
and active socialising. Thus, Jim implies that the negative effects ofME are limited to
the physical. Moreover, Jim's gloss in the last line - "I am now a different person (for
the better I believe)" allows us to infer that the non-physical changes resulting from
this illness have had a positive effect on his identity.
In the following extract, Tracey also constructs the effects ofME in two opposing
categories:
Extract 6:6 MEICCp76 Tracey
3 Disabled -1 am not not able to do many or most of the things I
4 did before including drive, walk, party, drink, work etc. So
5 ME has slowed me down and added frustrations to my life
6 which were not there before.
7
8 Enabled - It has also had a profound effect on the pace my life
9 is carried out which really and truly is an improvement. I have
10 time to watch and think, time to spend with my husband and
11 share the simple things of life and delight in them. I am no
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12 longer in a hurry to conquer the world or be in control of
13 everything around me. I have always appreciate the wonderful
14 world in which we live but now I have time for that
15 appreciation. I am a calmer and more contented person despite
16 the ME
In her response, Tracey categorises the ways in which she has been influenced by ME
as 'disabled' and 'enabled'. Within each category, she uses a list formulation to
describe the effects this illness has had. The disabling effects are all related to reduced
levels of physical activity, ability to work and to socialise (lines 3-4). Those effects
that are categorised as 'enabling' relate to non-physical pursuits that result from a
slower pace of life. Tracey provides a gloss in lines 15-16, similar to that offered by
Jim in extract 6:5: "I am a calmer and more contented person despite the ME." Thus,
like Jim, she constructs the negative changes wrought by ME as physical, and non-
physical changes as having positive identity implications.
So far in this section, we have looked at responses in which sufferers counterbalanced
the negative effects ofME with the positive. In the following extract, I will examine
Debbie's construction of the positive effects ofME.
Extract 6:7 MEICCp73 Debbie
27 Its not all bad though -it has taught me to see the smaller
28 things in life and to take pleasure from them and also to listen
29 to others as they may be ableto help or I may be able to help
30 them even if it is only with a few small words, things that
31 maybe I woudln't have noticed in my lifebefore DD [dreaded disease].
32 I must admit though that although I am thankful for these small
33 things, I would like to have my life back and to be able to do
34 the most mundane of things again.
Extract 6:7 comes after a long account of the difficulties Debbie has encountered as a
result of having ME, and this is signalled by her claim in line 28: "[i]t's not all bad
though." This formulation, therefore, follows the 'negative' balanced by 'positive'
construction discussed above (although Debbie does not explicitly categorise the
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effects in this way). In the last lines of her response, Debbie rejects the possible claim
that she stands to gain more from her illness than she loses by it: "although I am
thankful for these small things, I would like to have my life back and to be able to do
the most mundane of things again" (lines 32-34). This suggests that to speak in
positive terms about the impact of illness is something that has to be carefully
managed. This can be seen in the next two extracts.
Extract 6:8 MEICCp74 Gillian
4 On the whole having ME has been a life changing, positive
5 experience (although I think I've learned all I need to in 6 years
6 so please can I get better now?!!)
Extract 6:9 MEICCp76 Lesley
1 I can empathise with Gillian as in my case, too, I think it has
2 had a positive effect, and I feel more at peace. It has made me
3 stop and evaluate what is important in life.
[...]
27 All this isn't to say I wouldn't appreciate the chance of being
28 well again - all the more so with a new perspective on life!!
Both Gillian in extract 6:8, and Lesley in extract 6:9, referred explicitly to only the
positive consequences of having ME. However, Gillian's assessment begins "[o]n
the whole" (line 4). This expression allows us to infer that the positive assessment
that follows can be seen in a context that is not entirely benign. Thus, some
counterbalancing of negative and positive effects is implied. Lesley's response refers
to this account - "I can empathise with Gillian" (line 1), which sets up their
constructions as similar. Furthermore, Lesley writes "/ think it has had a positive
effect" (lines 1-2; emphasis added). Thus, like Gillian, she allows us to infer that her
account of the positive aspects of the experience of having ME is dependent on her
cognition, and not a fact relating to the illness per se. In both accounts, the positive
assessment is followed by an explicit reference to the writer's desire to recover. Thus,
Gillian writes "I think I've learned all I need to in 6 years so please can I get better
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now?!!" (extract 6:8, lines 5-6). Lesley's response (extract 6:9) is positive
throughout, although only the first three lines are shown here. At the end of her
response, she also refers to her desire to recover: "[a]ll this isn't to say I wouldn't
appreciate the chance of being well again - all the more so with a new perspective on
life!!" (lines 27-28). Thus, in both these extracts a positive account ofME is set
within an implied context that is not completely benign, and it is followed by a claim
that constructs the sufferer as someone who is keen to get better. This shows an
orientation to the potential charge that the sufferer is malingering, and that to construct
the effects ofME in a positive light involves some delicate interactional work.
It is notable that the extracts in which participants described ME in positive terms were
exclusively from data collected via the internet. I found no such examples in the focus
group response to my question about the effects ofME on the person. It is possible,
then, that the source of data might be significant For example, it may well be
problematic to claim to have benefited from an illness when in the presence of other
sufferers. Speakers may run the risk of being challenged. Moreover, by
downplaying the effects of their illness they may undermine the very basis on which
the group is formed, which is to provide support to people with ME.
3. Summary
So far, we have seen that when participants described the effects ofME as a change
for the worse, they used a 'before and after' contrast formulation in which they
compared their lives before and after the onset of this condition. This allowed them to
emphasise the losses brought about by their illness. Detailed descriptions were used
to construct a 'before ME' identity that characterised them as doing ordinary things,
but at a particularly exacting level. This functioned as a defence against the potential
implication that the sufferer is either lazy or unmotivated. Participants used list
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formulations and extreme case formulations (Pomerantz, 1986) to stress the impact of
ME.
Some respondents categorised the effects ME had on them as positive or negative.
While the negative effects were described in terms of reduced physical activities,
leading to restrictions in work and social life, the positive effects related to non-
physical changes, and the construction of the person with ME as a "better person" than
before. Respondents who wrote in positive terms about ME, and did not explicitly
counterbalance these effects with the negative ones, nevertheless inferred that the
impact was not entirely beneficial. Furthermore, they followed their positive
assessments with an explicit reference to their desire to recover. This works to defend
against the possible claim that they are profiting from their illness - and might therefore
be malingerers. It was noted that positive assessments were found only in internet
data, and the possibility raised that the source of data might be a significant factor in
the ways in which sufferers can construct their illness.
4. Discussion
The literature on the effects of chronic illness and identity suggests that it leads to a
disruption of the sufferer's sense of self. In order to deal with this, the research
suggests, the sufferer may re-construct his or her life story so that some sense of
continuity of self is preserved. From a social constructionist perspective, these
notions are of particular interest because of the possible rhetorical functions they might
have. Thus, an account of how the self has been lost, or how illness has disrupted
one's life might work to construct that illness as serious, or to construct the sufferer as
a particular type of person - the type who does not, for example, easily give in to
illness.
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An analysis of responses to my question "in what ways would you say that having
ME has affected you as a person?" showed that ME sufferers in this research used
'before and after' contrast formulations to emphasise the negative changes brought
about by their illness. Similar formulations were also noted by Bland (1995) and
Horton-Salway (1998; 2001a; 2001b), who concluded that they work to construct ME
as a serious, physical condition. Horton-Salway argues that this construction shows
an orientation to blame and accountability, in that if 'serious and physical' are
successfully accomplished, the sufferer can avoid the negative identity implications of
malingering. Participants responding via the internet did also refer to some positive
effects ofME, and this suggest that the context in which research is carried out may be
of some significance.
In this research, participants did attend to the identity implications of constructing the
effects that ME had on them. They constructed pre-illness selves as involved in
everyday activities, and thus accomplished 'being ordinary'. Bland (1995) reports
similar findings, and notes the importance of such an accomplishment in countering
potentially problematic identity ascriptions associated with chronic illness.
Participants in this study also stressed the extent to which they participated in ordinary
activities prior to becoming ill. This enabled them to construct a positive pre-illness,
and current, identity which worked to counter the potential charge that they were the
sort of people who would give in to illness. Respondents also worked to construct the
positive, non-physical effects this illness had on them, and thus oriented to identity
issues.
It is notable that stroke sufferers also used 'before and after' formulations to construct
their condition in terms of loss of abilities, and that they also constructed an ordinary
pre-stroke existence. The next chapter examines the ways in which these respondents





In this chapter, I will show how participants oriented to identity issues in then-
responses to my question "in what ways would you say that having had a stroke has
affected you as a person?" I have noted at the start of chapter 6 that research into
chronic illness suggests that people suffering from such conditions experience some
sort of disruption to their sense of self. In order to make sense of this disrupted self,
the person with chronic illness may modify his or her 'life narrative' to preserve some
feelings of continuity (Corbin & Strauss, 1985; Corbin & Strauss, 1987; Riessman,
1990; Williams, 1984). Research also suggests that people with chronic illness
experience a changed relationship with the body, and that this in turn can affect then-
sense of identity. In addition, research suggests that having a chronic condition can
have negative implications for the sufferer's identity. The literature on stroke suggests
that sufferers do indeed experience a sense of disruption of the self, and that the body
can become objectified, leading to a lowering of feelings of self-esteem.
In preliminary analyses, it was found that some respondents constructed themselves as
having changed their outlook as a result of their stroke. Another theme that was
identified was that participants oriented to issues of self-presentation when writing or
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talking about the ways in which stroke had affected them. These observations are
discussed in detail in sections 1 and 2. These analyses led to an exploration, shown in
section 3, of the stigma of stroke observed in accounts of non-sufferers' reactions to
this condition, and of the effects this has on the ways in which sufferers talk and write
about stroke and personal change. In the final section, I explore the issue of identity
change that arose in focus groups made up of both stroke sufferers and carers.
1. The changed outlook of stroke sufferers
In this section, I will analyse two internet, one-to-one responses for the devices that
are used to construct the ways in which stroke has changed participants' outlook.
Extract 7:1 DSIPCp12 Ana
1 Having had a stroke has affected me profoundly:
2
3 My value systems have altered i.e. there are different
4 priorities I consider important I place less importance on
5 ideas of'morality', 'goodness', etc and more on the basic
6 principle that people are more important than ideas.
[...]
32 I am very aware of a sense of time being precious, and
33 feel grateful at every birthday and try to live life more for
34 the present.
Extract 7:2 DSIPCp12 Barry
1 I think my haemorrhage has changed me for the better.
2
3 After the actuall seriousness ofmy illness had sunk in, I
4 decided not to take things for granted again. My friends, family
5 all rallied round to help me recover, so I am forever in their
6 debt.
7
8 I learned that you can't let little things in life get you down, and
9 that every day is a new experience. My mother gets upset if the
10 car breaks down for example, and she has to walk to work.
11 Whereas I would look at it as "thank goodness the car broke
12 down at home, and not out in a lonely place late at night". I
13 know thats a wierd example, but I look at the best in each
14 situation. I take each day at a time, I don't get stressed out as
15 much. I always try and smile, no matter how hopeless the
16 situation. I think "if I didn't laugh about it and smile and be
17 kind to others - I'd go mad!" Its certainly better than feeling
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18 sorry for myself and shut myself away, a sad fact that a lot of
19 stroke sufferers do.
Both Ana and Barry begin their response with a claim regarding the change brought
about by their condition: "[h]aving had a stroke has affected me profoundly"
(extract 7:1, line 1); "I think my haemorrhage has changed me for the better" (extract
7:2, line 1). They then each provide an account of the ways in which they have
changed, and in each case they construct their response to stroke in positive terms.
After Ana's claim in line 3 - "[m]y value systems have altered", she draws a
contrast between ideas and people, the latter being more important to her now. She
thus constructs herself as a person who now values others more than abstract
concepts. Similarly, in extract 7:2, Barry makes a claim - "I learned that you can't let
little things in life get you down" (line 8), then describes a hypothetical situation in
which he contrasts the reaction his mother typically has, and the way in which he
would react: "[m]y mother gets upset if the car breaks down" (lines 9-10); "[w]hereas
I would look at it as "thank goodness the car broke down at home"" (lines 11-12).
The contrast helps to construct his own response as positive, and his use of active
voicing (Wooffxtt, 1992) helps to construct the reality of this outlook. In his evocation
of this potential problematic situation, Barry also manages to cast himself as active in
his response. It is the way that he would look at it that makes the experience less
upsetting.
Barry uses idiomatic formulations to construct facticity (Drew & Holt, 1998) when he
describes the way he approaches life now: "you can't let little things in life get you
down" (line 8); "every day is a new experience" (line 9); "I look at the best in each
situation" (lines 13-14); "I take each day at a time" (line 14). Ana also draws on
idiomatic formulations - "I am very aware of a sense of time being precious, and
[...] try to live life more for the present" (lines 32-34; emphasis added).
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2. Identity work
Ana and Barry's construction of the positive change brought about by stroke helps
them to construct an identity that is positive, and for which they can take credit. In the
following extracts, we can see the identity work that participants do when writing or
talking about the effects of stroke:
Extract 7:3 DSIPCp13 Ana
19 I am probably less tolerant of some behaviours e.g.
20 rudeness and other sorts of bad manners, dishonesty, etc,
21 and more tolerant of others e.g. eccentricity.
22
23 My moods can be changeable and I can be irritable, this
24 is noticeable not because it's necessarily abnormal, but
25 because I was so calm and placid before.
In extract 7:3, Ana describes the ways in which her tolerance levels and her mood
have changed as a result of stroke. Some of these changes are positive, and some
negative. When she describes what might be considered to be the more negative
impacts, she uses a number of linguistic devices as moderators. For example, she
writes "[m]y moods can be changeable and I can be irritable" (lines 23-24;
emphasis added). She notes that she is "probably less tolerant of some
behaviours" (line 19; emphasis added). When she describes her changeable moods,
Ana writes that "this is noticeable not because it's necessarily abnormal, but
because I was so calm and placid before" (lines 23-25). She moderates the
negative implications of her occasional irritability by constructing it as an attribute that
is only evident in contrast to her previously placid nature. We can also note the use of
"so" to emphasise positive attributes - "so calm and placid" (line 25). When Ana
writes about more positive traits, she does not use moderators. In her description of
how she reacts to different behaviours she writes that she is "more tolerant of
others" (line 21). Thus, she moderates only those identity attributes that are
potentially negative, and she emphasises positive identity attributes. Furthermore,
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Ana constructs herself as a reasonable person. Her list of behaviours of which she is
now less tolerant - "rudeness and other sorts of bad manners, dishonesty, etc"
(line 20) are ones for which such a reaction is quite excusable.
We can see a similar orientation to the construction of a positive identity in the
following extract
Extract 7:4 FGDS1
853 Jennifer: can anybody say in what in () what wa:ys would you
854 say that having had a stroke has affected you as a
855 person?
856 (...)
857 Yvonne: impatient (.) e:h
858 Jennifer: what make it has made you impatient
859 Yvonne: mhmm
860 Jennifer: yeah?
861 Yvonne: [very quietly] aye (...)
862 Norman: yeah it's [unclear]
863 Ian: it's maybe
864 Norman: one of the things that trauma and shock bring on
865 Ian: yeah maybe you should ask the carers rather than the .h
866 the sufferers of that [laughs]
867 Yvonne: that's right
Extract 7:4 is taken from the beginning of the response in focus group 1 to my
question about the ways in which stroke has affected the sufferer as a person. There
is a three-second silence (shown in line 856) before Yvonne's response "impatient (.)
eh" (line 857). Jefferson (1989) suggests that a silence of this length may indicate that
what has been said is problematic, or that providing a response is problematic.
Yvonne's response suggests a negative change, the impact of which is lessened
because she provides minimal detail. She does not, for example, say that she herself
is more impatient, and my response to her (line 858) constitutes a request for such
clarification. Her agreement is minimal - "mhmm" (line 859); [very quietly] "aye"
(line 861), followed by another three-second silence. The lengthy pauses and minimal
agreements suggest that there are interactional difficulties in providing a response to
my question about the effects of stroke. Norman orients to Yvonne's discomfort with
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his assessment in lines 862-864: "yeah it's [unclear] [...] one of the things that trauma
and shock bring on." Here, he provides a plausible reason for impatience. With "one
of the things", he also suggests that this is a general reaction. This makes Yvonne less
personally culpable for what might be considered to be a negative attribute.
In chapter 5,1 discussed the self-presentational issues that might affect stroke
sufferers in groups made up not just of other sufferers, but also of carers. I showed
that it was more problematic to take credit for successful recovery in such
circumstances than it was for participants who responded in writing on a one-to-one
basis. I would argue that it is similarly difficult to construct oneself in a positive light
when there are people present who might challenge such a construction. This echoes
the findings of chapter 6, in which I noted that it was only in the internet
communication that participants gave a positive account ofME. Thus, the method of
capturing data may be of some significance in the constructions that are provided.
Problems can also arise when participants construct the effects of stroke on the self as
negative. This extract ends with Ian's suggestion that the carers might be the best
arbiters of any change, and this can be seen as an orientation to their presence in the
group. In the next section, I will analyse extracts in which stroke sufferers orient to
the views that non-sufferers have of their condition.
3, The stigma of strpkg
In the first part of this section, I will show how, in orienting to issues of self-
presentation, participants construct others' reactions to their stroke.
Extract 7:5 DSIPCp13 Ana
14 I am more assertive than before, perhaps as a result of
15 better awareness of what it feels like to be ignored, and
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16 feeling that I am responsible for whether I am understood
17 and my feelings acknowledged.
Extract 7:6 DSIPCp12 Frederick
4 It has taken a big part away from me in terms of self realisation
5 (i.e. I won't be able to do what I wanted to achieve before and
6 I'm not even able to see myself the way I was before). This is
7 not self generated, but a reflection of how society looks at
8 disabled people. I don't fit the profile of any other group in the
9 hierarchy in our macho society. Personally I find that I have
10 more time to reflect on life and spiritual values have overtaken
11 material ones.
In extract 7:5, Ana characterises herself as more assertive, a trait that would normally
be considered positive in terms of its impact on identity. This is followed by an
account that is designed to construct this change as one for which she can take credit,
resulting perhaps, as she claims, from "better awareness of what it feels like to be
ignored" (line 15; emphasis added) and "feeling that I am responsible for whether
I am understood and my feelings acknowledged" (lines 16-17; emphasis added).
Extract 7:6 begins with Frederick characterising the effects of stroke in terms of a
negative change in his personal attributes - "I won't be able to do what I wanted to
achieve before and I'm not even able to see myself the way I was before" (lines 5-6).
This claim is potentially damaging in terms of self-presentation, and Frederick orients
to this by following it with an account that attributes the claim as "a reflection of how
society looks at disabled people" (lines 7-8). Thus, he is explicit about the impact of
other people's reactions to his stroke. Frederick implies that he belongs in the
category of 'disabled people' by default, because he does not "fit the profile of any
other group in the hierarchy in our macho society" (lines 8-9). The categorisation
'disabled' is therefore constructed as one that is externally imposed - and, we might
infer, not one that he would necessarily choose. The negative social impact can be
contrasted with Frederick's personal response that is constructed as both active and
positive:" [personally I find that I have more time to reflect on life and spiritual values
have overtaken material ones" (lines 10-11).
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In the last two extracts of this section, I will show how participants use the example of
other disabled people to counter others' attributions that are damaging to their identity:
Extract 7:7 FGDS2
655 Alison: y<eah I've wondered about that as well whether that's (.)
the stroke or whether it's just that they have well (.) it
doesnae [doesn't] (.) I cannae [can't] be bothered you
know whether it's (.) being lazy or whether it's (.) the
stroke
mhmm
[it's sometimes] like that
[it's very easy] (.) eh I can understand how people who
have got eh .hh hip problems or whatever back problems
whatever .hh they just sit because it's it's very easy just













Extract 7:7 follows a discussion in which carers and stroke sufferers accounted for the
stroke sufferers' failure to carry out everyday tasks. Lorna, a carer, "wondered"
whether it was due to a lack of energy or "whatever", and this extract begins a few
lines later. Alison's turn takes the form of an indirect question about the extent to
which Eric's immobility can be explained by his condition - "I've wondered about that
as well [...] whether it's (1) being lazy or whether it's (.) stroke" (lines 655-658).
Eric's turn begins "it's very easy" (line 661), then, rather than saying immediately
what it is that is very easy, he inserts a claim. The claim is that he understands how
other people "just sit" because it is too much effort to do otherwise. Eric's inserted
claim provides an indirect means of countering Alison's challenge. It does this in
three ways. First, by claiming to understand these other people, Eric suggests that he
has some empathy with them. From this, we might infer that his problem is similar to
theirs; indeed, the issue to which he refers is immobility. Second, he attends to self-
presentational issues by constructing himself in a positive light - as someone who
understands. Furthermore, Eric's understanding can be contrasted with Alison's
failure to work out what is going on. Third, he provides a warrant for the behaviour
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of these other people. That is, they may "just sit", but they are identified as having
good reason to be immobile - hip and back problems.
The first four lines of extract 7:7 were discussed in chapter 5, extract 5:15, in which I
argued that sufferers were held accountable for the extent to which their apparent
disability was due to the effects of stroke. In conversation analysis, a significant
feature of interaction is the way in which utterances are designed in response to the
sequentially previous turn. It is in the design of next turns that we can see how
speakers themselves make sense of what is going on. Hutchby andWooffitt (1998)
have called this 'next turn proof procedure'. This analysis of Eric's turn shows that
he does indeed orient to the potentially damaging attribution of laziness. The indirect
nature of Eric's response to Alison's challenge is what renders it rhetorically
powerful. He does not provide a straightforward account that would give an
indication of how much of his inability might ormight not be attributable to stroke,
and instead makes a claim that would be hard for Alison to counter. His
'understanding' is an internal event, therefore difficult to refute. He refers to a
hypothetical group of people, and therefore his attitude towards them could not easily
be challenged on the basis of actual behaviour. Furthermore, the attributes of the
group to which he refers provide a reasonable warrant for their behaviour. We can
see, then, that to claim understanding of other people's problems can work as a device
to counter the stigmatic responses of other people to those with stroke. A further
example comes from a one-to-one internet communication:
Extract 7:8 DSIPCp13 Colin
5 Having a stroke has made me more confident in myself, mainly
6 due to the pride I have about how I've recovered so far. It has
7 also meant that I've learnt to discount many of the opinions
8 people have ofme. I've also been able to understand a lot of
9 the problems physically disabled people face.
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In extract 7:8, Colin claims that stroke is responsible for a positive change in his
personal attributes: "[h]aving a stroke has made me more confident in myself (line 5).
He also writes that "[i]t has also meant that I've learnt to discountmany of the
opinions people have of me" (lines 6-8; emphasis added). His claimed response to
these opinions suggests that they are negative, invalid or unacceptable to Colin. We
can also infer from the prior and subsequent context that these opinions are related to
the fact that Colin has had a stroke. That is, this is preceded by a claim about the
effect stroke has had on him, and it is followed by his claim "I've also been able to
understand a lot of the problems physically disabled people face" (lines 8-9). This
claim can be seen as an orientation to providing a defence against the stigmatic
responses of others, and it does so indirectly in a similar way to that discussed in
extract 7:7. First, he implies an empathy with other physically disabled people that
allows us to infer that he has encountered similar problems. Second, it helps to
construct a positive identity for Colin - he is understanding and knowledgeable.
Third, there is some warrant provided for the problems faced by the people to whom
he refers - they are "physically disabled."
4. The problem of change
In this last section, I will examine the issues that arise for stroke sufferers when they
are asked, in a focus group made up of sufferers and carers, about how stroke might
have changed them. I will show that sufferers orient to the implications of change for









but as far as Eric's concerned before it this () very
strong forthright person and was invincible
mhmm
nothing would ever happen to him you know (.) and I




574 Alison: the same
575 Lorna: but that's maybe why they've made such a good
576 recovery?
577 Alison: well (.) possibly as well
578 Eric don't know why I had a stroke in the first place
[....]
582 Eric: .h but I would have taken the view .hh before the stroke
583 that I could have run this hospital you know .h I could
584 have been the .h the (.) manager of the place you know
585 but eh .hh now I just [blows out 'pwrr'] couldn't care
586 less
587 Jennifer: mhmm
588 Alison: [that's not true that's not true to say you couldn't care
589 less]
590 Euan: [I could still I could still do I could still but I keep falling
591 asleep] [[laughs]]
592 Eric: [[laughs]]
593 Alison: because you could care less and that's what's bugs you=
594 Eric: that's the frustration yeah
Extract 7:9 can be divided into two sections. In the first, ending at line 578, Alison,
Eric's wife and carer, constructs his identity prior to his stroke. In the second,
ending at line 594, Eric and Alison construct his post-stroke identity. I will analyse
each of these in turn.
In lines 567-568, Alison describes Eric before his stroke as: "this very strong/
forthright person/ and was invincible." This three-part list (Atkinson & Heritage,
1984; Jefferson, 1991) works to construct Eric's sense of invulnerability, an
interpretation that can be supported by the claim that follows: "nothing would ever
happen to him you know" (line 570). Having constructed Eric as invulnerable, Alison
then appears to suggest that this might have been what caused his stroke: "and I think
that's yup () and that's why" (lines 570- 571) The 3-second pause that follows, and
the hesitancy markers "well" and "possibly" suggest that what Alison is saying is
problematic - as it would be to suggest that a sense of invulnerability could account for
Eric's stroke. Lorna, another carer, provides an account in which these attributes can
be seen in a more positive light: "but that's maybe why they've made such a good
recovery?" (lines 575-576). By prefacing this with "but", she signals that this
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explanation is an alternative to the one that she understands Alison is making.
Alison's response - "well (.) possibly as well" (line 577; emphasis added) is amild
agreement that also implies that her own explanation is different to Lorna's, and still
stands. Eric's response - "don't know why I had a stroke in the first place" (line 578)
shows that he orients to Alison's talk as an account of why he had his stroke. Thus,
we can see in this section of the extract that Alison has constructed Eric as having a
sense of invulnerability, that this characteristic might be attributed as the cause of his
stroke.
In lines 582-586, Eric uses a contrast formulation to construct the extent to which he
has changed as a result of his stroke. He claims that, whereas before his stroke he
would have taken the view that he could have run the hospital (in which the focus
group was held), now he couldn't care less. With this claim, he constructs the change
as one of motivation rather than, say, inability. That is, he does not say that he could
not run the hospital now, but effectively that he is not at all interested in doing so.
This allows for the inference that he might still be able to run the hospital. The
construction is designed to deal with the delicate interactional problem of constructing
change. It allows him to lessen the negative impact on identity while acknowledging
the effects of stroke. Similarly, Euan constructs his potential inability to run the
hospital as due to fatigue rather than inability: "I could still I could still do I could still
but I keep falling asleep" (lines 590-591). Alison directly challenges Eric's claim:
"that's not true that's not true to say you couldn't care less [...] because you could
care less and that's what's bugs you" (lines 588-593). Eric's response to this
challenge is not to defend his earlier claim, but rather to agree: "that's the frustration
yeah" (line 594). Thus, he appears to contradict what he has just said. The apparent
contradiction here can be explained if we consider the actions that are being performed
in each turn. With his first claim, Eric is orienting to the charge that his sense of
invulnerability might have caused him to have a stroke. When Alison challenges this,
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she does not orient to any inference that Eric might still be capable of running the
hospital, but to the potentially damaging implication that he lacks motivation. Thus, to
agree with her construction is to maintain a positive identity.
We can see in this extract, then, how Eric deals with the difficult interactional problem
of responding to Alison's suggestion that his stroke might be attributable to his
feelings of invulnerability. On the one hand, if this were the case, and he wishes to
avert future strokes, then he should change with regard to this characteristic.
However, it follows that by constructing his sense of invulnerability as changed, he
runs the risk of lending credibility to Alison's theory. Furthermore, to have a sense of
invulnerability might reasonably be considered a positive characteristic, and so any
change might bring with it problems of self-presentation. On the other hand, if Eric
constructs himself as unchanged by his stroke, this might imply that his condition is
not serious enough to warrant his incapacity (which, as we have seen in extract 7:7,
and in chapter 5, is an accountable issue). He also risks being held accountable for
any potential future recurrence. What he does here is to construct himself as changed
and at the same time orients to potentially damaging implications for his identity.
5. Summary
In this chapter, I have shown that participants oriented to self-presentational issues in
their response to my question "in what ways would you say that having had a stroke
has affected you as a person?" Throughout, we have seen the positive identity work
that is done by stroke sufferers. Those who responded via one-to-one internet
communication constructed change in positive terms, as an active response to stroke.
Thus, the method of data collecting may have a significant impact on the constructions
that are available to participants. Both internet and focus group participants designed
their responses to moderate the potentially negative identity implications of change
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brought about by stroke. That identity issues are particularly salient can be seen in
participants' construction of others' response to stroke as stigmatising. For those
speaking in focus groups in which carers were present, there were particular
interactional difficulties surrounding the construction of change, and these were
oriented to in a way that helped to maintain a positive identity.
6. Discussion
In chapter 6,1 discussed the social constructionist perspective on traditional theories
which describe the effects of illness on the self in terms of disruption. Briefly to
recap, the approach taken in this study is that accounts describing illness in such a way
might fruitfully be examined for their rhetorical function. They might, for example,
work to construct the condition as serious, and the sufferer as legitimately ill. In this
research, participants who had suffered stroke did not talk or write about a disrupted
self. This is not to suggest the notion of the disrupted self is less valid - indeed, the
perspective taken in this research is that constructions are worked up in, and in
response to, the local context, so a degree of inconsistency across contexts is to be
expected. Participants did, however, work in other ways to construct a positive
identity.
Issues of self-presentation are important. In the traditional research, one of the
reported effects of chronic illness is also a changing relationship with the body
(Corbin & Strauss, 1987; Bury, 1988;Lupton, 1994), and this is something that has
been found in people who have suffered stroke (Bendz, 2000; Ellis-Hill et al., 2000).
A social constructionist perspective on the body focuses on how we represent it in our
interactions and on the rhetorical functions such representations might have. To speak
in terms of a body that is separate from the self might, for example, work to counter
the stigma that is associated with being ill. That is, the self need not be held
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accountable for bodily incapacity. Traditional research also suggests that negative
views about the body are mirrored by negative feelings about the self (Keppel &
Crowe, 2000). This suggests that the body and the self are not separate. However,
from the social constructionist perspective, such apparent inconsistency can be
understood if we consider the possible functions of this kind of account To attribute
negative self identity to an unhealthy body might for example, be used to counter the
stigma of problems that arise in the mind. Thus, a social constructionist perspective
and a consideration of issues of self-presentation can provide some insight into
findings from traditional research perspectives.
In the remaining two analytic chapters, the focus moves to the ways in which





In this chapter, Iwill examine the ways in which participants with ME spoke or wrote
about how they dealt with ME. Much of the research into chronic illness is centred on
the ways in which people 'cope'. In chapter 1,1 discussed some of the distinctions
that have been made between different types of coping, some being held to be superior
to others. In the particular case ofME, some researchers have suggested that there
may be an association between fatigue and 'avoidance coping', which signifies a
failure to confront the illness (Afari et al., 2000). In this study, I was interested to
know whether 'coping' was a concept that participants would deploy. For this
reason, I avoided using the terms 'cope' or 'coping' and instead used the following
two questions in an attempt to generate discussion around this issue. These were:
1. "Can you describe how you dealt with your condition when you first
knew about it?"
2. "What advice would you give to someone who has just developed
symptoms ofME?"
Another concern of mine was that, in the literature, there are moral implications
underlying the notion of 'coping', and that participants may well be aware of the
inference that some coping strategies are thought to actually exacerbate illness. By
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avoiding terms related to coping, I hoped to get a clearer idea of the issues that arose
for participants. If, for example, there were ways of coping that were considered
better than others, this would more fruitfully be explored by examining how sufferers
frame this. I hoped that by asking separate questions about how they dealt with their
illness, and what they would advise others to do, that this would shed some light on
the ways in which they thought the illness could best be managed.
A preliminary analysis of the data revealed four themes and this is reflected in the
organisation of this chapter. First, sufferers' initial response to ME was constructed
here as one of surprise. Second, participants in this study constructed resting as an
appropriate way of managing this condition. Third, accounts were provided of
participants' other attempts to get better. Last, respondents described the kinds of
support they got from other people. This is relevant because it highlights some of the
issues that participants orient to when they talk about how they manage their illness.
1. Constructions of initial response to ME
In the extracts that follow, participants constructed their initial reaction as one of
surprise at discovering they had ME, and at its likely duration. In the first extract, for
example, Rosemary constructs herself as knowing very little about her condition when
she was first diagnosed with post-viral fatigue syndrome^:
Extract 8:1 FGME1
2013 Rosemary: eh my first reaction was em (.) really complete
2014 misunderstanding and disbelief e:m cos I got diagnosed
2015 very early on () it was just a matter of I had a chest
2016 infection or a virus and was given three lots of
2017 antibiotics they didn't do any good () and then my
2018 doctor said "you have post-viral fatigue" and I more or
2019 less said "oh what's that" (.) and she said it would may
3Post-viral fatigue syndrome is one of the terms that has been used to describe ME. A discussion of
the naming of this condition can be found in Chapter 1, p27
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2020 take some time and I remember distinctly I said "I've had
2021 ten days offwork already [what do you mean?]
2022 Evelyn: [[laughs]]
2023 Rosemary: [laughing] more time?" [laughs] and without any inkling
2024 it would be years and not another few days
Here, Rosemary uses three devices to construct her initial reaction to the doctor's
diagnosis as one of surprise. First, she makes a direct claim: "my first reaction was
e:m () really complete misunderstanding and disbelief"1 (lines 2013-2014). Second,
Rosemary uses active voicing (Wooffitt, 1992) to lend credibility to a narrative
account of her diagnosis and her reaction to it For example, in lines 2017-2019 "and
then my doctor said "you have post-viral fatigue" and I more or less said "oh what's
that."" Her use of "oh" is the third device used to convey her surprise. Heritage
(1984a) has shown that the preface "oh" can be used to signal a change in the
speaker's locally current state of knowledge about what is being discussed.
A further aspect of this account is that it is designed to show that not only was she
surprised, she also underestimated the likely duration of her condition. Thus,
Rosemary uses a repair in lines 2019-2020 when describing the doctor's advice as to
the possible duration of her illness: "she said it would itmav take some time"
(emphasis added). The repair has two effects. First, "it may" suggests less certainty
about the timeline of this condition than "it would." Second, since this is the
information that is reported to have been given to Rosemary at the time, it suggests
that Rosemary herself was unsure at this point about the possible duration of her
illness. She makes a direct claim to not being aware when she notes that her response
was made "without any inkling it would be years and not another few days" (lines
2023-2024). She also uses active voicing (Wooffitt, 1992) to convey her surprise at
even this slight possibility of her illness being protracted, with her comment "I've had
ten days off work already what do you mean? [...] [laughing] more time?" (lines
2020-2023). This is framed as a response that she remembers distinctly (line 2020),
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which helps to construct her account as a true version of what happened.
Furthermore, her laughter (line 2023) suggests that she found the doctor's suggestion
ridiculous.
We can see, then, in extract 8:1, that Rosemary works to construct her initial reaction
to the doctor's diagnosis as one of surprise. She also constructs her initial assessment
of her condition as one that underestimated its duration. There is one final point of
interest that can be observed in this extract When Rosemary expresses her disbelief
about the likely duration of her illness, she does so in terms of the precise number of
days of absence from her employment: "I've had ten days off work already" (lines
2020-2021). There are other ways that her disbelief might have been formulated - for
example, that she had felt unwell or was unable to carry out other sorts of activities or
interests. What Rosemary does here is to construct herself as someone who is aware
of the exact time she has had offwork, and for whom this is an issue of some
concern. She therefore constructs herself as motivated to work. In the following
extracts, we can see an orientation to the same issue.
Extract 8:2 MEICCp44 Tracey
27 relatives began to suggest possibility ofME - still thought this
28 was not likely - wouldn't happen to me!! carried on working
29 pushing myself as hard as I possibly could, Spending hours
30 not at work in a state of utter exhaustion and inactivity.
Extract 8:3 MEIPCp7 Dorothy
4 I was told by many folks if I didn't take things easy I would come
5 to a standstill. I believed my illness would be short lived and that I
6 could work my way out of it. I thought because I had, and still do
7 have, a very positive attitude that this would help me to get better.
8
9 So I came to a standstill.
In extracts 8:2 and 8:3, Tracey and Dorothy use a contrast formulation to construct,
respectively, surprise at the diagnosis ofME and an underestimation of its possible
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duration. They do this by first expressing the views of other people on their illness.
Thus, Tracey writes that "relatives began to suggest the possibility of ME" (extract
8:2, line 27), and Dorothy notes "I was told by many folks if I didn't take things easy
I would come to a standstill" (extract 8:3, lines 4-5). In both extracts, the views of
other people are then contrasted with the sufferer's own view. In Tracey's case, she
constructs her disbelief regarding the possibility that she might have ME: "still thought
this was not likely - wouldn't happen to me!!" (lines 27-28). Dorothy then constructs
her assessment of her condition in terms of its likely duration: "I believed my illness
would be short lived" (line 5).
The contrast formulation provides an inferential context for the accounts that follow.
Tracey uses contrast and extreme case formulations (Pomerantz, 1986) to compare the
level of effort she put in at work with her complete incapacity the rest of the time:
"carried on working pushing myself as hard as Ipossibly could, Spending hours not
at work in a state of utter exhaustion and inactivity" (extract 8:2, lines 28-30; emphasis
added). Dorothy similarly contrasts her positive beliefs about her ability to recover
with what actually happened - "[s]o I came to a standstill" (line 9).
In each of these extracts, the contrast formulation also works to construct participants
as motivated to work. Tracey refers explicitly to the extent to which she pushed
herself at work. Dorothy refers to the way she thought about her illness, rather than,
for example, the actual activities she carried out: "I believedmy illness would be short
lived and that I could work my way out of it. I thought because I had, and still do
have, a very positive attitude that this would help me to get better" (extract 8:3, lines 5-
7; emphasis added).
It is also notable that Dorothy uses the same expression twice in her account. In lines
4-5, she reports that she was told by other people that if she didn't take things easy
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she "would come to a standstill." In line 9, she provides an upshot of what happened
when she failed to do this - "[s]o I came to a standstill." Thus, Dorothy emphasises
the extent to which these people were right, and this constructs the view that she was
doing too much as accurate. By prefacing the upshot with "so", Dorothy treats the
outcome as a result of the way she initially responded to her illness. Thus, her
motivation to work and positive attitude are constructed as contributing to her decline.
In each extract, then, it is made relevant that, in the early stage of their illness, other
people's knowledge of their condition proved to be more accurate than the sufferer's.
The observations of other people provide a warrant for the apparent impact that ME
had on Tracey and Dorothy, and of their motivation to keep working. This can be
seen as further evidence of their failure at the time to fully appreciate the seriousness of
their illness.
In the following two extracts, participants construct themselves as motivated to work
and ME as a serious illness:
Extract 8:4 MEICCp42 Lesley
9 My job was 26 miles away so I practised trips to places first 2 miles
10 away, then 6 miles, then 11 miles, but the 11 mile one caused such a
11 relapse I had to go back to square one.
Extract 8:5 MEICCp39 Lynn
4 I still thought i could work a full day,come home run the
5 house cook meals,iron clean,Paint and decorate,and gardening
6 too. That lasted all of 3 months,before i became so ih,i
7 couldnt get out of bed at all.
In each of extracts 8:4 and 8:5, Lesley and Lynn use detailed narrative and listing to
construct themselves as highly motivated to work in the early stages of their illness.
Thus, Lesley provides narrative detail when she notes the exact number of miles she
drove, and her account lists the attempts she made to improve her performance: "I
practised trips to places first 2 miles away, then 6 miles, then 11 miles" (extract 8:4,
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lines 9-10). Lynn also gives a detailed account: "I still thought i could work a full
day,come home ran the house cook meals,iron clean,Paint and decorate,and gardening
too" (extract 8:5, lines 4-7). Here, her use of "still" works to suggest that the
activities listed were ones in which she engaged before her illness. Thus, she
constructs herself as a person who worked hard before being ill, as well as at the start
of her illness. Her use of commas gives the impression of a list being made, and the
activities she describes suggest a physically demanding schedule. Both accounts are
followed by a claim that participants' efforts were counter-productive: "the 11 mile one
caused such a relapse I had to go back to square one" (extract 8:4, lines 10-11); "i
became so ill,i couldn't get out of bed at all" (extract 8:5, lines 6-7). This works to
construct ME as a serious condition.
Thus, we can see that participants' initial response to ME was constructed as one of
surprise as to the nature of the illness, in particular its duration and its seriousness.
Their initial response also worked to suggest that they were motivated to work.
However, the reaction this response produced was constructed as one that actually
exacerbated their illness. In the next section, I will examine accounts in which ME
sufferers describe how they then learned to manage their condition.
2. Constructions of resting as an appropriate response to ME
In the first three extracts in this section, participants construct resting as an appropriate
response to ME by framing it as follows. They first describe aspects of their illness,
their previous response to it, and the problems with this response. They then
construct their subsequent process of reflection as providing a rationale for resting.
This is followed by a claim regarding the impact this had on the management of their
condition. The first tines of extract 8:6 were examined as extract 8:5:
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Extract 8:6 MEICCp39 Lynn
4 I still thought i could work a full day,come home run the
5 house cook meals,iron clean,Paint and decorate,and gardening
6 too. That lasted all of 3 months,before i became so iU,i
7 couldnt get out of bed at all. Then i took a long hard look,at
8 what i could,and couldnt manage, and decided to stick to a
9 plan,I would do as much as i could and be thankful for it,rest
10 when i had to,and go to bed when i couldnt manage staying
11 up,My physical health was far more important
12 than washed dishes,hoovered floors,and polished sideboards.
13 And a closet full of ironed clothes,i couldnt wear.
14 10 years on,i now wish that i had learnt this all earlier.
15 111 health is no joke„no one wants to be disabled by an illness
16 no one wants to have to rely on others to do the things,you once
17 took for granted.
Extract 8:7 MEICCp42 Lesley
46 I couldn't work out what caused relapses - it was quite
47 alarming to wake up with the heavychested feeling and realise I
48 had overdone it yet again, then try to work out why, when I
49 had felt ok the day before. It was more difficult then as I was
50 more active, and so it was harder to work out which particular
51 activity or combination thereof was the cause. I started to
52 make a note on the big milkmans calender ofmy main activity
53 for the day - eg if I went to the shops or for a walk.
54
55 It was much later that I realised standing was a common factor
56 causing the worst relapses
Extract 8:8 MEICCp44 Tracey
37 A wonderful Occupational therapist taught me how to deal with this DD
38 [dreaded disease]. How to keep a diary ofmy activities and the highs
39 and lows ofmy exhaustion. She taught me to realise that by listening
40 to my mind and body I was not giving in to the illness but learning to
41 manage it-very very difficult I fought every inch of the way. I had to
42 break down my day into small segments of maybe 10 mins activity and
43 thenan hours rest -1 have gradually built that up to about lhrs activity
44 and then rest (on a good day)
In the first 3 lines of extract 8:6, Lynn provides a detailed account of the physical
activities - working, cooking, ironing, cleaning, painting and decorating and
gardening - in which she was engaged prior to and at the start of her illness. Lesley
also suggests a high level of activity with her assessment "I had overdone it yet again"
(extract 8:7, lines 47-48). In extract 8:8, Tracey allows the reader to infer that she was
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active by referring to her "exhaustion" (line 39) and relating the advice given to her by
an occupational therapist: "[s]he taught me to realise that by listening to my mind and
body I was not giving in to the illness" (lines 39-40). In the subsequent lines of this
extract, it becomes apparent that the advice given was to rest, and that therefore Tracy
had not been doing this. In extracts 8:6 and 8:7, participants also provide an account
of the negative effects of their early levels of activity. Thus, Lynn writes "i became so
ill,i couldn't get out of bed at all" (extract 8:6, lines 6-7). Lesley notes that "it was
quite alarming to wake up with the heavychested feeling and realise I had overdone it
yet again" (extract 8:7, lines 46-48).
In all three extracts, a description of a previous response to their illness is followed by
a construction of the participants' efforts to reflect on their circumstances in order to
develop an alternative way to manage their condition. Thus, Lynn describes a process
in which she examined the situation and developed a rational way to deal with it. With
her claim "i took a long hard look,at what i could,and couldnt manage" (lines 7-8), she
suggests a degree of reflexive thinking and self examination. We can infer that this is
what led her to decide to "stick to a plan" (lines 8-9). Thus, through reflection and
careful thought, she developed a strategy for managing her illness. Lesley describes a
similar process of reflexive enquiry in which she tried to work out the possible causes
of her incapacity by noting her main activity for the day on her kitchen calendar. In
extract 8:8, Tracey describes a detailed management plan: "I had to break down my
day into small segments ofmaybe 10 mins activity and thenan [sic] hours rest" (lines
41-43). In each case, management of their illness displays an awareness of the
harmful effects of too much physical activity and the benefits of resting.
Participants then describe the different state of knowledge that resulted from a
reflexive examination of the possible causes of their symptoms. Thus Lynn writes
"10 years on,i now wish that i had learnt this all earlier" (extract 8:6, line 14). In
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extract 8:7, Lesley claims "[i]t was much later that I realised standing was a common
factor causing the worst relapses" (lines 55-56). Tracey refers to the change in
lifestyle that resulted. Referring to the outcome of breaking her day into blocks of
activity followed by rest, she writes "I have gradually built that up to about lhrs
activity and then rest (on a good day)" (lines 43-44). Thus, participants' claims all
construct their management plans as useful.
In each of the above extracts, then, a previous response to ME is constructed as one
that involved a level of activity which caused a worsening of symptoms. The
subsequent response of resting is constructed as one that was only tried after the
previous response had failed, and only after careful reflection. In Tracey's account it
was not she herself, but an occupational therapist, who instigated the process of
reflection. Sacks (1979; Sacks et al., 1974) has suggested that categories allow us to
infer certain things about the behaviour of the people designated by them. In this case,
the category of occupational therapist would reasonably be expected to be
knowledgeable about the most appropriate way to deal with a long-standing illness,
since that is a large part of the job. We can infer, then, that hers was useful advice.
Thus, resting is constructed as an active and strategic response, and not, for example,
laziness.
That resting might be a problematic issue for people with ME can be seen in extract
8:8, where Tracey accounts for her schedule of activity and rest by first providing a
detailed description of how it came about. Her initial resistance to the Occupational
Therapist's suggestions is described using extreme case formulations (Pomerantz,
1986) - "very very difficult I fought every inch of the way" (line 41) - and this serves
to construct herself as someone who would not rest if there were no good reason to do
so. Thus, we can see that Tracey attends to the possible negative identity implications
ofmalingering. We can see a similar orientation in Lynn's account: "[i]ll health is no
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joke/„no one wants to be disabled by an illness/ no one wants to have to rely on
others to do the things,you once took for granted" (extract 8:6, lines 15-17). Here,
she uses a three-part list (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984; Jefferson, 1991) in which the
common feature is that illness is not something that people enjoy. The claims made
are general - "no-one wants to be disabled [...] no-one wants to have to rely on
others." This works to suggest that not just Lynn, but ME sufferers in general, have
no desire to be ill. It also helps to construct Lynn as someone who is not malingering
or profiting in any way from her condition.
So far, we have seen how participants describe the process of reflection that they went
through before they realised that resting was the best response to ME. Similar
constructions can be seen in participants' responses to my question about the advice
they would give to new sufferers, and this can be seen in the following two extracts:
Extract 8:9 MEICCp29 Lesley
1 Rest, rest and rest again. Do about 70% of what you feel you
2 are able to do, so stop *before* you are tired, and *never*
3 push yourself if you ever do get to the stage where you are
4 tired and feel you want to rest. You have a good chance of
5 recovery if you can do this early on.
6
7 Remember you may not feel the effects of overdoing it till next
8 day or even 2 or 3 days later.
9
10 Think of your energy as if you were living off the interest on
11 money in a bank - you need some there to earn interest - if you
12 use too much, it takes a long long time to make it up again, and
13 if you go into the red you will never catch up..
Extract 8:10 MEICCp37 Lynn
1 Rest as much as you need too,listen to your body, only you
2 can decide how much rest you need, If that means sleeping 20
3 hours a day for a while do it, Then each day try to do a little bit
4 more,but still listen to what your body is saying,If you get
5 aches and pains,stop,rest,recover and start again,This illness
6 will not tolerate stupidity,you soon learn How much you can
7 do,and what you cant do,Be prepared to pay the price a few
8 days later.
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In extracts 8:9 and 8:10, respondents produce advice about how to manage ME, and
here they construct the illness as something that sufferers have to manage actively.
The advice in each case is followed by a warning which emphasises the need to rest.
There are three ways that Lynn and Lesley construct ME as an illness that needs active
management. The first is that they present their advice as a list of rules. Thus, Lesley
begins "[r]est, rest and rest again" (extract 8:9, line 1), using repetition within a three-
part list for emphasis. Lynn's advice is similar: "[r]est as much as you need too [sic],
listen to your body, only you can decide how much rest you need" (extract 8:10, lines
1-2). The second is that in each case participants suggest that sufferers should
carefully monitor their energy and activity levels. This can be seen in Lynn's advice to
"listen to your body" (extract 8:10, line 1). Similarly, Lesley implicitly suggests
monitoring when she advises sufferers to "[d]o about 70% of what you feel you are
able to do, so stop *before* you are tired" (extract 8:9, lines 1-2). This constructs
resting as a planned strategy. The third device that constructs ME as an illness that has
to be actively managed is to use the analogy of financial planning. Thus, Lesley
writes "[t]hink of your energy as if you were living off the interest on money in the
bank" (extract 8:9, lines 10-11). Interest constitutes a fund that is by its nature
variable. Therefore, to live off one's interest, and not dip into the capital that produces
it, implies active management
Both Lesley and Lynn produce a warning after their advice. In extract 8:9, Lesley
writes "[r]emember you may not feel the effects of overdoing it till next day or even 2
or 3 days later" (lines 7-8). There are two aspects of this warning that are of note.
First, it assumes a cause-effect connection between "overdoing it" and what might
then occur - presumably relapse. Second, it suggests that the effects will take an
indeterminate time - between one and three days - to be felt. If over-activity might
leave the ME sufferer waiting for up to three days to know the extent of its effects, we
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might infer that it would be wiser to follow Lesley's advice from the start. She
produces a second warning after her description of energy as being like interest in the
bank: "if you go into the red you will never catch up" (line 13; emphasis added). The
extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) adds to the impression that the
consequences of overdoing things cannot be remedied and are, therefore, serious.
Lynn's warning - "[b]e prepared to pay the price a few days later" (extract 8:10, lines
7-8) similarly draws on the analogy of financial management:
In the last two extracts of this section, I will show how participants provide a case for
resting as a response to ME by comparing this with other illnesses:
Extract 8:11 FGME1




787 Claire: people saying you know "cancer I fought against it"
788 [you know "I I]
789 Linda: [mm]
790 Evelyn: [that's right uhu]
791 Claire: I did this and I did that"
792 Linda: mhmm
793 Claire: you can't fight ME you've got to give inn
Extract 8:12 FGME1
802 Linda: cos this is why it'll be interesting for you to look at me
803 because I mean I could fight my brain haemorrhage and
804 my paralysis and I just used to (.) stri:de out and keep
805 going=
806 Claire: yeah=
807 Linda: and it's no good I mean you know you so I tried to do
808 the same with the ME and I mean that was fatal it just got
809 worse and worse and worse
Just prior to the dialogue in extract 8:11, Linda and Claire had suggested that the best
advice to give to someone suffering from ME would be to rest In line 783, Claire
characterises ME as "the only illness that you can't fight" She therefore displays
sensitivity to the notion that sufferers would normally be expected to combat their
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illness. She then uses active voicing (Wooffitt, 1992) to suggest the sort of thing that
a cancer suffermight say about his or her illness - "I fought against it" (line 787); "I
did this and I did that" (line 791). The use of past tense suggests that the cancer was,
to use the same analogy, defeated. In extract 8:12, we see a similar formulation.
Linda describes her own experience: "I could fightmy brain haemorrhage and my
paralysis and I just used to (.) stri:de out and keep going" (lines 804-805). This
suggests that fighting was successful in overcoming the effects of her stroke.
In each extract, participants then give an assessment of fighting ME. Claire claims that
"you can't fight ME you've got to give i::n" (extract 8:11, line 793). Linda provides
an assessment of the effect that this strategy had: "I tried to do the same with ME and I
mean that was fatal it just got worse and worse and worse" (lines 808-809).
Emphasis and repetition work here to stress her point.
Thus, resting is constructed as part of an active management plan. Participants also
attended to the negative identity implications of malingering by constructing
themselves as actively trying to recover by other means, and this is discussed in the
next section.
3. Constructions of sufferers as active in their attempts to get better
In this section, Iwill examine one extract taken from a focus group discussion in
which participants spoke about efforts to get better that did not involve resting.
Extract 8:13 FGME1
2027 Rosemary: em (..) and eh like you I've spent you know spent abs-
2028 thousands of pounds
2029 Claire: mm
2030 Rosemary: running after you know (.) someone who had written up
2031 about this herbal medicine or (.) acupuncture or
2032 Claire: mhmm=
2033 Rosemary: just absolutely everything and I putmy heart and soul
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2034 into it [and I] was
2035 Mandy: [yes]
2036 Rosemary: taking cold baths [laughs] [general laughter] I was taking
2037 cold baths for three months [general laughter] it
2038 apparently helped Barry Sheen [laughs]
2039 Claire: oh well good for him (.) good gracious (.) I thought I
2040 would have a heart attack if I cold bath=
2041 Evelyn: mm=
2042 Claire: so I reckoned I'd put up with the ME rather than [the
2043 cold bath]
2044 Rosemary: [well I
2045 did] so that just shows what what extremes I went to
[...]
2055 Rosemary: [laughs] and eventually the money ran out so I had to
2056 () stop trying any [more things]
2057 Mandy: [but but] eventually it () you you
2058 () decide you're not going to put yourself through these
2059 any more because (.) every time you think (.) "yes I'll
2060 try thai there's that seems to (.) be a good idea tike I can
2061 see the logic in that so I'll try that and 111 give it a good
2062 try" and of course you are hoping
2063 Linda: mhmm
2064 Mandy: that this is going to be the thing that makes all the
2065 difference and it isn't
In extract 8:13, Rosemary constructs herself as active and committed in her efforts to
find something that would help her ME. First, she makes relevant her high level of
financial expenditure: "I've spent you know spent abs- thousands of pounds."
Second, she uses a three-part list (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984; Jefferson, 1991), the
third element being an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986), to convey the
extent of her search for a remedy: "this herbal medicine or (.) acupuncture or [...] just
absolutely everything" (lines 2031-2033; emphasis added). Third, she makes an
explicit claim regarding her level of commitment: "I put my heart and soul into it"
(lines 2033-2034). Fourth, she describes a particular remedy that she tried - cold
baths. That this is an unusual course of action is signalled by the laughter that
follows, and by Claire's claim that follows "good gracious (.) I thought I would have
a heart attack if I had a cold bath" (lines 2039-2040). Rosemary provides an upshot in
line 2045 that again emphasises her level of commitment: "so that just shows what
extremes I went to."
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There is a further point that is worth noting here. Rosemary's account is also
designed to suggest that trying these methods was a reasonable thing to do. Thus,
there was "someone who had written up about this herbal medicine or (.) acupuncture"
(lines 2030-2031), which suggests some kind of external warrant Of the cold baths,
Rosemary notes "it apparently helped Barry Sheen^" (lines 2037-2038). This works
to suggest that there is a rational basis to Rosemary's search for a remedy. Mandy
also orients to the need to provide some kind of warrant for trying different treatments.
She does this by describing the thought processes of someone who is about to try a
new treatment: "that seems to (.) be a good idea the I can see the logic in that so I'll try
that" (lines 2060-2061). Thus, these measures are undertaken only after some
consideration of the rationale behind them.
Whereas Rosemary claims that she gave up trying any more things because
"eventually the money ran out" (line 2055), Mandy's turn overlaps Rosemary's and
reffames it as an active choice: "but but eventually it () you you () decide you're not
going to put yourself through these any more" (lines 2057-2059). She goes on to
construct these alternative treatments as disappointing, by contrasting the sufferer's
aspirations with the reality: "and of course you are hoping [...] that this is going to be
the thing that makes all the difference/ and it isn't" (lines 2061-2066).
We can see in this extract, then, that when talking about remedies other than resting,
participants construct themselves as committed to getting better, as well as active and
rational managers of their condition.
4Barry Sheen was a world motorcycle champion who suffered from CFS
204
4. Constructions of others' responses to ME
In this section, I will look at extracts in which respondents spoke and wrote about the
responses of other people, such as medical personnel, friends and family, to their
illness. This is of interest because of the insights it provides into the context in which
participants deal with their condition.
Extract 8:14 MEICCp31 Debbie
1 The advise I would give is to make sure your Doctor takes
2 notice of you and ensures that you are tested for anything with
3 similar symptoms, or refers you to a sympathetic Consultant.
In extract 8:14, Debbie's advice to "make sure your Doctor takes notice of you" (lines
1-2; emphasis added) works to suggest that the Doctor's taking notice is something
that the ME sufferer cannot take for granted. The reference to a "sympathetic
Consultant" (line 3; emphasis added) allows us to infer that there are some who would
not fall into that category. Both of these points alert the reader to the fact that the
relationship between the ME sufferer and his or her doctor or consultant is potentially
problematic. We would normally expect a doctor to take notice of his or her patients,
and that a Consultant would be sympathetic about the illness for which his or her
patients have been referred. Debbie's advice allows us to infer thatME not always
considered by health professionals be a condition that warrants their care or attention.
In the next extract, Dorothy is more explicit about the problems that can arise forME
sufferers:
Extract 8:15 MEIPCp4 Dorothy
5 develop a thick skin cos you're going to need it. Even
6 when you have seen dozens of Drs/consultants and have a
7 confirmed Dx [diagnosis] ofME and not depression most folks
8 you meet will consider that if you have ME you actually have
9 depression, but won't admit to it. And they will also often think
10 that if you have ME you want to be ill, that you are a quitter, that
11 you are just idle, or that you are a pathetic wretch who would get
12 better if you tried - a "maladaptive coping strategy" I think is the
13 buzz phrase here.
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Here, Dorothy works up an account that orients to the fact that other people construct
ME sufferers as suffering from depression, and as lazy and unmotivated. She
counters these constructions by contrasting them with clinical diagnoses. Thus, she
begins by constructing as valid the diagnosis of "ME and not depression" (line 7).
This is achieved by referring to the large number of highly-qualified medical people
involved - "dozens of Drs/consultants", and to its collaborative nature - "a confirmed
Dx" (tine 7; emphasis added). Doctors and consultants belong to a category of
medically qualified and skilled people. We would normally expect such people to
have a high level of expertise in the diagnosis of clinical conditions. This provides an
inferential context for the other claims that follow. That is, when Dorothy writes that
"most folks you meet will consider that if you haveME you actually have depression,
but won't admit to it" (lines 8-9), we read these as prejudiced opinions with no basis
in fact. The views then attributed to "most folks" construct the ME sufferer as a
malingerer. They are presented as a list that gives the impression of a relentlessly
negative and unsympathetic perspective: "they will also often think that if you have
ME you want to be ill, that you are a quitter, that you are just idle, or that you are a
pathetic wretch who would get better if you tried" (lines 9-12). This is glossed using
one of the terms of cognitive behavioural therapy^: "a "maladaptive coping strategy" I
think is the buzz phrase here" (lines 12-13). She therefore suggests that the preceding
views are represented by this expression, and presumably by those who might use it.
Thus, we can see a quite explicit orientation to potential claims that ME sufferers are
lazy and not motivated to get better. Dorothy undermines this argument first by
presenting it as the prejudiced views of "most folks" (line 7), and then by describing it
as a trendy piece of jargon - a "buzz phrase."
In the next extract, Claire constructs family members as unsympathetic to the problems
ofME:
5The use of cognitive behavioural therapy to treat ME is discussed in Chapter 1, p36-39
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Extract 8:16 FGME1
904 Claire: once you've () fought the battle with yourself and
you've decided you've still got other people's (.)









[not lying around in heaps] doing nothing
[and back to your old self]
yes











In extract 8:16, Claire contrasts the perspective of family members with that of the
person who has ME. She does this with a direct claim, and by using active voicing
(Wooffitt, 1992) to suggest that her account is factual. Thus, she claims of family
members: "they want to see you (.) fighting it [...] pulling yourself together [...] not
lying around in heaps doing nothing" (lines 909-913). This contrasts the positive
action expected by the family with their negative perceptions of the ME sufferer's
response to the illness. There is an orientation to the notion that people with ME
should be fighting their illness and that they might be lethargic rather than unwell. The
family's failure to understand the extent to which the ME sufferer needs to rest is also
demonstrated by the contrast in the last two lines, in which Claire appears to quote the
words of a member of her family: "you're lying there (..) "what's for dinner?"" This
suggests that whoever is speaking does not acknowledge that Claire is lying down
because she is unwell and presumably unable to prepare a meal. It also works to
construct family members as somewhat selfish, in the sense that they are more
concerned with their own needs than those of the sufferer.
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5. Summary
In this chapter, I have examined participants' responses to two questions designed to
allow an analysis of how they dealt with their illness, and the advice they would give
to others. I have shown that they constructed their initial reaction to finding that they
had ME as one of surprise. They also constructed themselves as unaware at first of
the possible duration and seriousness of their illness. They describe how they
continued to work physically hard in the early stages, and that this caused a worsening
of their symptoms. Resting was constructed as a strategic way of managing their
illness that was only made after this initial, and unsuccessful response, and a period of
careful reflection on the things that did and did not help.
When describing their initial response, participants constructed themselves as
motivated to work. When warranting their subsequent decision to rest, they
constructed themselves as active managers of their condition. Respondents therefore
oriented to the possible charge that they might not be motivated to get better, and that
they were being lazy. This orientation was made explicit when they described the
futility of fighting this illness, and in their accounts of their search for a remedy. It
was also a feature of participants' constructions of the responses of other people to the
ways in which they managed their illness.
6. Discussion
The literature suggests that, in chronic illness, some coping strategies are more useful
than others. In the particular case of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, the strategy of
'avoidance coping', has been linked to higher reported levels of fatigue. The
implication is that fatigue is made worse by sufferers' tendency to avoid activity. This
underpins the most common treatments, cognitive behavioural therapy and graded
exercise therapy.
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We can see in this analysis that participants did orient to the notion that some ways of
coping with illness are superior to others, and in particular that resting is an
accountable way of dealing with ME. Their accounts were designed to construct over¬
activity as an exacerbating factor in fatigue, and resting as the only successful way of
managing their energy levels.
It is also notable that identity issues were addressed when participants constructed the
ways in which they cope with this illness. Thus, when talking or writing about their
initial response, they constructed themselves as motivated to work, and therefore, we
can infer, not malingerers. Similarly, in accounts in which participants constructed
rest as an appropriate response to ME, participants attended to the negative identity
implications of this approach. That this is necessary is grounded in accounts in which
respondents describe the reactions of others to their condition while explicitly orienting
to the potential charge that ME sufferers are lazy and notmotivated to recover.
We can see, then, how coping with ME is an interactional achievement. That is,
participants work at constructing their response to their condition as an active and
well-thought strategy. Resting is constructed in opposition to the potential claim that
sufferers are being lazy. Thus, identity is implicated in coping. Furthermore,
construction of the illness itself is significant. Instead of taking illness schemas as a
representation of some kind of internal mental cognitions, constructions of the nature
of illness can be seen as performative. When participants gave accounts of their initial
surprise as to the likely seriousness and duration of their illness, this enabled them to
construct themselves as motivated to work through it, and not as the type of people
who would simply give in.
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Coping, therefore, can be an accountable issue. In the following chapter, we can see





At the beginning of the last chapter, I discussed my rationale for constructing
questions aimed at finding out how people 'cope' with their condition while at the
same time avoiding the use of this term. I therefore asked the following questions,
based on those use with ME participants, in an attempt to generate discussion of how
it was that people with stroke dealt with their condition:
1. "Can you describe how you dealt with your condition when you first knew
about it?"
2. "What advice would you give to someone who has just suffered a stroke at
a young age?"
In the first question, the inclusion of "when you first knew about it" was particularly
pertinent to my analysis of the ME data, because of the contentious nature of this
illness and the difficulties surrounding diagnosis. These factors meant that sufferers'
claims regarding the timing of onset were significant in an analysis of how they dealt
with their condition over the longer term. The wording was retained in the schedule of
questions for stroke sufferers out of a concern to for consistency throughout, given
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that one of the aims of this study was to produce some sort of comparison of findings.
It became clear from an analysis of responses that sufferers took up this question as a
request for information principally about the initial, acute stages of this condition. In
the acute stages, the stroke sufferer is usually hospitalised, and often quite unaware of
what is going on around them. My interest was in the ways in which people managed
their illness once discharged from hospital.
All of the extracts used here were, therefore, in response to the second question.
Here, my aim was to stimulate discussion of the ways in which sufferers coped, and
might have managed their illness better with hindsight. Thus, it was hoped that
responses would not only construct participants' coping strategies but would also
incorporate some sort of assessment of the different ways that people might deal with
this condition.
Three themes were revealed in a preliminary analysis. First, respondents constructed
their response to stroke as active. This is discussed in section one. In section 2,1
explore the second theme, which is that carers constructed stroke sufferers as solely
responsible for their recovery. The third theme related to the ways in which
participants who responded via the internet avoided accountability for their recovery.
1. Constructions of responses to stroke
In the first two extracts of this section, I will show how stroke sufferers constructed









257 Eric: start the fight back and e:m .h I think there's they say
258 the first six months .h then the second six months so .h
259 from day one start to do what you can
Extract 9:2 DSIPCp7 Ana
45 Everyone comes to terms with their stroke in their own
46 way; perhaps you'll never stop feeling angry, but then the
47 anger may motivate you to continue the struggle to be
48 independent and live life fully.
In each of the above extracts, participants use the metaphor of combat to refer to the
ways in which someone who has just suffered stroke should deal with its effects.
Both Eric and Ana orient to two specific aspects of this combat - its constant nature
and the sufferer's active role in getting better. Thus, Eric's advice is "keep on
fighting"; "from day one start to do what you can" (extract 9:1, lines 254 and 259).
He makes relevant that this response should be adopted from the start. Ana's advice is
to "continue the struggle to be independent" (extract 9:2, lines 47-48). In extract 9:1,
line 254, Eric uses a repair in which he inserts the definite article: "start to/ the fight
back." He recycles the repaired formulation in line 257: "start the fight back."
Similarly, Ana refers to "the struggle" (extract 9:2, line 47). The use of noun and
definite article here is significant. This formulation constructs such a response as
generally associated with stroke, and therefore appropriate. Thus, dealing with stroke
is constructed in terms of a constant, personal and somewhat inevitable combat. This
works indirectly to cast the sufferer in an active role in his or her recovery
In the following two extracts, respondents construct recovery as difficult:
Extract 9:3 FGDS2
205 Euan: yes it goes quite fast to start with and then (.) it slows
206 down which is a bit (...) e::m (.) demoralising
207 sometimes in that=
208 Eric: yeah
209 Euan: things just don't happen
210 Jennifer: mhmm
211 Euan: when you you hope they will
213
Extract 9:4 FGDS1
330 Norman: but em (..) its (.) the advice well as I say I see () it's
331 really (.) as I say you gotta work out what kind of (.)
332 person vou're talking to vou vou can see some vou can't
333 advise them that thev're gonna be go back to work and
334 because normal cos that's not gonna happen=
335 Yvonne: mm=
336 Norman: but they are gonna get better they are gonna change
337 Steve: [mm]
338 Norman: fandl and and within that category thev are gonna get to
339 a a better hfe than they are at the moment=
340 Yvonne: but are they?
341 Norman: yeah they are eh all the people that Fve seen
342 Steve: [mhmm]
343 Yvonne: [I dinnae] [don't]] think so [I cannae] [can't]
344 Steve: [aye]
345 Yvonne: move my [hand]
346 Steve: [no]
347 Yvonne: and I've tried for two vears and it will not move
In extract 9:3, Euan is talking about the rate at which he improved after his stroke.
Referring to a slowing down in progress, he says "things just don't happen when you
hope they will" (lines 208-210). Wooffitt proposed that to formulate something as an
'it' that happened suggests that the occurrence was "not contingent upon human
agency or involvement" (Wooffitt, 1992: 103). We can see a similar formulation in
extract 9:4, where Norman claims that among the people who have suffered stroke
there are "some you can't advise them that they're gonna be go back to work and
become normal cos that's not gonna happen" (lines 332-334). In each case, the 'it'
that did not or will not happen (expressed here using the similarly indefinite terms
"things" and "that") relates to recovery. This formulation therefore emphasises the
sufferer's lack of agency where there is an apparent failure to recover.
In both extracts, participants construct their failure to improve and follow this with a
claim regarding their motivation to get better. Thus, in extract 9:3, Euan's claim, of
his progress, that "it goes quite fast to start with and then (.) it slows down" is
followed by an assessment, "which is a bit (...) e::m demoralising sometimes" (lines
205-207). His use of the moderators "a bit" and "sometimes" allow Euan to construct
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himself as not completely demoralised and therefore allow us to infer that despite these
setbacks he is still motivated to get better. In extract 9:4, Yvonne follows her claim "I
cannae move my hand" with "and I've tried for two years and it will not move" (lines
343-347). Thus, she constructs her failure at the same time as her effort to improve.
She constructs this effort as real by giving precise information regarding the length of
time she has tried to move her hand.
That respondents oriented to accountability issues can also be seen in the following
extracts, which were taken from responses to my question about the advice they
would give to someone who had just suffered stroke at a young age. Here,
participants make relevant the particular kind of support that stroke sufferers receive
from healthcare professionals, and the effect that this has on recovery:
Extract 9:5 FGDS2
205 Euan: yes it goes quite fast to start with and then (.) it slows
206 down which is a bit (...) e::m (.) demoralising
207 sometimes in that=
208 Eric: yeah
209 Euan: things just don't happen
210 Jennifer: mhmm
211 Euan: when you you hope they will that's that's what was
212 mentioned earlier you know they co- cope they (.) they
213 concentrate a lot on physical things (..) like (.) with me it
214 was walking (.) and doing arm movements and things
215 like that
216 (6)
217 Lorna: maybe that's to do with the centres though they know
218 how to cope with physical things=
219 Euan: mhmm=
220 Lorna: but they don't (.) they're not willing to put the resources
221 into the sort of
222 Eric: yes
223 Lorna: psychological (..) rehab
Lines 205-211 have been analysed as extract 9:3. They are included here to provide
some context, which allows us to infer that talk about the provision of external support
is relevant to the issue of failure to make consistently good progress. Here,
participants work up an account that constructs rehabilitative support as focused on
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physical functioning and neglecting psychological issues. This allows for the
inference that psychological support is necessary. Euan's claim that "they concentrate
a lot on physical things" (lines 212- 213) allows the hearer to infer that non-physical
things are not addressed. Lorna orients to this by offering an account in explanation
of this state of affairs. She claims that the centres "know how to cope with physical
things" (lines 217-218). She then uses a repair to suggest that their failure to manage
the psychological aspects is not because they do not know how to cope, but rather that
there is a lack of motivation to do so: "but they don't they're not willing to put the
resources into the sort of [...] psychological (..) rehab" (lines 220-223; emphasis
added).
In the following extract, focus group participants similarly construct medical support
as inadequate, and this is used to account for failure to recover:
Extract 9:6 FGDS1
631 Kirsty: and I feel he was just put out of [hospital 3]
632 and that was it (.)
633 Ian: and my wife would agree [with that as well]
634 Emma: [do you feel embarrassed]
635 [unclear]
636 Kirsty: LITERALLY [put out]
637 Steve: [and my wife I know aye]
638 Simon: [I think I think [unclear]]
639 Kirsty: [you take (.) I know I realise that hospitals don't have
640 the resources]
641 Simon: [I think that's the problem]
642 Kirsty: [but I feel that my brother's not had any support as in]
643 Yvonne: [it's frustrating cos you know you can do it eh]
644 Kirsty: he (.) lives on his own he's (.) he's divorced and what
645 have you
646 Ian: mm
647 Kirsty: and he's literally just left
In extract 9:6, Kirsty makes a complaint about what happened in the case of her
brother: "he was just put out of [hospital 3] and that was it (lines 631-632). We
would normally speak in terms of a patient leaving hospital, or being discharged. To
use the term 'put out' suggests that Harry's exit from hospital was inappropriately
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hasty, and that his role in this was passive. Kirsty warrants this implicit claim in three
other ways. First, she uses 'just' in a restrictive form (Lee, 1987) to suggest that
something else might have been done, but was not. For example, he might have been
offered some ongoing support. She uses "just" in the same way in line 646: "and he's
literally just left." Second, Kirsty's use of the formulation "LITERALLY put out"
(line 636) represents an explicit claim that this verb reflects what actually happened.
Third, in lines 642-644, Kirsty uses a three-part list, with a generalised list completer
(Atkinson & Heritage, 1984; Jefferson, 1991), to describe circumstances relating to
Harry that would normally warrant help: "my brother's not had any support as in [...]
he (.) lives on his own / he's (.) he's divorced / and what have you." A three-part list
can be used to orient to a general feature of the items in the list (Jefferson, 1991). In
this context, Kirsty is referring to the fact that Harry has no-one at home to care for
him. This suggests that he needed a high level of both practical and emotional
support, and by implication, that this was not provided. In line 643, we can see that
Yvonne treats this lack of support as something that inhibits a level of recovery that
would otherwise be certain: "it's frustrating cos you know you can do it eh" (line
643).
We have seen, then, that respondents construct themselves as active in their efforts to
get better. However, when recovery is not as well as might be hoped, the
construction of an 'it' that did not happen allows them to infer a lack of agency.
Furthermore, claims about failing to recover are accompanied by claims that construct
the sufferer as nevertheless motivated to improve. Respondents construct the
provision of healthcare support as inadequate, and as a factor that can be used to
account for poor recovery. This also constructs the responsibility for recovery as
shared. Thus, we can see that stroke sufferers' accounts are sensitively designed to
deal with the possibility of being held to account for getting better. In the next section,
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I will explore the issue of accountability in the context of focus group sessions made
up of sufferers and carers.
2. Responsibility for recovery
In focus groups, carers constructed sufferers as solely responsible for their level of
improvement. This can be seen in the first two extracts of this section:
Extract 9:7 FGDS2
338 Lorna: so I think () is there not it's () even in the professionals
339 it's still very much they don't know how much recovery
340 you're gonna make they just sort of say "you just accept
341 what you've got" (.) so it's very much down to the
342 patient to actually say "I can do better than this" and and
343 11 mean we'd say that the people we saw on the wards
344 those that fought the hardest for themselves were the
345 ones that made the best recovery
In Extract 9:7, Lorna explicitly relates improvement after stroke to sufferers' personal,
active efforts to recover. Her claim is that "it's very much down to the patient to
actually say "I can do better than this"" (lines 341-342). This claim is warranted in
three ways. First, Lorna refers to the views of "the professionals" (line 338).
Professionals would normally be considered to have some expertise in their area of
work, and by referring to this category, Lorna makes available the inference that such
views are credible (Potter, 1996; Sacks, 1974; Sacks, 1979).
The second warranting device used by Lorna is whatWooffitt (1992) has described as
'active voicing'. This helps to establish the objectivity of her claim that the role of
healthcare professionals is limited: "they just sort of say "you just accept what you've
got" (lines 340-341).
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The third way in which Lorna warrants her claim is by producing evidence that makes
explicit the association between active effort and recovery: "we'd say that the people
we saw on the wards those that fought the hardest for themselves were the ones that
made the best recovery" (lines 343-345). This claim is constructed as fact by
providing some detail about the people to whom she refers, that is, that they were on
the wards. She also uses the first person plural, to suggest that her claim is not just
her opinion but is a view taken by at least one other person. It is also notable that
Loma uses the metaphor of combat, which has already been noted as a way of
constructing sufferers as active in their efforts to get better. Finally, she emphasises
her claim that sufferers are solely responsible for their recovery by referring to "those
that fought hardestfor themselves" (line 344; emphasis added).
In the next extract, focus group participants discuss the sufferer's role in his or her
recovery.
Extract 9:8 FGDS1
369 Yvonne: vou've actuallv got to push Tvourselfl
370 Steve: [aye]
371 Kirsty: nobody can do it for you
372 Norman: you've got to you've got to try
373 Steve: [aye aye]
374 Kirsty: [cos] you can () you're the only you're the only people
375 that can help yourself
376 Steve: that's right aye
In extract 9:8, respondents were discussing the advice they would give to someone
who had just suffered a stroke. Yvonne makes a direct claim that constructs the
appropriate response to stroke as one involving personal motivation and effort on the
part of the sufferer: "you've actually got to push yourself" (line 369). Steve and
Norman, both stroke sufferers, and Kirsty, a carer, display their agreement with
particular aspects of that claim in the lines that follow. Norman's agreement orients to
the personal effort that is involved: "you've got to you've got to try" (line 372). This
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helps to construct coping with stroke as hard work. Kirsty's agreement, however,
orients to the stroke sufferers' own agency: "nobody can do it for you [...] you're the
only people that can help yourself' (lines 371-375). This constructs the sufferer as
solely responsible for his or her recovery.
In the next extract, we can see how one of the carers constructs stroke sufferers as
lacking in motivation to recover:
Extract 9:9 FGDS1
if you show sympathy (.) well they tend to sort of well
() she'll wallow in it
aye yeah
you know "look at me look what's happened to me"
you've got to sometimes you've just got to be a wee bit
cruel say "oh come on" and
aye
mm










Here, Emma constructs stroke sufferers as lacking in motivation. She makes a claim
regarding stroke sufferers, and Yvonne in particular, that "if you show sympathy (.)
well they tend to sort of () well shell wallow in it" (lines 534-535). By describing a
hypothetical situation, Emma constructs her claim as a fact. Thus, she constructs the
stroke sufferer in a passive role. Emma uses active voicing (Wooffitt, 1992) - "look at
me look what's happened to me" (line 537) - to illustrate her claim, and to establish its
objectivity. She also constructs carers as responsible for motivating sufferers to take
an active part in getting better. With her repetition of the imperative - "you've got to
sometimes you've just got to be a wee bit cruel say "oh come on" and you know and
push them" (lines 538-542; emphasis added), Emma constructs this as a necessary
response. By characterising it as "a wee bit cruel" she orients to the negative identity
implications that might arise for the carer. That carers have to motivate sufferers even
when they are aware that this might be perceived as cruel further suggests that this
course of action is not avoidable.
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We have seen that carers construct stroke sufferers as solely responsible, and also
lacking in motivation to get better. In the last two extracts of this section, Iwill show
that sufferers orient to being held accountable for any lack of recovery.
Extract 9:10 FGDS2
392 Eric: and they do use this this term t- time time to give it time
393 give it time .hh and nobody knows how long it could be
394 (.) eh I can remember () my doctor saying (.) that if it
395 happens earlier than one year then fine if it's the year
396 then fine and here we are almost at two years (.) and the
397 fight still goes on yeah so it go- can go on for a while
398 but even from the the very first night I've been taken in
399 the in the ambulance .hh they didn't make it clear to me
400 that (.) part of the problem was a starvation of oxygen to
401 the brain you know with a clot (.) and so this .h they (.)
402 gave me this oxygen mask they said () "breathe that" I
403 said "just () take it away I don't want it" you know (.)
404 and nobody said "but you've got to have it because" (.)
405 you know
In extract 9:10 Eric constructs healthcare professionals' role in recovery as limited.
He achieves this by referring to the ways in which healthcare professionals have
spoken about recovery. These references describe a laissez-faire approach: "they do
use this term t- time time to give it time give it time" (lines 392-393); "if it happens
earlier than one year then fine it it's the year then fine" (lines 394-396). Here, an 'it'
that happens also suggests a lack of agency (Wooffitt, 1992). The repeated phrase
"give it time" further implies a passive approach to recovery. This can be contrasted
with Eric's claim "and the fight still goes on" (lines 396-397). Here, he uses the
metaphor of combat, which has been discussed previously, to suggest that his own
response is active.
These contrasting constructions provide an interpretative context for the next part of
this extract. Here, Eric talks about the night he had his stroke. In his narrative, he
works to counter any potential accusations that he might be in some way responsible
for his lack of recovery. His refusal to take oxygen is treated as accountable. He
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justifies it by referring to the lack of adequate explanation from ambulance staff: "they
didn't make it clear to me"; "nobody said "but you've got to have it because"" (lines
399-404).
In the next extract, an internet correspondent constructs himself as accountable for his
lack of recovery:
Extract 9:11 DSIPCp8 Tim
1 I felt
2 very sorry for my self which was the last thing you should do!
3 Isuppose the best thing you can do Is listen to the docters , they
4 can give you advice on the the right things to do.but also try to
5 come to terms with whats happend and get on with the physo as
6 soon as you can dont do what Idid and belive it would all come
7 back on it,s own with no help thats a big mistake as I have
8 found to my regret get on and work hard at trying to get back
9 the most movement you can early ok.
In extract 9:11, Tim describes his own response to stroke as passive and follows this
with an assessment that constructs this in negative terms - for example, "I felt very
sorry for my self which was the last thing you should do!" (lines 1-2). Similarly, in
lines 6-7, he writes "dont do what Idid and belive it would all come back on it,s own
with no help thats a big mistake." Here, he constructs himself as personally
accountable for his lack of recovery. This can be contrasted with the advice that Tim
would give to someone who has just had a stroke at a young age: "get on with the
physo as soon as you can"; "get on and work hard at trying to get back the most
movement you can early ok" (lines 5-6 and 8-9). He refers to physically active
behaviours, and makes relevant the fact that these should be performed from the start.
By contrasting these with his own unsuccessful response, Tim constructs an active
approach to recovery as preferable.
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3, Internet participants' avoidance pf accountability
In the last two extracts of this chapter, internet participants construct themselves as
active in the process of their recovery:
Extract 9:12 DSIPCp9 Barry
5 When I finally realised what had happened, and the long road to
6 recovery that was ahead, I told myself that I had to recover if I
7 wanted to do all the things I so enjoyed before. I knew that by
8 taking things one day at a time, try as hard as I could during
9 rehab and set myself achievable goals, I would recover - maybe
10 to to the physical standard I was before, but I am mentally and
11 emotionally better off for the experience. That might sound
12 odd, but its true!!
Extract 9:13 DSIPCp6 Colin
3 All I would say is don't
4 listen to people you tell you won't be able to do something as
5 because anyone who speaks to like that probably have only seen
6 stroke in the elderly and if you're young and determined you
7 can achieve what you want. For me a pessimistic surgeon who
8 said I would never walk again drove me on to walking around
9 after 3-4 months. I would certainly use that as an example
10 whilst giving advise. That along with the fact I made it to
11 university 12 months after my stroke
In extract 9:12, Barry uses the vocabulary of volition and effort to construct his
recovery from stroke as something within his control: "I knew that by taking things
one day at a time, try as hard as I could during rehab and setmyself achievable goals,
I would recover" (lines 7-9; emphasis added). Thus, he constructs his response as
active and his recovery as a result of his own efforts. It also provides an inferential
context for what follows, which is an assessment of his progress. Here, he constructs
his recovery as not just to his pre-stroke level but as an improvement on this: "I am
mentally and emotionally better off for the experience" (lines 10-11). We can infer,
then, that Barry can take full credit for this state of affairs.
In extract 9:13, we can see a similar formulation. Colin also constructs recovery as
something that is influenced by the sufferer's efforts "if you're young and determined
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you can achieve what you want" (lines 6-7). This provides an inferential context for
what follows. Here, he provides an account to establish his successful progress:
"[f]or me a pessimistic surgeon who said I would never walk again drove me on to
walking around after 3-4 months" (lines 7-10). This constructs his recovery not just
as due to his determination, but as beyond what might have been expected. He does
this by referring to the views of a skilled clinician, who would normally be warranted
with knowledge about the likelihood of recovery. He makes relevant the extent of his
recovery again in lines 10-11: "I made it to university 12 months after my stroke." It
is notable that in both of these extracts, participants who claim recovery is attributable
to their strength ofwill also construct their recovery as extremely successful.
4. Summary
Stroke sufferers in this study used the metaphor of combat to construct themselves as
active in their response to stroke. They also oriented to issues of accountability
potentially arising from failure to make a consistently good recovery. They did this by
constructing their lack of agency when recovery was not good, and by attending to the
negative identity implications associated with the possible charge that they are
unmotivated. That recovery is an accountable issue can be seen in carers'
constructions. In this study, they constructed stroke sufferers not as lacking in agency
but rather as solely responsible for recovery from their stroke, and also as
unmotivated. Internet participants managed to avoid accountability by constructing
themselves as both active and successful in their recovery.
5. Discussion
The traditional view in psychological theory that some coping strategies are better than
others has been used to study the ways in which people manage stroke. However,
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findings have been inconsistent Finset & Andersson (2000), for example, report that
avoidant coping is associated with depression in stroke sufferers. Kremer & Quednau
(2000b), however, suggest that problem-focused coping has negative implications.
Such apparent anomalies can be understood if we examine this from a social
constructionist perspective, in which talk about recovery is expected to vary with local
context and according to the discursive actions being performed at the time. In this
study, for example, participants who had suffered stroke constructed their role in
recovery as active at times, and as passive at other times. This can work to deal with
accountability issues. On the one hand, if stroke sufferers construct themselves as
passive, then they can avoid accountability for recovery, but their situation is one in
which there is no hope of making a personal impact on their condition. This might
make the outlook seem very bleak indeed. On the other hand, when sufferers
construct themselves as active in the recovery process, then there is always the
potential charge that they are accountable for the extent to which they fail to get better.
This has identity implications, which can be seen in stroke sufferers' orientation to
construct a self that is active and motivated. Those participants who were able to claim
credit for their personal effort in getting better also made the point that their recovery
was complete, and so avoid such a charge. It may be relevant that these participants
were both internet correspondents, who were not directing their comments to a
number of differently-affected stroke sufferers and carers, which was the case for
those in the focus groups.
We can see, then, that accountability for coping is related to issues of identity. Similar
findings were discussed in the analysis ofME sufferers' accounts of coping. It was
also found that coping and identity are influenced by the construction of the illness
itself. Thus, ME sufferers oriented to the negative identity implications of
malingering. In the case of stroke sufferers, it has been shown that there is little
medical treatment available, and the focus is instead on rehabilitation, in which the
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sufferer plays a key role. This study has shown that stroke sufferers' participation in




This study aimed to explore the experiences of people with two types of chronic
illness - ME and stroke at a young age. It focused on three areas: the ways in which
sufferers defined their illness, the effects it has on their identity and the ways in which
they cope. A discourse analytic approach was adopted, in which it is assumed that
illness, identity and coping are an ongoing achievement performed in interaction.
Focus group discussions and email correspondence were analysed to see how this is
done.
This final chapter begins with a summary of findings. Three themes emerged from the
analyses produced in this research. The first is that participants who had ME and
those who had suffered stroke oriented to issues of accountability for being unwell
and for the ways in which they coped with being unwell. The second relates to the
identity work that participants did to maintain a positive self. The third theme
concerns the extent to which illness construction, identity and coping are
interconnected. I will discuss these themes in turn. This will be followed by a brief
comparison of the two methods of data gathering - face-to-face focus groups and
internet. The focus of the chapter will then move to an evaluation of findings, and a
discussion of potential theoretical and practical applications before a final, brief
summary.
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1. Summary of findings
1:1 Accountability
A recurring theme in this research is the extent to which participants oriented to issues
of accountability for becoming ill, for the extent to which their incapacity was due to
illness, and for the success with which they coped. Participants with ME constructed
this illness as enigmatic and were thus able to counter the potential charge that they had
done something to bring about their symptoms. A similar orientation was seen in
stroke participants' constructions of their stroke as unpredictable. That is, if their
stroke could not have been foreseen, then there is nothing they could have done to
prevent its occurrence, and they could not be held to blame. A feature of focus group
sessions with stroke sufferers was that carers were present, and it was possible to
carry out further analysis of interactions between carers and sufferers to examine the
issue of accountability in context. This was done in chapter 5. It was shown here that
participants did orient to such accountability. In their interactions, carers did hold
sufferers accountable for their condition, and they constructed stroke sufferers' prior
behaviour as a precipitating factor.
Respondents with ME and who had suffered stroke also oriented to the potential
charge that their inability to perform activities might be attributable to laziness.
Constructions ofME as serious and not psychological worked to suggest that
incapacity resulted from the illness itself, and not indolence or psychological weakness
on the part of the sufferer. Participants who had suffered stroke oriented to the
potential charge of laziness, and carers who were present did at times construct stroke
sufferers in this way.
Both groups of participants provided accounts designed to counter claims that they
were not motivated to get better. People with ME also had sensitively to negotiate the
implications of resting as a response to their illness, in that this might suggest a lack of
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effort. Stroke sufferers carefully managed the task of constructing their role in
recovery as active at times and passive at others, depending on the level at which
improvements had been made. Issues relating to accountability for recovery were
particularly salient in focus groups in which carers participated. The importance of
carers' response to stroke can be seen in the literature. As already noted, it has been
assumed by many that damage to a specific area of the brain can predict impairment.
Manzo and colleagues (1995) have, however, suggested that the stroke sufferer's
relationship with his or her carer can have a significant effect on the sufferer's capacity
to communicate effectively. We can, therefore, see an orientation to participants'
accountability for both ME and stroke. A comparison between data collected in
different ways suggests that this was particularly evident in face-to-face interactions.
Implications are raised for research.
Wemight infer from these findings that the person with a chronic condition may well,
at times, have to account for any incapacity caused by illness, in a context in which his
or her complaint is perceived as poorly understood by non-sufferers. There may also
be issues of accountability for becoming ill in the first place. Furthermore,
people who suffer chronic illness may be held accountable for the ways in which they
cope. This study suggests that coping - or being deemed to cope - is an interactional
achievement that is skilfully worked up and managed by participants.
1:2 Identity work
Analysis showed that respondents with ME worked to maintain a positive identity
when talking or writing about the ways in which they had been affected by their
illness. In particular, they worked up a pre-illness identity that was active and
sociable. This allowed them to counter the possible charge that they were lazy and
unmotivated, an identity that is problematic when the key symptom of this illness is
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unexplained and enduring fatigue. By constructing their approach to ME as a process
of rational enquiry, and accounting for the methods they had tried, participants also
constructed themselves as active, motivated and rational managers of their condition.
That they did this suggests that there are implications for identity in the ways in which
people cope with ME. We saw some evidence for this in their constructions of others'
unsympathetic response to sufferers' need to rest The question of how much illness
had changed identity was sensitively managed to attend to identity implications of
either being overly negative, or profiting from being ill. A "balanced' account of the
effects ofME was designed to construct the sufferer as a 'better person' despite the
negative physical impact of this condition.
Participants who had suffered stroke also carefully managed the way they constructed
its effects on identity, particularly in focus group sessions made up of both sufferers
and carers. Stroke sufferers in this study constructed others' response to their
condition as stigmatising
Both groups of sufferers, then, oriented to the problematic nature of identity that
stemmed from their accountability for becoming ill, and for their inactivity. We might,
therefore, infer that these issues may be relevant to other people with chronic illness.
This study suggests that the issue of change is something that has to be carefully
managed so that the effects of illness are acknowledged while at the same time any
negative identity implications that may arise from having a chronic condition are
avoided.
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1:3 The interconnectedness of illness construction, identity and coping
In the course of analysis, it became apparent that illness constructions, sufferers'
identity work and accounts of coping were not phenomena that could be easily
separated. Thus, with ME, the illness construction of serious and not psychological
works to counter possible claims that it is not a physical illness. The ME sufferer's
identity is constructed as active and hard-working pre-ME, and this orients to possible
doubts about the nature of this condition. Such identity work can also help to defend
against accusations of malingering. Resting as an appropriate coping response is
carefully worked up to attend to identity issues that are especially relevant when the
illness is of uncertain status.
For people with stroke, one of the key issues identified in the literature is that there is
no medical treatment. Stroke sufferers in this research designed their accounts of
coping to orient to the potential claim (at times made explicit by carers) that they were
not motivated or working hard enough to get better.
One interesting difference between the constructions of stroke and ME sufferers is that
people who had had a stroke constructed themselves as tired or unmotivated after it,
rather than incapable of certain activities. In their case, this worked to help maintain a
somewhat positive identity. That is, to claim a lack of energy may, at times, be
preferable to claiming a lack of ability. This strategy is a useful one when the sufferer
is largely responsible for recovering physical functioning. Participants with ME,
however, oriented to the possibility that their illness might be construed as laziness, as
a psychological complaint, or in some way associated with depression. They
therefore emphasised their physical incapacities and in their case this worked to
maintain a positive identity. Thus, we can see that illness constructions can influence
the kinds of identity work and accountability that arise for sufferers.
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2. Comparison - focus group and internet data
A review of the literature relating to computer-mediated communication (CMC)
suggests that it may constrain or enable different interactional practices, and that its
effects will vary according to the context. Furthermore, although it usually takes the
written form, it can nevertheless be said to display oral qualities.
There were two areas in which the mode of communication appeared to be significant
in this thesis. The first relates to the social context of internet as opposed to focus
group discussions. The second concerns the application of analytic methods in textual
and oral communication. I will discuss these in turn.
A potentially significant difference between email and focus group responses is that
other people may or may not be present in the interactions. Participants responding in
focus groups were able collaboratively to work up accounts, to produce and resist
constructions of their illness, its effects on identity and ways in which they coped.
They did this in an immediate context that included other people suffering from the
same illness. Most of the ME email correspondence was done via a chatline in which
responses were available to other members of this particular group. Thus, most of the
ME data were provided in a context of some level of social interaction.
The situation was different, however, in the case of people who had suffered stroke.
On the one hand, focus group responses were given in the presence not just of other
sufferers but also of carers, who also took part in the focus group sessions. On the
other hand, stroke sufferers' email correspondence was more likely to be on a one-to-
one basis. Thus, we can see potentially more significant context effects in the stroke
sufferers' data than in those collected from people with ME.
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It is indeed in the analysis of the stroke sufferers' responses that important differences
were noted between the two methods of data collection. For example, stroke sufferers
who responded via the internet gave more vivid accounts of what it is like to have this
condition than those taking part in focus group discussions. Stroke sufferers who
participated in focus groups were shown to be held directly accountable, in the course
of the sessions, for having had a stroke, for distinguishing the effects of stroke from
laziness, and for their role in recovery. While internet correspondents did orient to
such issues, they were able to avoid accountability in a way that focus group
participants could not. This may be because their claims were not open to direct and
immediate challenge by carers. Furthermore, there was no orientation to the sensitive
task of responding in a group in which sufferers' disabilities and levels of recovery
were mixed. For example, when participants in focus groups were asked about the
effects of stroke on identity, the notion of change was sensitively managed to
acknowledge the effects of stroke while attending to issues of self-presentation.
Internet correspondents constructed change in positive terms, as an active response to
stroke. When focus group participants were asked questions related to coping with
stroke, they oriented to the problems involved in constructing an association between
active effort and recovery. Internet correspondents who claimed unexpectedly high
recovery levels were also able to take personal credit for the ways in which they
managed their condition.
Although the ME data offered less of a contrast between levels of social presence,
there was still an observable difference between data collected via the internet and in
the course of focus groups. When describing their condition, for example, internet
chatline correspondents - whose responses to me were simultaneously emailed to other
members of the group - used both the first person singular and the first person plural.
Focus group participants only used the first person plural, and indeed appeared
actively to avoid the use of T. It may be that 'you' provided a more general
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assessment for which the speaker is less personally accountable, and that this is an
issue for people who are in the physical presence of other sufferers. Another
observation is similar to that found in the responses of people who had had a stroke.
When asked to describe the effects of their illness on them as people, it was only via
the internet thatME sufferers spoke in terms of any kind of positive impact
These findings suggest that the ways in which people talk, or write, about their illness
is affected by the social context in which they are approached. Some effects may
relate to the physical presence of other people - otherwise, there would have been no
demonstrable difference between ME focus group and internet chadine
communications. Analysis suggests that the presence of other people may have
influenced the extent to which participants oriented to issues of accountability.
The second category of difference between email and focus group correspondence
relates to the oral/written distinction. Focus group responses to my questions could be
analysed on a turn-by-turn basis, so that analytic findings could be verified by looking
at participants' own uptake ofwhat was said, and indeed this was often the initial
starting point for analysis. Email correspondence was largely one-to-one; although
much of the ME data were collected on a chatline, this was not done 'real time'. While
participants knew that their responses would be available to all of the people on the
mailing list, the dialogues that ensued tended to be around other subjects (discussed in
the 70 or so emails a day that were posted) and were not therefore relevant to this
research.
While oral dialogue can be examined for such things as hesitancy, repairs, changes in
intonation and overlaps, written communication cannot. For example, when
examining stroke sufferers' response to my question about what it is like having had a
stroke at a young age, it was clear from pauses and hesitancy in the focus group
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transcripts that providing an answer was in some ways problematic. However, the
same conclusion was reached in my analysis of internet communication by means of
respondents' direct claims about the suitability of their answers.
Some rhetorical devices were equally observable in email correspondence and focus
group conversations. These included listing, extreme case formulations (Pomerantz,
1986), narrative accounts, vivid description, use of analogy and metaphor,
appearance/reality formulations (Potter & Wetherell, 1989), contrast structures
(Widdicombe &Wooffitt, 1995), active voicing (Wooffitt, 1992), reference to
'reliable witness' (Potter, 1996; Sacks, 1974; Sacks, 1979), and 'before and after'
formulations.
Finally, some features ofwritten responses were unique to that form of
communication. For example, I noted the use of parentheses to introduce and draw
attention to a claim (that stroke was not predictable and therefore potentially not
preventable by the sufferer). In addition, line breaks were used to emphasise contrast
structures and to delineate lists. Thus, we can see that internet communication can be
modified to allow forms of expression that might otherwise be communicated, for
example, by pauses or changes in intonation.
Data collected via the internet could, then, be analysed for many of the same devices
and formulations as those collected in face-to-face discussions. An interesting feature
is that emails have a different interactional context from face-to-face communication.
The writer may correspond privately, on a one-to-one basis, or in a forum in which
other people have access to everything that is written. Nettleton & Burrows (2003)
note that social policy in the UK is currently directed towards the provision of internet
facilities to a greater number of people, but that we do not yet know the impact this
will have on issues such as communication and the dissemination of knowledge.
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Other writers have also called for more research into the differences between face-to-
face and written, delayed internet communication (Lamerichs & Molder, 2003;
Sneijder & te Molder, 2004).
3, Evaluation Qf findings
This research has taken a social constructionist perspective, and adopted the
methodology of discourse analysis to examine illness from the point of view of people
with ME and people who have had stroke at a young age. Constructions of illness, its
effects on identity and ways of coping have been explored. To date, most of the
research into these conditions has been from the medical or the traditional
psychological perspective. I have argued that these approaches are limited by their
essentialist assumptions about the nature of illness, of identity and of the ways in
which people cope. The aim of a discourse analytic approach is to give priority to
participants' concerns as far as possible in order to broaden our understanding of how
it is that people account for different aspects of their illness in the course of social
interaction.
There is very little published research into either stroke or ME which takes a social
constructionist perspective. In the general stroke literature, only one paper used a
social constructionist (conversation analytic) perspective, exploring stroke sufferers'
interactions in the home environment (Manzo, Blonder & Bums, 1995). In ME, only
the work of Bland (1995), Horton-Salway (1998; 2001a; 2001b; 2004) and Tucker
(2004) take a discourse analytic perspective. Bland's and Horton-Salway's (1998)
studies are unpublished theses. Therefore, while they can be consulted in an academic
library, they are not publicly available. Bland analyses interviews with 10 ME
sufferers for descriptions of their illness. Horton-Salway analyses clinical case
definitions of CFS and GPs' accounts of this condition, as well as one illness
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narrative constructed by a sufferer and her husband. The same illness narrative is
analysed in a later paper (Horton-Salway, 2001b), and in a book chapter, in which she
also uses GPs' accounts ofME to illustrate the ways in which meaning is worked up
in interaction (Horton-Salway, 2001a). In her most recent paper (Horton-Salway,
2004), she analyses data collected from one ME support group meeting and from an
interview with a group member, in order to see how expertise and experience are
locally produced in interaction. Tucker (2004) takes four illness narratives and
analyses them to see how participants manage blame and accountability.
Thus, this study is unique in providing an insight into sufferers' own accounts ofME
and early stroke, the effects it has on their identity and the ways in which they cope. It
has taken their accounts as the focus of interest and has given a voice to groups of
people who are not well represented in the literature. The use of discourse analytic
techniques enabled an exploration of how it is that accounts are interactionally
managed and the strategies that are used to defend or resist claims about the nature of
illness, identity and coping.
Analysis showed that there were three key themes running through both the ME and
stroke data. First, people in each group of sufferers oriented to accountability for the
onset of their condition, and for its effects. Both ME and stroke participants oriented
to the possibility that non-sufferers might not understand their illness. Second,
identity in both groups was constructed as problematic, and discourse relating to
change was, accordingly, sensitively managed. People with ME and people who had
suffered stroke oriented to their accountability for the ways in which they coped with
illness. Third, the interconnectedness between illness construction, identity and
coping has been demonstrated. These common themes suggest that similar issues
might arise for other people with chronic conditions, and that the findings of this study
might potentially have a wider relevance.
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Some of the analytic findings were specific to ME. It was constructed as a physical,
and not a psychological or a psychiatric complaint. Sufferers' identity work and
discourses of illness management oriented to this aspect of the illness construction,
and therefore emphasised participants' physical incapacities, their pre-illness activity,
and their current mental well-being. Discourse analysis allowed an exploration not
just of how this was done, but also why it might be done. That is, the function of
constructions was examined in context, and analysis went beyond the linguistic
content of what was said or written. This provided the basis for a complex account of
illness constructions and their possible relationship to current clinical definitions and
treatments. The uncertain status ofME as a physical illness is significant in the ways
in which sufferers construct their identity. This finding might be of some relevance to
the study of other conditions whose cause is not clear, for example, 'GulfWar
syndrome'.
An evaluation of findings must consider not only their place among other work, but
also the question of validity. Wetherell, Taylor & Yates (2001) have noted that claims
relating to validity should address issues such as logical coherence, the generation of
novel perspectives and findings, plausibility and grounding in previous research. I
will therefore consider each of these aspects in relation to this study. To begin with, I
would argue that the finer detail of analysis is related to the broader analytic
conclusions, and that these provide a coherent and logical account of the experience of
ME and of stroke. I have noted above that this study adopts a novel perspective and
an approach to the study of these conditions, and given this, the findings themselves
are of interest. Extracts on which my analysis is based are reproduced in full in the
body of the study, and are therefore open to critical examination for the plausibility of
its findings. Finally, this study has examined theoretical, methodological and
empirical literature in an effort to provide a context in which findings are located and
judged.
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4. Implications for theory
There are a number of theoretical implications arising from this study, and these are
related to two aspects of the ways in which the person with chronic illness is
conceptualised. First, we should consider the extent to which the experience of illness
can be understood when the individual is viewed as an independent, cognitive entity.
Second, we should consider the traditional categorisations of the mind and body. I
will discuss these in turn.
4:1 The individual as an independent, cognitive entity
The traditional, cognitive approach to psychology assumes that the individual has,
organised within the brain, schemas relating to the nature of illness, specifically its
identity, causes, consequences, time-line and potential to be controlled. When a
person becomes ill, he or she refers to such schemas, then adopts a coping strategy
based upon them. Personality traits have been linked to the propensity to become ill in
the first place, and to the type of coping style that is employed. There are obvious
moral implications, then, for the person who is chronically ill. This study shows that
people with ME and people who have had stroke at an early age do orient in interaction
to the kinds of accountability that arise from having these conditions.
Theorists have suggested that the terminology of illness should reflect its effects on the
individual, and on his or her relationships with others (Bury, 1988; Bury, 1991;
Kleinman, 1988; Radley, 1994). This brings social factors to the fore. However,
there is still an assumption that these effects can usefully be separated into the denoted
categories. This research suggests that when people construct their illness, they do so
in the context of their potential accountability to others. It is not, then, a simple matter
to separate the 'individual' effects from the social. Thus, ME and stroke were not
defined in accordance with cognitive schemas; rather, their constructions can be seen
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as performative and therefore liable to change according to the local context. From the
perspective adopted, such variability is a feature of all talk. I have shown, for
example, that the clinical definitions of both stroke and ME have changed over time.
ME is particularly interesting because its meaning has been openly contested. This
study suggests that participants construct ME, their identity as people with this
condition, and the ways in which they cope precisely to counter potential claims that
the origin of their fatigue is not physical, and that there may be some association with
depression. Such claims can be seen as responses to the ways in which ME has been
clinically defined. The traditional approach to sufferers' accounts is simply to take
them at face value. Thus, when people with ME have stressed their previously active
lifestyle, this has been used to support the theory that a perfectionist personality has
brought about, or at the least exacerbated, their condition. Their avoidance of activity
has been attributed to a faulty belief system. Thus, not only is the medical account
privileged, it may play some role in the ways in which this illness has been
constructed by sufferers and non-sufferers alike. This suggests that researchers,
academics and clinicians should be aware of the possibility of reification of their
theories, and of the likely implications. From the perspective taken in this study, what
becomes important is not discovering the 'truth' of the matter, but allowing different
accounts to be heard, and offering some interpretation of the processes at work. This
should be done in the spirit of an ongoing debate in which people who are most
affected are given a voice.
4;2 Categorisations of mind and bQdy
Historically, the mind and body in chronic illness have been studied in the separate
disciplines of psychology/psychiatry and medicine, and this had led to theories in
which the two are somewhat dissociated. The biopsychosocial model represents an
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attempt to adopt a more integrated approach in which the medical perspective is
combined with the psychological and the social. I have argued above that
categorisations of the individual and social effects of illness on the sufferer are not a
simple reflection of the ways in which illness is experienced. Similarly, while the
biopsychosocial model does attempt to be inclusive, it still treats the different elements
as distinct Furthermore, the clinical perspective is often privileged (Radley, 1994;
Turner, 1992). Salmon & Hall note that "medical debate often disguises as scientific
decisions ones that are morally or culturally determined" (Salmon & Hall, 2003: 21).
From the perspective of this study, the medical account is, like any other, constructed.
We have seen that research and clinical definitions ofME and stroke have both
changed over time. Furthermore, the current state of knowledge about each of these
conditions has been questioned.
This study suggests that to treat the effects of illness as separately affecting the mind
and body can be problematic for people who suffer from each of the conditions
discussed. This in turn suggests that the issue might be important for the ways in
which we conceptualise chronic illness in general. For those with ME, the
construction of their condition in terms of cognitive dysfunction locates responsibility
for illness with the sufferer. That this construction might influence the ways in which
sufferers experience their illness has been largely ignored. Similarly, the medical
emphasis on functional rehabilitation in stroke casts the sufferer in an active role. This
study suggests that such a position has to be sensitively managed, that functional
incapacity can be accountable, and that sufferers' experience of the effects of stroke
are wide-ranging.
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5. Implications for practice
There has been some debate about the extent to which the findings of discourse
analytic research can be applied in practice. Willig (1999) has noted three ways in
which this might be done - as social critique, for empowerment and as a guide to
reform. An exposition of the ways in which racism is worked up and managed in
everyday talk could, for example, be offered up as a critique of social practices.
People in less privileged groups might be empowered by the provision of a counter-
discourse, or some knowledge of the kinds of discursive skills they might deploy in
resistance. However, both social critique and empowerment strategies can be
theoretically problematic from the perspective of this study. That is, there is an
underlying assumption in this research that knowledge about the world can only be
relative, and it is not therefore possible to suggest that one version of events is more
accurate than another. It has been argued, though, that as social actors in the world,
researchers can take a moral stand by supporting particular constructions (Shotter,
1992). In this study, I have shown that sufferers' constructions ofME and stroke and
their effects have been given little attention in the research and I would argue that they
therefore merit closer attention.
This leads us on to the possibility of using discourse analytic techniques to empower
certain groups. We must then consider the extent to which the researcher can be seen
as separate from the process of social construction. That is, the results of research
might offer alternative perspectives, but they might also contribute to the production of
a different set of disempowering discourses. Willig (ibid) provides as an example the
ways in which the promotion of a discourse of pre-menstrual syndrome might be used
to provide an account for episodes of violence, but then becomes available to
medicalise women's behaviour in general. Thus, while it is important to examine
sufferers' constructions of their illness and how it affects them, it is equally important
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that analytic conclusions should not be viewed as a once-and-for-all representation of
sufferers' experience.
The third way in which discourse analytic research can be applied in practice is as a
guide to reform. There are two strategies that are relevant here. The first is that
discourse analysis can provide a space for telling versions of events that are not
normally heard. The second is that it can be used to encourage people to reflect on the
discourses that they and others use.
With the above points in mind, I will now consider the possible practical applications
of the findings of this study. Harper (1999) proposes the concept of 'usefulness' as a
guide for assessing discourse analytic findings. This is not restricted to the
development of novel technologies, but also encompasses the idea that research might
lead to a richer understanding and to socially desirable outcomes. Iwill therefore end
this section with a discussion of the ways in which this study might be useful, in these
terms, to the following groups - sufferers, healthcare professionals and carers.
People with ME might benefit from having some awareness of the possible impact of
their illness constructions on others. If, for example, their intention is to stress the
serious, physical nature of their condition, it might be useful to know that accounts in
which previous activities and current symptoms are listed can in fact work to suggest
that their illness might be self-inflicted and stem from some kind of cognitive
dysfunction. This information might be of particular practical value to sufferers who
need to provide a valid case for access to Disability Living Allowance. Hammond
(2002) demonstrates the particular problems that arise here for people with ME.
Biilow & Hyddn's (2003) discussion of an ME patient school suggests that a key
benefit is that it facilitates participants' 'discursive management' of their condition. By
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being exposed to others' views of their illness, patients were in a better position to
deal with 'meanings at risk'.
People who have suffered stroke at a young age might be interested to see how the
medical account of illness is privileged and that they can deploy this as an effective
way of dealing with their accountability. In general, then, if sufferers have some
insight into the kinds of processes at work then they can strategically use them to their
advantage in problematic interactions.
Healthcare professionals might benefit from an awareness of their part in the
construction of illness. For example, some insight into the ways in which sufferers'
constructions ofME might have been influenced by medical definitions might
encourage practitioners to be more reflective in their interactions with sufferers.
Listening not only for the content of what is said, but also its possible function, might
lead to a situation in which the patients and clinicians are not diametrically opposed.
This could open up the possibility of a more productive level of communication, and
more successful management of illness. Similarly, ifmore account were taken of
stroke sufferers' concerns, which go beyond the ability to perform functional tasks,
this would result in a better level of care for these people.
Carers might benefit from having some understanding of the importance of non-
sufferers' interactions - that is, not just their own - in the ways in which illness is
constructed and made accountable. This may help carers to gain some understanding
of the experiences of the people they are looking after, and make it easier to empathise.
Some insight into the notion of social construction might help carers to see how people
are ill in a social context, and that carers themselves manage that situation in a social
context This may help to diffuse notions of accountability and blame.
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6. Summary
This study has examined constructions of illness, its effects on identity and ways of
coping in people with ME and those who have had stroke at a young age. The
findings of this study have important implications for research into these conditions,
and in particular point up some of the issues that might stem from the source of data
gathered. They also suggest areas of interest for the study of chronic illnesses in
general. Furthermore, this research has the potential to be of practical use to
sufferers, healthcare professionals, and carers.
It is crucial to pay attention to the accounts of people who suffer chronic illness. In
the case ofME, diagnosis is made, and treatment has been developed, on the basis of
what the sufferer says about his or her illness. In the case of stroke, the importance of
exploring illness from the sufferers' perspective has been noted by the World Health
Organisation (1995), which also stated that management should in future be focused
on priorities of those who have experienced stroke. This research has provided a
valuable and rare insight into the ways in which people with ME, and people who
have suffered stroke, make sense of their illness.
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APPENDIX I
Schedule of questions put to all respondents, with variations according to the illness:
1. How would you describe having ME to someone who doesn't know anything
about it?
How would you describe your situation - having had a stroke at a young age -
to someone who doesn't know anything about it?
2. In what ways would you say that having ME has affected you as a person?
In what ways would you say that having had a stroke has affected you as a
person?
3. What advice would you give to someone who has just developed symptoms of
ME?
What advice would you give to someone who has just suffered a stroke at a
young age?
4. Can you describe how you dealt with your condition when you first knew
about it?
(same question for bothME and stroke)




6. What were your reactions when you were diagnosed as suffering from ME?
(ME only)
7. Before your diagnosis, how did you feel?
(ME only)
8. How have the people around you reacted to your condition? That is, family,
friends, work colleagues.
(same questionfor both ME and stroke)
9. How do you feel about the way medical people treat you?
(same questionsfor both ME and stroke)
10. Do you think things would be different if your condition had been caused by
something other than ME?
Do you think things would be different if your condition had been caused by
something other than a stroke?
11. How do you feel about having had a stroke at such a young age?
(stroke only)
12. Do you have any ideas about how it is that people get ME?
Do you have any ideas about how it is that people get strokes at a young age?
13. What kinds of things help when you are not feeling well?




Extracts are labelled according to their source, as follows:
FG = Focus Group
ICC = Internet Chatline Communication (emailed to all members of the web-
based support group)
IPC = Internet Personal Communication (emailed one-to-one)
Internet communications were pasted and copied in the format received, so that
spelling and punctuation were preserved as in the original.
Focus group sessions were transcribed using the notation below. Carers' names were
in italics, and the researcher's name was underlined.
[ A left hand bracket indicates the point at which overlapping speech
begins
] A right hand bracket indicates the point at which overlapping speech
ends
= An equals sign indicates that one turn follows another with no gap
() A space surrounded by brackets indicates a short silence
(.) A dot in brackets indicates a 1-second silence6
(..) Two dots in brackets indicate a 2-second silence
6Timing was estimated using an informal beat count as an approximate measure; this is one of the
methods recommended by ten Have [ ten Have, 1999 #618]
260
(...) Three dots in brackets indicate a 3-second silence
(4) Numbers in brackets indicates seconds of silence equal to the number
noted; this is done to draw attention to longer silences, and for ease of
reading
underlining is used to show emphasis
"speech" Quotation marks are used to denote 'active voicing' (Wooffitt, 1992)
CAPITALS are used to mark an increase in volume
We:ll A colon is used to indicate the extension of sound of the vowel directly
preceding it; the more colons used, the greater the extension
? A question mark denotes rising intonation
Wha- A hyphen indicates an abrupt stop
hh The 'h' is used to indicate an outbreath, with each additional 'h'
denoting longer length of outbreath
.hh The 'h' preceded by a full stop indicates an inbreath, with each
additional 'h' denoting longer length of inbreath
[... ] This indicates that some text has been omitted
[comments] Transcriber's comments are in square brackets
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